At the end of December 2024, media outlets reported that Albanian authorities in Lipljan, within the local assembly, unanimously supported the initiative of Enis Kervan, a representative of the Turkish community in the Assembly of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, to grant the Turkish language the status of a language in official use in this municipality.
In this regard, it is important to note that the Law on the Use of Languages of the so-called Republic of Kosovo distinguishes between an official language and a language in official use. The status of an official language across the entire territory of the so-called Republic of Kosovo has been granted to Albanian and Serbian. In certain municipalities, this status can be granted to a minority language if that minority constitutes at least 5% of the total population of the municipality. A language in official use can be designated within specific municipalities if it is a traditional language in that area or if more than 3% of the municipality’s population speaks it. The status of a language in official use primarily includes the right of individuals to receive official documents and administrative records in that language upon individual request.
LACK OF CENSUS BASIS
The Turkish language holds the status of an official language in the municipalities of Mamuša and Prizren. However, in the case of Prizren, an exception was made to the rule that this status can only be granted to a minority constituting at least 5% of the total municipal population, which the Turkish minority does not meet in Prizren. Turkish has also been granted the status of a language in official use, justified by claims of its traditional presence, in the so-called Kosovo municipalities of North and South Mitrovica, Vučitrn, Priština, Gnjilane, and Lipljan.
However, such a status for Turkish cannot be substantiated by the most recent census data (2024), which indicates that the total number of Turks in the so-called Republic of Kosovo is only 1.21%. Furthermore, while the Turkish language was traditionally present in some parts of Metohija in the recent past, it was never historically widespread in Kosovo. The region from Kosovska Mitrovica to Lipljan, as well as Kosovo Pomoravlje, was not traditionally Turkish-speaking but was, until recently, an area where Serbs were a relative majority.
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NEO-OTTOMANISM
Granting Turkish the status of a language in official use in these municipalities is directly linked to Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the territory of Kosovo, which was violently separated from Serbia. In this context, references to history and tradition serve both as a means of legitimizing these interests and as a way to disguise them. Turkey’s activities and ambitions across the entire Balkan Peninsula, including Kosovo and Metohija, can only be understood within the framework of Neo-Ottomanism. According to Darko Tanasković, one of Serbia’s leading Orientalists, Neo-Ottomanism is:
“A complex macro-ideological platform according to which modern Turkey, as the legitimate civilizational heir of the Ottoman Empire, should reaffirm the entire spiritual, cultural, and political legacy of the Ottoman state. The goal is to secure and effectively play a role as one of the globally significant international actors in the ongoing redistribution of world power and influence.”
— (D. Tanasković, Neo-Ottomanism: Doctrine and Foreign Policy Practice, Belgrade, 2010).
A TRUSTED PARTNER, BUT NEVER A SUBSERVIENT FOLLOWER
Darko Tanasković emphasizes that “Neo-Ottoman foreign policy is perhaps just the most visible horizon of a complex matrix that is simultaneously spiritual, ideological, cultural, economic, and political.” Building upon the principles of the “Strategic Depth” doctrine, formulated in 2009 by then-Turkish Foreign Minister and university professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, contemporary Neo-Ottomanism prioritizes the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans as regional focal points. These are territories that were, at some point in history, under Ottoman rule.
Tanasković highlights a critical characteristic of modern Neo-Ottoman Turkey’s engagement in these priority regions:
“It is important to understand that Turkey, even when its actions align with the strategic projections of a great power in a given region, primarily acts with the intent of realizing its own interests. If these interests can fit into a broader favorable scenario, all the better; if not, Turkey does not hesitate to diverge from the plans of major powers. This has been demonstrated multiple times over the past decade, especially in the Middle East. Turkey may serve as a regional trustee for someone, but never as an unconditional follower.”
REDEFINING THE BALKANS
For Neo-Ottomanists, the Balkans are seen as historic ground where the roots of Turkish Europeanness are embedded. Some even regard Ottoman Rumelia—rather than distant Asia or Anatolia—as the true cradle of Turkish civilizational identity. From this Neo-Ottoman perspective, Turkey’s main strategic allies in the Balkan Peninsula are Albanians and Bosniaks. As Tanasković puts it:
“The Yugoslav crisis, conflicts in the former Yugoslav territories, and the ultimate disintegration of the federation created favorable conditions for the expansion of Neo-Ottoman Turkish policies—both within the framework of international community interventions and independently.”
The relationship between Turkey and the so-called Republic of Kosovo reflects all key characteristics of Neo-Ottoman foreign policy and doctrine described by Tanasković. If the Balkans are one of three strategic regions for Turkey under the Neo-Ottoman framework, then Kosovo and Metohija, as the ‘Heart of the Balkans’ and its ‘Geopolitical Knot’ (Stepić), hold immense—perhaps the most crucial—significance for Turkey’s Balkan policy.
TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SO-CALLED KOSOVO
It is no surprise that Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the so-called Republic of Kosovo, doing so on March 18, 2008, immediately after its unilateral declaration of independence. The significance of Kosovo in Turkish foreign policy is further demonstrated by the fact that Turkey was the first country to open a consulate in Kosovo, establishing one in Prizren in 2015. In 2013, Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the so-called Republic of Kosovo, though it was only ratified in 2019. As of 2023, Turkey has become the sixth-largest investor in Kosovo’s economy, with a total investment of €429 million, primarily in electric power, transport infrastructure, and facilities for the 2030 Mediterranean Games in Priština. Turkey’s economic influence in Kosovo becomes even more significant when considering that Kosovo and Albania function as a single economic space. Furthermore, according to Albania’s central bank (Bank of Albania) data from September 2024, Turkey is the largest foreign direct investor in Albania, with investments totaling €1.22 billion.
