The Kosovo War, whose grim anniversary we mark on March 24, represented a geopolitical turning point. Twenty-five years ago, NATO’s military aggression against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which violated international law, deeply alienated the Russian political elite and the Russian people from the West. At the time, even some Russian liberals—alongside the entire political spectrum in Russia—condemned the Kosovo War, labeling it the beginning of a new Cold War.1
A PRECEDENT IN RUSSIA’S HANDS
The Kosovo War marked the beginning of Russia’s gradual geopolitical pivot towards China and BRICS, moving away from Atlantism, NATO, and the EU. Above all, through the war in Kosovo, NATO set a precedent that Russia would later invoke in its war against Ukraine, also in violation of international law. Some experts I spoke with suggested that, without the Kosovo War, Putin might not have risen to power, or his policies toward the West might have taken a different course.
For NATO, the Kosovo War was its first operation beyond territorial boundaries, paving the way toward a “global NATO.” It was no longer about national and collective defense but about the global projection of (American) interests.
In various ways, the United States and Germany played a significant, perhaps even decisive, role in shaping policies toward the Balkans and in the initial stages of the war, which, for the first time in Europe since 1945, forcibly shifted borders, disregarded the United Nations and international law, and failed to balance the right to self-determination with the right to territorial integrity, instead making the former absolute.2
So, what are the geopolitical interests of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in the Balkans, particularly in Serbia, and what role did they play in the Kosovo War? This paper examines that question, which is significant not only from the perspective of contemporary history but also for understanding current policies—especially in the context of the war in Ukraine.
THE BALKANS – A BRIDGE OR A WALL
The Balkans serve as either a bridge or a wall between Europe and the Orient, Europe and Central Asia, and Europe and the Islamic arc of instability.
From an American perspective, this arc of instability—which for the U.S. Marine Corps includes the Balkans—is characterized by abundant oil and gas reserves (three-quarters of the world’s total), political instability, Islamic extremism, and high population growth. Additionally, there is the risk of the proliferation of NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons.3
Serbia is the heart of the Balkans. The shortest route between Europe and Central Asia passes through Serbia—via the Morava-Vardar Valley. Belgrade serves as the gateway to Central Europe.4

Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defense from December 19, 1988, to April 1, 1992. and Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from July 1994 to July 2000, attended a conference jointly organized in 2000 by the U.S. State Department and the American Enterprise Institute, which is closely associated with the Republicans.5
High-ranking participants at this conference—including future U.S. Undersecretaries in the State Department—did not mince words when discussing U.S. geopolitical interests in the Balkans. The goal was to establish control over the Balkans through the deployment of ground troops, a demand that was unacceptable to the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to any sovereign state. This entailed the stationing of foreign armed forces across the territory, with immunity for all criminal offenses committed by NATO personnel—precisely the reason why the Rambouillet negotiations failed. Even General Eisenhower could not have achieved such a demand during World War II. Control for what?
BALTIC-ODESSA-ANATOLIA
“Strangely, Americans see themselves as the heirs of Rome (…) We Americans view the Atlantic as our Mediterranean (…) and Europe as our opposite shore. Hence, the idea of drawing a line from the Baltic Sea through Saint Petersburg, across the Baltic states to Odessa on the Black Sea, from Odessa to Istanbul, and then to Anatolia. Everything east of that line—to paraphrase—is not of our interest; everything belongs to us. The goal must be unrestricted access west of that Baltic-Odessa-Anatolia line to establish a continuous land corridor on our territory (NATO, author’s note) between Anatolia and Poland.”6 Thus, the Balkans is an area of interest for the United States, as depicted by the U.S. Marine Corps on its geostrategic map of the (Islamic) world.
GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BALKANS AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE
From the above, we can draw the following geopolitical conclusions:
In the Balkans, the interests of the U.S. as a maritime power clash with those of Russia as a land power. Russia expands from east to west, while the U.S. moves from north to south. As an Atlantic power, controlling the opposite Eurasian shore (particularly coastal states) is essential for the U.S. For Russia, as a Eurasian land power, controlling its own strategic periphery (potential launch points on the East European Plain) is also of vital national interest.
Specifically, this is about either controlling the periphery of Eurasia or removing it from the sphere of U.S. influence. Militarily, this strategy is referred to in a different context as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).7
A compromise in the war in Ukraine is possible along the Kyiv/Odessa line. Everything east of this line would fall under Russian control, while everything west would be within the sphere of influence of the United States. Ultimately, the U.S. will “Europeanize” the war in Ukraine (“Europe for Europeans,” but in a way different from what the right might interpret). The role of Germany (Central Europe) is evidently not part of the plan.
