The so-called Assembly of Kosovo adopted on April 10 of this year the “Resolution on the Protection of Historical Truth about the War in Kosovo 1998–1999,” drafted following an exhibition by Shkelzen Gashi entitled “Massacres in Kosovo 1998–1999.” Among other things, the exhibition presented claims that armed persons of Albanian ethnicity were killed in the Dubrava prison. Pristina reacted immediately, the author was detained, and indictments were filed. This was followed by a reaction from the Humanitarian Law Center, which denied the author’s claims that their report stated the killed Albanians had been armed, asserting instead that they were civilians.
The Resolution, containing 17 points, was adopted expeditiously, and the entire situation was additionally fueled by part of the civil society sector from Pristina and from Serbia, above all the aforementioned non-governmental organization, which is regarded as an unquestionable and indisputably accurate database source.
Some of the points of the Resolution read as follows:
- “EMPHASIZES that it is the responsibility of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo to conduct research and documentation of crimes committed by Serbia during the war in Kosovo. The only confirmed data regarding Serbia’s crimes in Kosovo are the official data of the Institute for Crimes Committed During the War in Kosovo”;
- “ENCOURAGES judicial institutions to continue the initiated work with even greater dedication in investigating and prosecuting war crimes committed by Serbia in Kosovo, including through the recent legal amendments allowing investigations and trials in absentia”;
- “PAYS TRIBUTE with respect to the sublime sacrifice of the Albanian people, all fallen fighters, and all those who in any way contributed and sacrificed themselves for freedom and independence”;
- “CONDEMNS every attempt, official or otherwise, as well as every statement by public officials aimed at absolving Serbia of responsibility for crimes committed during the war in Kosovo.”
JUSTICE IN THE HANDS OF EULEX
Almost an entire decade, from 2012 to 2020, of the work of the so-called Kosovo judicial apparatus passed in relative stagnation when it came to prosecuting alleged war crimes against the Albanian population. During this period, executive powers within the judiciary were entrusted to the EULEX mission, and the number of arrests was sporadic, often limited to isolated cases.
Statistical data obtained through our extensive investigation show that accusations against Serbs were measured in single digits. More precisely, during its executive mandate, EULEX delivered a total of 15 war crimes verdicts. Of those 15 verdicts, 7 concerned defendants of Serbian ethnicity, while 8 concerned defendants of Albanian ethnicity. Sources among defense attorneys representing accused Serbs state that in the period from 2000 to 2019, which includes both the UNMIK and EULEX mandates, only four Serbs were finally convicted of war crimes before international panels.
It is further stated that in 2008 EULEX inherited around 1,200 war crimes cases from UNMIK, while approximately 500 cases were closed or dismissed during the mission’s mandate due to lack of evidence.
The aforementioned data unequivocally demonstrate that, despite the political narrative that dominated for years, there was no continuous or mass criminal prosecution of Serbs for war crimes. On the contrary, the number of prosecuted cases was limited, and a large number of investigations were closed primarily due to lack of evidence. Because real evidence, aside from insinuations originating from the civil sector, simply did not exist. Precisely for that reason, the sudden reversal was a direct consequence of new circumstances and old influence.
SUDDEN TURNAROUND – ARRESTS ARE NO LONGER SPORADIC
Thus, beginning in 2021, a serious shift occurred, and indictments started arriving one after another. The number of arrested Serbs for alleged war crimes began to rise sharply, and by the end of 2023 more than 30 individuals were registered in detention, while by the end of 2024 that number had almost doubled, surpassing an additional 55 detained and convicted persons physically present before the courts. By December 2025, the number of new indictments had increased by another 33. If one adds to this figure the 73 in absentia verdicts confirmed over the last three years, it becomes clear that something significant has changed.
The mandate of EULEX officially ended in December 2018, when it handed over to the local occupation Albanian authorities 434 police files concerning war crimes and more than 1,400 prosecutorial cases that were in various stages—active, dismissed, or completed. However, the campaign of arrests and trials against Serbs began only three years later.
This sudden increase cannot be explained solely by the “more efficient work of institutions.” On the contrary, the timing, coinciding with political and кадровске changes, indicates that this is a coordinated process with far more serious intentions and a dangerous outcome.
But the most important question is: who opened that channel?
According to sources from within the system itself, the answer to that question is not to be found in Pristina, but in Belgrade.
