In the “Bosnian pot,” everything is always mixed together — complex, tangled, and simmering. In today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina — a country for which at least twenty different “nicknames” circulate, many of them pejorative but nonetheless quite fitting — the situation is no different at the close of 2025.
NO IDLE MOMENT IN THE “DAYTON CONSTRUCT”
The “impossible state” has, in this period, been shaken by several controversial developments — Dodik’s mysterious deal with Washington, the thirtieth anniversary of “Dayton,” the anachronistic celebration by “political Sarajevo” of the 82nd anniversary of ZAVNOBiH, and the scandalous decision by the BiH Minister of Defense “from the Bosniak quota” to deny landing permission at the Banja Luka airport to the plane of Hungary’s foreign minister…
A particularly strong storm was triggered by Schmidt’s message after the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) session in early December, stating that there would be no more imposed decisions by the High Representative or his Office (OHR). Does this “smell” like the trimming down — or even the abolition — of that body, as the first sign of an American concession to Dodik (read: to Republika Srpska)? For the record, since 1995 the High Representatives, largely exceeding their mandate, have passed 166 laws and 900 decisions, stripping Republika Srpska of 83 competencies and transferring them to the BiH level in support of Muslim/Bosniak unitarist ambitions.
Speculation suggests that Schmidt would retain his “viceroy” prerogatives only “in matters concerning the establishment of state property.” Is that a small thing? Hardly — it is decisive. If it comes true, it will be for Republika Srpska the embodiment of Njegoš’s famous line: “No one ever drank a cup of honey that was not tinged with a cup of gall!”
A HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY GLASS
All of this was overshadowed, however, by the early presidential elections in Republika Srpska — triggered by the stripping of mandate from its previously legally and legitimately elected president for failing to comply with the decisions of the High Representative (who is not, in fact, a legitimate High Representative). It is evidently part of a “package” whose unwrapping will show what lies inside, and whether this “investment” yields the intended “profit” (and for whom) — in other words, whether it represents an act of “saving one’s own skin” or “sacrificing a piece to win the match.”
In any case, after a short campaign and modest voter turnout, the candidate of the ruling SNSD — “Dodik’s man” — Siniša Karan, won. According to unofficial preliminary data from the Central Election Commission (CEC) of BiH, he secured around ten thousand votes more, with a slight advantage of just over two percentage points (50.41 to 48.23 percent) ahead of the opposition SDS candidate, Branko Blanuša. For Republika Srpska, it is undoubtedly positive that both contenders can be seen as respectable figures — both PhDs and university professors.
Expected post-election reactions followed.
The losing side claimed fraud and demanded a repeat of the vote in several key municipalities, cities, and polling stations. On the other hand, they could be satisfied with the narrow margin and their convincing victories by several thousand votes in the two largest urban centers.
The ruling camp emphasized that “Republika Srpska had won,” and Dodik himself declared that opponents at the international and BiH level, as well as within Republika Srpska, now have “two Dodiks instead of one.” Nevertheless, they are aware that there is no room for triumphalism — the new president faces numerous inherited and upcoming challenges, and the ruling party has shown significant weaknesses. Moreover, the year 2026 brings new electoral trials.
INTERNAL ELECTORAL–GEOPOLITICAL CONFIGURATION
Despite the Central Election Commission’s “order” to conduct control recounts at several polling stations — and despite confirmed irregularities — the final outcome will not change in any meaningful way. Of the 64 municipalities and cities in Republika Srpska, Siniša Karan won in 43, while his opponent Branko Blanuša prevailed in only 21 — twice fewer. In an administrative-territorial sense, therefore, the victory of the SNSD candidate appears significantly more convincing. This fact reveals much — but hides just as much.
Even a cursory look at the electoral map of Republika Srpska reveals certain spatial patterns; a deeper analysis uncovers distinct endo-geopolitical implications. Given the earlier ideological-political landscape and historical legacies, we are now witnessing a highly indicative reversal. In the eastern “wing” of Republika Srpska — long considered a traditional bastion of right-wing, even pro-Chetnik sentiment and once a stronghold of the SDS — Siniša Karan, the standard-bearer of the left-leaning SNSD, achieved an overwhelming victory, winning in 21 municipalities.
There were only a few exceptions — regionally significant and symbolically telling — where the SDS retained dominance and where Branko Blanuša came out ahead: in the Sava–Drina–Majevica “triangle,” that is, in the Semberija–Majevica municipalities of Ugljevik, Lopare, and the city of Bijeljina; in the small municipality of Osmaci, located in the delicate, vulnerable Kozluk narrowing; in the East Sarajevo municipalities of Pale, East Ilidža, and East Stari Grad; and in three East Herzegovina municipalities — Gacko, Ljubinje, and Berkovići.
In the “Corridor,” the very “umbilical cord” of Republika Srpska, electoral preferences were split. SNSD’s Siniša Karan won in its eastern segment, in the small remainder-municipalities of Pelagićevo and Donji Žabar. He also secured victory in the geopolitically and geostrategically crucial Brčko District — an area intentionally designed to divide Republika Srpska and prevent any future self-determination, and which, through biased and deceptive post-Dayton arbitration, was granted condominium status. His rival, SDS’s Branko Blanuša, prevailed in the western part of the “Corridor,” securing wins in Vukosavlje and Modriča, and in Šamac — a port at the confluence of the Bosna into the Sava, squeezed between the Orašje and Odžak fragments of the predominantly Croat Posavina Canton of the Federation of BiH.
In the western part of Republika Srpska, spatially speaking, the victory indeed went to the “second Dodik.” However — and this is the second major reversal — in the traditionally partisan and left-leaning Krajina region, long considered the unquestionable electoral “base” of the SNSD, a significant political breakthrough was made by the conditionally “right-wing” SDS through Blanuša’s success. He won in eight municipalities and cities, particularly in the large and populous ones — Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Teslić.
Special attention is drawn to Karan’s painful defeat, that is, Blanuša’s dominant triumph in Banja Luka — the capital of Republika Srpska, which carries not only electoral but considerable geopolitical “specific weight.” Of more than 193,000 registered voters, over 74,000 cast ballots in this election; the SDS candidate won with an impressive margin — more than 14,000 votes and nearly 20 percentage points (59.01% vs. 39.67%).
A similar yet slightly less dramatic situation occurred in Bijeljina — also a geopolitically crucial city that represents the “hinge” between the eastern and western parts of Republika Srpska — where Blanuša prevailed by almost 3,000 votes and by 7.4 percentage points.
Blanuša — meaning, the SDS — also won, albeit by only a handful of votes, in the “historic capital” of Republika Srpska: Pale.
It is clear that Republika Srpska will face an intense political year ahead, full of challenges for all parties as the 2026 election cycle approaches. This is precisely what the “first Dodik” hinted at — without any post-election triumphalism.