EXPULSION OF GÜLENISTS
The 2018 conflict between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülenist movement exposed the extent of Turkey’s influence within Kosovo’s Albanian political elite. According to reports by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Priština, in 2018, Turkish nationals affiliated with the Hizmet movement, who were working in Kosovo’s educational institutions linked to the movement, were forcibly deported from the so-called Republic of Kosovo. What made this incident particularly controversial was that the president, prime minister, and the speaker of the Kosovo assembly were unaware of the deportation order. As a result, then-Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj dismissed the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. Haradinaj’s actions can also be partly explained by his close ties with official Washington, which had a different stance on the Turkish crackdown on Gülenists.
TAKING COMMAND OVER KFOR
Since Albin Kurti came to power, relations between the so-called Republic of Kosovo and Turkey have become particularly intense, especially in the field of security. A key moment in the security cooperation between Turkish and Albanian separatist authorities was Turkey’s assumption of command over KFOR in 2023. This was part of NATO’s broader plans, under which Turkey also took over the command of several other NATO joint operations in 2024. Turkey’s role within NATO can only be properly understood by considering the fact that it possesses the second-largest standing army within the Western alliance, with a total of 800,000 active soldiers and officers, along with an additional 379,000 reservists. Within KFOR, the Turkish contingent is the second-largest in terms of personnel.
THE COST OF BAYRAKTAR DRONES – A STATE SECRET
According to reports from Nordic Monitor, the so-called Republic of Kosovo purchased Turkish Bayraktar drones in the summer of 2023. However, information regarding the number of drones acquired and their cost has been classified as a state secret. Military cooperation between the separatist authorities in Priština and Ankara entered a new, more intensive phase after the signing of the Framework Military Agreement between Turkey and the so-called Republic of Kosovo on January 29, 2024. In May of the same year, both the ruling coalition and the opposition in the Kosovo Assembly voted in favor of ratifying this agreement. The agreement laid the groundwork for deepening military cooperation, which includes, among other aspects, the sale of Turkish weapons to Kosovo, joint military exercises, expanded training programs for members of the so-called Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), intelligence collaboration, and cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian operations.
KBS, TURKEY, AZERBAIJAN
Under the framework of this agreement, Turkey organized special training sessions for the so-called Kosovo Security Forces (KBS) in October and December 2024. These sessions focused on the use of American light artillery weapons and border unit training from December 4 to 13. Furthermore, KBS is scheduled to participate in early 2025 in the Winter EX joint military exercise between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which is part of the military cooperation between these two members of the Organization of Turkic States. The exercise will take place in Kars, a Turkish city near the Armenian border.
In August 2024, Turkey donated 1 million US dollars to the so-called Republic of Kosovo to support the equipping of the Kosovo Security Forces. At the beginning of October 2024, the Pristina authorities, specifically KBS Commander General-Lieutenant Jashari, hosted the Turkish Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. Their discussions focused on deepening military cooperation. On October 23, another meeting took place in Istanbul between the defense ministers of Turkey and the so-called Republic of Kosovo. This meeting occurred within the framework of the SAHA international defense industry fair, the largest industrial cluster in Europe, consisting of 1,200 companies and 29 universities. During the event, the defense ministers of Turkey and the so-called Republic of Kosovo signed a protocol on military-medical cooperation.
AGREEMENT LEADING TO A MUNITIONS FACTORY
At the end of December last year, the government of the so-called Republic of Kosovo signed an agreement with the Turkish defense company MKE to establish a munitions factory in Kosovo. According to official announcements, this factory will produce ammunition for weapons used by the Kosovo Security Forces (KBS) as well as for infantry weapons used by NATO member states. The factory is planned to be organized as a public enterprise, and its products will be branded under the so-called Kosovo label. The so-called Kosovo Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci, stated during the signing of the agreement that the location of the factory would not be disclosed for security reasons. At that time, it was also announced that a drone design laboratory would be established in Kosovo, though the investment for this project would come from a different country rather than Turkey. The intensive defense cooperation between the so-called Republic of Kosovo and Turkey is certainly linked to the plans of the Pristina separatist authorities to transform KBS into a fully operational military force by 2028. According to reports from Radio Free Europe, this military force is expected to have a total of 7,500 active and reserve personnel. These plans are also reflected in the increased defense budget for 2025, which is 54 million euros higher than in the previous year. The total allocation for military expenditures in 2025 amounts to 207.8 million euros.
RETURN TO THE BALKAN REGION
Granting the Turkish language the status of a language in official use in Kosovo’s cities, where there is no significant Turkish minority, but which are located along the strategic road and railway corridor connecting Kosovska Mitrovica, Priština, and Lipljan with Skopje, may be linked to future Turkish direct investments in the economy of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, including its defense industry. Such a move could indicate that investments in the construction of massive residential and commercial complexes in the largely depopulated Kosovo, particularly in the small town of Lipljan, are not only linked to money laundering from drug trafficking, as noted in an earlier interview by renowned political analyst Stevan Gajić, but also to a planned Neo-Ottoman economic and military return of Turkey to the Balkan region.