BY ORDER OF ZAGORKA DOLOVAC
Exactly three years later, prominent member of the NGO CEPRIS and prosecutor Radovan Lazić was assigned to Serbia’s War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office by order of Chief Public Prosecutor Zagorka Dolovac. Without any intention of pointing fingers at anyone, it is nevertheless difficult not to notice that from that moment onward the situation within the so-called “Kosovo” prosecution changed fundamentally, and—outside the Constitution and laws of Serbia—an unofficial yet extremely dangerous connection was established through the Humanitarian Law Center between Radovan Lazić and prosecutor Drita Hajdari from the non-existent para-state.
An insider from the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade states that cooperation between the so-called Kosovo prosecution and Serbia’s War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office had begun even earlier, namely that the first contact between Drita Hajdari and Zagorka Dolovac was established at one of the seminars organized by international organizations.
Official meetings between Albania’s Chief Prosecutor and Zagorka Dolovac, however, are no secret, nor is the fact that the Albanian prosecution assisted the so-called Kosovo prosecution in many respects.
The source further claims that Radovan Lazić was deliberately assigned to the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office primarily because of his background, which was not marked by successfully resolved cases but rather by numerous seminars financed by Western sponsors, as well as cooperation and membership in NGOs whose ideological orientation was closer to the interests of Tirana and Sarajevo than to those of Belgrade. According to the source, due to such a profile—and the fact that he allegedly could not advance professionally through expertise alone—Lazić’s main “quality” was obedience and readiness to yield to Western sponsors, above all to the directives of the Chief Prosecutor. Thus, his cooperation with Nataša Kandić, whose NGO the Humanitarian Law Center has for years promoted the thesis that Serbia is a genocidal creation and that the only criminals in the Balkans are exclusively Serbs, posed no problem for him.
If these allegations are true, then this is not merely a matter of the questionable professional biography of a single prosecutor, but of a far more serious issue—the possibility that sensitive information from cases being conducted in Serbia became available in the occupied territories of our country.
WHO WAS FORWARDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION?
The Humanitarian Law Center, founded in the early 1990s, is regarded as a pioneer among NGOs that pursued an openly anti-Serb policy. While columns of refugees were arriving from Croatia and Serbs were dying on the front lines, while Serbian children were being killed, this NGO organized protests accusing the policies of Slobodan Milošević of causing the catastrophe. While bombs were falling on Belgrade and the business of trafficking Serbian organs organized by Albanian terrorists flourished in Kosovo and Metohija, Nataša Kandić, Sonja Biserko, Sonja Licht and numerous other leading figures from this sector sent hundreds of reports on alleged crimes committed by Serbs against “innocent Albanians,” thereby filling the columns of foreign media outlets which in turn used such narratives to justify every form of aggression committed against the Serbian people.
It is difficult to overstate how controversial it is for any state official—and especially a prosecutor from the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office—to cooperate with individuals who, financed by foreign money, engage in anti-Serb propaganda and assist other nations in placing the entire Serbian people into a compromising position on the basis of falsified history and alleged crimes, thereby influencing numerous other political developments. Particularly, as the insider claims, given that cooperation between Nataša Kandić and the so-called Kosovo prosecution and all other institutions in the occupied territories is intensive, and that this NGO in Serbia effectively acts as a representative office of Pristina, while Radovan Lazić simultaneously had access to sensitive cases conducted against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
“He had access to our cases involving suspected KLA members, and we know that he passed that information on. My colleagues did not hand over cases of special importance to those spies; such cases were handled by trusted prosecutors. However, after Zagorka Dolovac decided to relaunch proceedings against Serbs, she allowed Dušan Knežević, Svetlana Nenadić, Radovan Lazić, Bruno Vekarić, and Rabrenović to gain access.”
MEETING WITH DRITA HAJDARI
According to the same source, the shift in policy began as early as 2018, precisely at the time when EULEX was ending its mandate. At that point, the cases were allegedly handed over to the institutions in Pristina, but at the same time an unofficial line of communication with Pristina was established:
“Drita Hajdari was a prosecutor for war crimes. When I was appointed prosecutor, Veljko Odalović suggested that I meet with her, which I refused until consensus had been reached at the top level. Soon afterwards, I saw that the Chief Prosecutor had met with Hajdari in 2018.”
