Written by: Sarkis Sargisyan Arazovic (Lead Researcher at the Black Sea-Caspian Region Institute named after V.B. Artsruni)
The leap year 2024 can be described as a difficult year for the South Caucasus region, marked by strong tendencies of Armenia distancing itself from Russia. At the same time, we can confidently state that the hopes of certain circles in Russia that Baku would replace Yerevan as a regional partner have proven futile. This became evident after the incident involving the plane en route to Grozny. On the first Tuesday of the new year, the President of Azerbaijan gave an interview to the republic’s leading media outlets, highlighting several crucial nuances.
IN THE SHADOW OF TRAGEDY
First and foremost, in the wake of the tragedy in the skies above Grozny and Aktau, there has been—if not a full-blown crisis in Moscow-Baku relations—then certainly a serious test of those relations. In such situations, it is difficult to imagine any head of state maintaining emotional restraint (especially when civilian casualties are involved rather than military personnel). However, the Azerbaijani leader did not opt for diplomatic de-escalation of the situation. Instead, he publicly voiced—and even intensified—all of his country’s grievances against Russia. This occurred even after the leadership of the Russian Federation had issued an apology. In reality, Baku is striving to assert its unique role in its relationship with Moscow and emphasize its importance on all levels—not just within a bilateral framework. On January 6, the President of Azerbaijan held a meeting with the relatives of the passengers who perished in the crash of the Embraer AZAL Airlines plane near Aktau. Aliyev then launched a new wave of accusations against Russia, demanding that those responsible be punished and calling for “humane behavior.” His rhetoric clearly exceeded the boundaries of diplomatic decorum, yet this does not indicate a lapse in memory. Rather, it suggests that Aliyev is playing a far more calculated game than what might be considered acceptable.
THE PLAN: DEMILITARIZATION OF ARMENIA
The year 2024 did not bring the signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And in the new year, Baku is not so much seeking a formal legal document on peace as it is demanding the complete and final demilitarization of Armenia.
“It is no secret that a new world order is being formed. I believe we are at the beginning of this process, and many fractures are appearing—and will continue to appear,” Aliyev stated, leaving journalists to decipher the implications of his remark through their questions. The essence of his message is that power is asserting itself in global affairs, and Baku possesses the resources to advance its interests. In this context, the strategic closeness between Turkey and Azerbaijan deserves special attention. When neighboring Armenia is repeatedly labeled a “fascist state” in these discussions, it inevitably raises urgent and alarming questions about future scenarios.
What is also clear is that Baku has no intention of seeking permission—from either Russia or the West—to carry out its plans.
ERDOGAN’S BETRAYAL
Regarding Turkey, it is now completely clear that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken advantage of the situation. Over the years, he failed to fulfill agreements with Russia regarding the withdrawal of militants from Syrian territory but retained control over them, preventing the implementation of an active action plan. The agreements between Russia and Turkey concerning the Syrian conflict have been violated. Ankara had committed to disarming militants in Idlib, where they were, in fact, concentrated in anticipation of strikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces. This issue could have been resolved quickly several years ago. However, Erdogan convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin that he could influence the situation. Russian philosopher and pro-government political analyst Alexander Dugin touched upon events in Syria and, in that context, made accusations against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
“Syria was a trap for Erdogan. He made a strategic mistake. He betrayed Russia, he betrayed Iran. He is condemned to death. The end of Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey has begun. Kemalists, we have supported you until now. From now on, you will regret it,” Dugin wrote.
THE SYRIAN LESSON
It is worth noting that Dugin has long been regarded in Russian analytical circles as one of the most pro-Turkish and pro-Erdogan experts. He has repeatedly stated that “Erdogan is the best choice for Russia.” Until recently, Azerbaijani lobbyists in Russia were proclaiming everywhere that Azerbaijan was a friend of Russia—more than that, a reliable and worry-free ally. After Ilham Aliyev gave an interview to Dmitry Kiselyov, many Russian commentators began expressing enthusiasm: Look at this anti-Western stance! It seems that Erdogan’s and Syria’s example should serve as a lesson. Meanwhile, in his conversation with Kiselyov, Aliyev complimented Trump.
He reiterated this in his national media agenda: “Trump has made very clear and open statements. At the time when Washington was trapped in the ‘Greater Middle East’ policy, White House representatives repeatedly referred to Azerbaijan as the ‘Muslim ally’ of the United States. This is impressive.”
