Following the night of the first round of the 2024 Romanian Presidential Elections on the 24th November, Romania – and, indeed, the European continent as a whole – received the shocking news that the independent nationalist candidate, Călin Georgescu, came first in the race with 22.94% of the popular vote, with liberal candidate Elena Lasconi coming in at second with 19.18% of the popular vote.
The unexpected results from this first round of elections have brought into the European political spotlight several questions as to why the Romanian people are now so ideologically divided between hardline nationalism and liberalism. It has been suggested that several recurring issues within Romanian society have served as the primary talking points when elections in general are concerned in the country – government corruption, the separation of church and state, LGBT rights and Romania’s stance on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Respectively, Călin Georgescu and Elena Lasconi have vastly contradictory views on how best to approach and address such issues, and whoever of the two ultimately ends up winning the second round of the elections, which are set to take place on the 8th December, the future of Romania in a world that is changing very rapidly may look very different indeed.
CĂLIN GEORGESCU: THE NATIONALIST
One of the reasons as to why the success of Călin Georgescu came as such a shock to the Romanian public – in the eyes of both his supporters and opponents alike – is that prior to the first round of the elections, Georgescu was a relatively unknown figure in Romanian politics. In fact, so little were his predicted chances at achieving much success in the elections in general, even many of his own supporters and voters predicted that he would barely garner very many votes, and even considered a vote for him as yet another example of a protest vote. Media outlets and political analysts across Europe have also noted that a significant part of Georgescu’s campaigning took place on the popular social media platform TikTok, which, especially in a more traditionalist country like Romania, would otherwise be seen as an unusual method of political campaigning and self-promotion. Georgescu has even been affectionally nicknamed the TikTok Messiah, for his strongly religious campaigning. It has also been suggested that Georgescu’s strong emphasis on populist rhetoric and traditional, patriotic values resonated strongly with demographics who were otherwise disillusioned with the current ruling establishment and government in Romania, which has, since the Romanian Revolution in 1989 and the fall of communism, predominantly been pro-Western in nature, ideologically swinging between the centre-left and centre-right, with little room for outright left-wing and right-wing parties to gain much of a meaningful foothold. The range of voter demographics in support of Georgescu is also very telling, with his supporters ranging from members of the Romanian youth (who are usually more on the liberal or left-wing side of politics), the city-dwelling working class, rural voters and farmers. Such a broad appeal among multiple demographics of the Romanian population – including strong support from the Romanian diaspora abroad – has made Georgescu a favourite in the race for the Romanian presidency, with many polls even putting him ahead of his opponent, the liberal Elena Lasconi.
Georgescu ran his campaign on a platform that explicitly promoted Romanian nationalism, and, as an independent candidate, it can be argued that the lack of restraints that would usually come with running as a candidate as part of a political party has indeed benefited Georgescu and contributed significantly to his current electoral success and popularity. No party restraints and “rules” mean that Georgescu and other independent candidates can run on whatever platform they like, without needing to adhere to any external party policies or regulations that place a limit on what a candidate can or cannot say or do. Such a gloves-off situation and approach from Georgescu has arguably resulted in his mass appeal to the common Romanian man and woman.
Georgescu’s direct attacks against the ruling Romanian Government and coalition, the centrist National Coalition for Romania, have proven to be very popular among both Georgescu’s supporters and opponents who are against the current government. Countless accusations of government and party corruption within the two members of the ruling coalition – the centre-left Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL) – seem to have had a significant and negative effect on the performance of the latter two’s presidential candidates, neither of whom ultimately made it into the second round. It is also very telling that the majority of Romanian voters went for the independent candidate, and not a party affiliate, thus further signifying that the Romanian electorate are finally beginning to grow tired of party politics, and would instead prefer to see an individual running on a platform of his own creation and philosophies, and not on a platform of policies which were pre-determined by party manifestos, which can very quickly become outdated and/or even outright ignored by the winning party candidates. This also brings into the fray the topic of democracy, which Georgescu certainly has some thoughts of his own of, especially when taking into consideration some of his ideological inspirations from history, which shall be touched upon and explored in due course.