GERMAN INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS
It was Bismarck who coined the phrase that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. In reality, however, the former Yugoslavia was constructed by the Entente powers, France and Great Britain, to serve as a bulwark against Germany in their containment strategy between the two world wars—just like other states positioned between the German Reich and the Soviet Union. Thus, Germany—much like Austria-Hungary before World War I—had an interest in limiting or obstructing France and Great Britain’s access to Yugoslavia.
This historical continuity remained intact. Unified Germany led the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, participated in UN missions during the Yugoslav wars8, and was one of the strongest supporters of the Kosovo War at the governmental level.9 Meanwhile, French sentiment remained sympathetic to the Serbs (despite France’s participation in the Kosovo War).10
The major difference, however, was that Yugoslavia, this time, did not allow itself to be instrumentalized by France (or other Atlantic powers). On the contrary, Yugoslavia resisted the expansion of American hegemony. During the Kosovo War, the Federal Republic of Germany was marginalized due to U.S. interests, as the American plan clearly did not include an independent German policy toward Central Europe.11
THE ALTERNATIVE IS WORLD WAR III
From the German perspective, the following realistic scenario represents a desirable direction for the future: under President Trump in his second term, the U.S. shifts its focus to China and the Indo-Pacific in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and systemic competition, encouraging Europeans to invest more in their own security. The United States increasingly becomes one of the poles of power in a multipolar world—one of five global powers (the U.S., China, Russia, India, and a strategically positioned European Community as the successor to the EU)—rather than a superpower insisting on its “exclusivity” and “unique historical mission.”
The war in Ukraine concludes with a negotiated ceasefire; discussions begin on a new pan-European security order. Germany expands its influence in Central Europe and the Balkans in collaboration with Russia and Turkey. The Balkans transitions from a zone of constant conflict to a bridge connecting Europe with Central Asia and the Orient.
Nothing is lost yet. Because the alternative is World War III.
(The author served as a Member of the Bundestag from 2017 to 2021, was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Human Rights Committee, and holds a doctorate on the topic of U.S. strategy in the war in Afghanistan, with academic and professional experience in the U.S., Finland, the UK, and Ukraine.)
Footnotes and literature:
- Cf. A. P. Tsygankov: “The Final Triumph of Pax Americana? Western Intervention in Yugoslavia and the Debate in Russia on the Post-Cold War Order.” In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34 (2001), pp. 133–156; here: p. 141. Available online at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X01000083?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=84a8c7dd99a858f6. ↩︎
- Cf. J. Elsässer. “Create One, Two, Three, Many Kosovos! The Uprising of Tribes Against Nations.” In: J. Elsässer (ed.): Never Again a War Without Us. Kosovo and the New German Geopolitics. With a Reluctant Foreword by Joschka Fischer. Hamburg, 1999, pp. 114–129. ↩︎
- Map available at: https://nation.time.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2012/01/screen-shot-2012-01-24-at-2-21-08-pm.png ↩︎
- Cf. D. Dostanić: “Balkan i srpsko pitanje.” In: SEZESSION, no. 110, October 2022, pp. 46–49. Available online at: https://sezession.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Sez110_Dostanic.pdf. ↩︎
- Cf. Official biography of Willy Wimmer on the German Bundestag website. Available online at: https://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2010/0427/bundestag/abgeordnete/bio/W/wimmewi0.html. ↩︎
- Quote by Willy Wimmer
From: “Americans Perceive Themselves as Heirs of Rome.” Strategic Patterns of Conflict in the Balkans. Interview with Willy Wimmer by Blätter. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 9/2001, pp. 1054–1065, here: p. 1057; map below from: https://media.diercke.net/omeda/88794__Europa_Topographie.pdf (red line added by the author). ↩︎ - Compare: A. Dugin: Foundations of Geopolitics. Moscow, 1994. Available online at: https://vector-eurasia.ru/books/Dugin.Geopolitika.pdf. ↩︎
- Compare: K. Thorner: Serbia Must Die. Constants of German Balkan Policy. In: J. Elsässer (editor), Never Again a War Without Us. Kosovo and the New German Geopolitics, pp. 16–24. ↩︎
- This did not pertain to the general population. Only a slim majority supported the war (54 percent). The strongest support for the war came from Green Party voters (72 percent). Even then (not just since the start of the war in Ukraine), the term “olive-green” and the phrase “red-green war pacifists” were justifiably used. ↩︎
- Compare: J. Elsässer: Create One, Two, Three, Many Kosovos! The Uprising of Tribes Against Nations, same work, p. 114. ↩︎
- Compare: J. Elsässer: Germany as an Instigator. From Dayton to Rambouillet to the Berlin Balkan Conference. In: J. Elsässer, Never Again a War Without Us. Kosovo and the New German Geopolitics, pp. 50–62. ↩︎