Ilham Aliyev further stated: “… there are hopes, and they are significant, including the possibility of bringing U.S.-Azerbaijani relations to a strategic level.” And this comes from Russia’s “reliable ally.” We must understand that the pride of Azerbaijan’s president has been wounded. It should also be noted that the controversy surrounding the Armenian government’s plan to associate with the European Union had not yet subsided when new developments emerged from Washington. In the U.S. capital, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed the Strategic Partnership Charter.
The reactions to this event have varied widely. On the one hand, the signing of the document is being presented as a clear signal (and symbol) of Yerevan’s distancing from Moscow. On the other hand, doubts are being raised about the effectiveness of the Charter.
SLEEP MODE
After all, on the American side, the Charter was signed by a representative of an administration that was forced to cede its positions to a new guard—one that has grown tired of waiting and is eager to implement its vision of a brave new world order, led by America, which they plan to restore to its former greatness! If you carefully analyze the text of the Charter, it becomes clear that it is largely declarative. The document outlines “expanding cooperation in areas such as the economy, security, defense, democracy, inclusion, and people-to-people contacts.” Many of these points are already being implemented, and many are ideologically driven. “Inclusivity” or “people-to-people contacts,” considering the nearly two million-strong Armenian diaspora in the United States, has long been secured. At the same time, the mention of strengthening defense and security cooperation is a phrase worth paying attention to—despite its declarative nature and the lack of any concrete security guarantees from the U.S. for Armenia. It is a kind of “sleep mode”—a clause that can either be filled with substance or left in a state of dormancy.
NO FINAL CHOICE
Experts point out that the United States is not offering Armenia any security guarantees and that Yerevan agreed to sign the strategic partnership document just before the anticipated arrival of a new U.S. administration under Donald Trump. In their view, this raises questions about the document’s long-term viability, despite the fact that Nikol Pashinyan’s rise to power in Armenia in May 2018 occurred during Trump’s presidency and had Washington’s backing. According to a forecast by the American private intelligence and analysis firm Stratfor, by 2025, Armenia could find itself without U.S. support, as the Trump administration is expected to prioritize ties with Azerbaijan. One thing is clear: Neither Moscow in the past nor Washington (nor Brussels) today or tomorrow will make a complete and final choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 2025 Charter will not alienate the U.S. from Turkey. On the contrary, the U.S. will actively nurture Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation and will especially support Ankara during its disputes with Moscow—an inexpensive way to push Russia out of Eurasia. Accordingly, the anticipated breakthrough for Yerevan with U.S. assistance may never materialize.
LOOK AT GEORGIA
Today in Armenia, both politicians and social activists keep repeating one thought: Russia is not an effective guarantor, Moscow has failed, it did not help. Even if we accept these arguments 100 percent, a logical question arises regarding Georgia. On January 9, it was exactly 16 years since the United States signed a strategic charter with Georgia. And what? The Americans themselves in 2024 “froze” the agreement with Georgia.
The motive? A revision of Tbilisi’s foreign policy. But wasn’t this because the strategic charter of the United States, first of all, was primarily instrumental in nature, and secondly, contained more declarations than practically useful things? But both the West and Russia, both in the past and now, are forced to maneuver between the interests of the Turkish tandem and Armenia and weigh all the conflicts that arise. The Armenian government has submitted to parliament a draft law “On the Beginning of Accession to the European Union.” But one should not rush to final judgments. If nothing else, then because in politics nothing is given or predetermined once and for all. Look at neighboring Georgia. And it is not about Tbilisi moving towards Moscow and Beijing.
The pace of European integration is slow, in fact, we see a “freezing” of Georgia’s European integration dynamics. It can be assumed that a possible “Ukrainian stalemate” or a de-escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, and the significance of Ukraine for “united Europe” will sharply decline, while the number of claims about its unreformability and corruption will increase. Moreover, Nikol Pashinyan noted that the adoption of the law “does not mean Armenia’s membership in the European Union in the literal sense of the word.”