However, the appointment of Radovan Lazić and Svetlana Nenadić in 2021 opened the way for what the source describes as a direct endangerment of state interests. While Lazić worked with Nataša Kandić, Nenadić, under the sponsorship of National Endowment for Democracy (NED), participated in conferences where, according to the source, a dangerous legal qualification was being introduced:
“She, together with Sahović as defense counsel (for Albanians), classifies the criminal offense as incitement to genocide and war crimes, thereby introducing through the back door something that will come back to haunt us…”
These testimonies cast an entirely new light on the fact that arrests of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija intensified precisely at the moment when individuals who openly cooperated with exponents of Pristina’s policy and international NGO power centers were granted access to data within the Serbian judicial system.
NGOs — A REFERENCE POINT IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SERBS
Looking retrospectively at the events, available data, and insider testimonies, it becomes clear that the prosecution of alleged war crimes in Kosovo and Metohija after 2021 no longer followed the same pattern that existed during the mandates of international missions. While under UNMIK and EULEX the number of proceedings was limited and a large number of cases were closed due to lack of evidence, the following years saw a sudden increase in indictments, detentions, and trials in absentia.
At the same time, this shift coincided with the establishment of contacts between certain officeholders within the Serbian prosecution system, representatives of the NGO sector, and prosecutorial structures in Pristina. According to the source, these contacts did not remain at the level of formal meetings during professional events, but over time developed into operational cooperation despite the fact that Serbia’s Constitution does not recognize Pristina’s parallel institutions. This allegedly evolved into a one-sided exchange of data and access to sensitive cases being conducted before Serbian authorities.
What is particularly concerning is the fact that Serbian public prosecutors, by attending conferences organized by NGOs, lend institutional legitimacy to them, while at the same time reports produced by those NGOs—specifically the Humanitarian Law Center, RECOM, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Civic Initiatives, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights and CEPRIS—are used as reference databases and appear as some of the key sources of information in proceedings conducted before the so-called Kosovo institutions.
A ROGUE PROSECUTION SERVICE IN THE SERVICE OF NGOs
In the end, we arrive at a closed circle in which a renegade part of the prosecutorial system no longer acts as a state institution, but rather as an integral part of the NGO sector—which, in essence, it has become—and through institutional mechanisms operates on multiple fronts aimed at undermining the Serbian state.
Precisely for that reason, a detailed request for access to information of public importance was submitted to the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office of Serbia, containing specific questions regarding the number of indictments against Serbs in the period from 2015 to 2025, the possible increase in such proceedings, and the existence of any institutional or informal cooperation with the so-called prosecutors’ offices in Pristina.
The request also sought clarification as to whether the Prosecutor’s Office had been aware of prosecutor Radovan Lazić’s contacts with illegal structures in Pristina, whether there had been any exchange of data and documentation, and whether any internal investigations had ever been conducted regarding allegations of confidential information being removed from the system.
A separate section of the inquiry concerned the role of the NGO sector—specifically, whether the Prosecutor’s Office had analyzed the influence of reports and activities produced by such organizations on criminal proceedings conducted against persons of Serbian nationality, and whether any control mechanisms existed to prevent the unauthorized sharing of data with foreign institutions.
THE EXPECTED RESPONSE
The response we received after nearly two weeks of waiting was entirely expected. Apart from directing us to seek answers regarding the number of cases against Serbs from the so-called prosecution office in Pristina—as though the matter did not concern citizens of Serbia and Serbian territory—the Public Relations Service of the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office of Serbia confirmed that it had indeed been fully aware of Radovan Lazić’s cooperation with civil society organizations.
The response stated:
“The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office was aware of prosecutor Radovan Lazić’s participation in a professional gathering organized by relevant civil society organizations. Specifically, public prosecutor Radovan Lazić took part in the international conference organized by the Humanitarian Law Center entitled ‘Prosecution of War Crimes in the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia – A Twenty-Year Review,’ held from November 28 to 30, 2024, in Belgrade, bearing in mind that this was a professional event of significance for the field of war crimes prosecution and that prosecutor Lazić, through his professional experience and work, contributed to the exchange of knowledge and the improvement of international cooperation.”
Everything else consists of empty phrases that stand in complete contradiction to the facts emerging from the field: the number of arrested Serbs continues to rise day by day, while indictments are increasingly drafted on the basis of “expert” input from the Humanitarian Law Center, CEPRIS and similar foreign-funded organizations whose sole objective, according to critics, is to portray the Serbs as a genocidal people.
And all of this serves as fertile ground for new pressures, new fragmentation of the country, and perhaps even the creation of new identities composed of future former-Serbs seeking to escape what is portrayed as a “genocidal burden.”