INTENSIVE EUROPEANIZATION
There are obvious reasons for such a conclusion. Currently, the republic is a member of the EAEU, but unlike the CSTO, Yerevan does not have significant complaints about this structure. However, EU membership implies the rejection of Eurasian integration, which benefits Armenia if it is dissatisfied with the security guarantees of its traditional allies. In this context, the EU representative for foreign and security policy, Kaja Kallas, stated that the mandate of the Civilian Mission in Armenia (EUMA) on the border with Azerbaijan should be extended for another two years. But is its work truly that effective? What real guarantees does it provide? There are more questions than answers. So far, we see that Armenia’s intensive “Europeanization” is causing clear dissatisfaction in Moscow, but it does not free Yerevan from the pressure of the “Turkish tandem,” nor does it provide tangible socio-economic benefits that already exist “here and now.”
WITHIN THE EAEU FRAMEWORK
It should be noted that official Yerevan is clearly signaling that the bridges of the Russian-Armenian strategic alliance have not been burned, but unresolved issues are hindering its implementation. Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan, at a press conference on January 15, responding to a question about the CSTO, stated that Yerevan is interested in maintaining high-level cooperation with Moscow. But when we talk about the CSTO, when we refer to the events of 2022 and then look ahead to 2025, can we say that everything is going very well… We have issues that are of an objective nature, and these objective issues must be addressed within the framework of a rational discussion, and the depth and level of our future cooperation will depend on that.
Is our position to not remain under the umbrella of the CSTO objective and balanced? I think it is confirmed daily that as long as our CSTO partners do not change their stance, our position is legitimate and based on Armenia’s interests.
He added that every day confirms that, although the partners in the Organization have not changed their stance, Armenia’s position will stem from that, and it will be based on Armenia’s interests. Official Yerevan is interested in maintaining high-level relations with Moscow. However, the minister continued, when discussing the CSTO and the events of 2020, objective questions arise that require answers based on rational discussions, and the depth of relations depends on that.
FROM DIPLOMATIC TO “DIRTY LAUNDRY” STATUS
The minister emphasized that Yerevan has not canceled any bilateral cooperation documents with Moscow. “We have not even officially withdrawn from the CSTO, but in reality, we do not participate in that organization, and we are not to blame for the fact that the CSTO is no longer present in Armenia. However, I must point out that when we talk about bilateral cooperation, it must be balanced and based on mutual respect,” Papikyan said. Responding to a question about whether there are prerequisites for this, the minister stated that prerequisites are not one-sided and cannot be determined through a television program but must be based on sound reasoning. The minister alluded to the broadcast of Kiselyov’s program “News of the Week” on January 12, which discussed the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan, its exclave—the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (separated from the main territory of Azerbaijan by Armenia)—and Turkey. The TV host called the establishment of this route “vital” for Baku and pointed out that Yerevan is ignoring Azerbaijan’s demand to open the Zangezur corridor. Yerevan has repeatedly stated that it has not taken on any obligations regarding the construction of the Zangezur corridor, and this remains indisputable.
In the same broadcast, Kiselyov stated that Armenia would lose its “greenhouse conditions” by leaving the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), reminding viewers of Russian gas prices. Why and by whose will Armenian-Russian relations have moved out of diplomatic corridors and acquired the status of “dirty laundry,” and who is responsible for this, is difficult to determine.
YEREVAN-BAKU-TEHRAN-MOSCOW
It should be recalled that Yerevan insists that problems with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will persist as long as the organization refuses to recognize Armenia’s international borders.
Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan outlined the way to resolve the issues with the CSTO: “We expect the CSTO to recognize its zone of responsibility in our region: Armenia’s borders are 29.8 thousand square kilometers. These are the borders that exist with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, and Georgia. As long as the CSTO does not recognize these borders, this issue remains open.” It is worth noting that on January 17, a trial began in Azerbaijan for a group of political leaders from the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, who were arrested in September 2023. On the morning of the same day, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Moscow. As a result of his negotiations with Vladimir Putin, a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed. The increasing rapprochement between Russia and Iran is of great interest. However, it is important to understand not only what the agreement contains but also what it does not include. The agreement involves mutual defense cooperation, commitments not to assist third parties in case of their aggressive actions against Moscow and Tehran, as well as various separatist movements. A crucial provision is Article 12, which focuses on “preventing external forces from interfering in the Caspian region, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East.” However, the signed document does not imply the formation of a military-political alliance. I am confident that both of these events will significantly influence the further development of the situation in the South Caucasus in the near future, and we will return to them.