Georgescu has also campaigned heavily for the increased role of Christianity in Romania, a country that is overwhelmingly Romanian Orthodox Christian (although 73.6% of Romania identifies as Orthodox Christian, as of the 2021 census, the overall statistics also include the religious views of minority groups). Although Romania is a member state of the European Union, which often reiterates its firm dedication to concepts such as “progressivism”, multiculturalism and state secularism, Romania itself remains very strongly a conservative and traditionalist nation, despite a significant number of its youth veering more towards ideological liberalism and secularism. It is this religious factor which can be considered crucial for Georgescu’s presidential campaign, for a very large number of Romanian voters would arguably prefer to see their state religion continue to play an important part in their national affairs, instead of seeing their long-standing traditionalist and religious society undermined by what many see as a liberal, globalist threat (in this situation, the threat being an Elena Lasconi presidency, in the eyes of Georgescu’s supporters).
The issue of LGBT rights has been a long-standing one within Romanian society for decades. For Georgescu’s presidential campaign, much in the same way as with the issue of the separation of church and state in Romania, the issue of LGBT rights and Georgescu’s stance on the matter also arguably contributed to his electoral success. The strongly conservative and traditionalist nature of Romanian society in general has given Georgescu a crucial opportunity to promote his own strongly conservative and traditionalist platform, arguing that increasing LGBT rights in Romania could potentially damage the socio-cultural fabric of traditional Romanian society and could potentially open the doors to even further rights for other sexual minorities. Due to these factors, Georgescu has been very much open regarding his views that any and all LGBT movements and organisations must be opposed and fought against.
Although much of the Romanian and wider European media report Georgescu as a “pro-Russian” figure, in reality, Georgescu promotes the concept of “Romania first”, and has also advocated for Romanian geopolitical neutrality and non-alignment. This is extremely important when it comes to the future of Romanian foreign policy, for as a member state of both the European Union and NATO – both of which Georgescu is opposed to – if Georgescu were indeed to become the next President of Romania, he could very well seek to take Romania out of both the EU and NATO, which could also include the expulsion of all foreign military forces from Romanian territory and the dismantlement of all of their military bases. Georgescu had also stated that NATO’s ballistic missile defence shield at the Deveselu Military Base in Olt County is a “shame of diplomacy” and a “disgrace”.
Within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the new and emerging multipolar world order, a neutral and non-aligned Romania would have significant ramifications for both the West and the East. On the one hand, a neutral Romania under Georgescu would deprive NATO of a crucial geostrategic location on the Black Sea, and on the other hand, Russia would be able conduct its military campaign in Ukraine without needing to worry about any potential Romanian military intervention via Ukraine’s Odessa region, in the case of any further escalation with NATO that could potentially see NATO forces intervene in Ukraine against Russia. However, it must be remembered that Bulgaria and Turkey are both NATO member states on the Black Sea as well, so even if Romania were to pull out of the alliance, Russia’s ability to manoeuvre its fleet in the Black Sea would still be limited. Although Romania would no longer be a member of the NATO alliance, its status as a neutral state would also still mean that Russia would not be able to legally manoeuvre its fleet in Romanian waters without significant geopolitical repercussions, unless Romania gave Russia explicit permission to do so. Such a move, however, would very likely be unpopular with the Romanian people, given how anti-Russian sentiment in Romania has historically been consistently high.
Although Georgescu is pro-neutrality, this did not stop him from making statements which many have accused of being pro-Russian in nature. For example, Georgescu had previously praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as “a man who loves his country”, and has also said that he was in favour of engaging with Russia in geopolitical dialogue, not challenging and confronting Russia. In his own words, “security comes from dialogue, not confrontation”. Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War in general, Georgescu controversially stated that “the situation in Ukraine is clearly manipulated, with the goal of provoking a conflict destined to financially help the military-industrial complex of [the] USA”.
It is also interesting to note that during an interview in November 2020, Georgescu openly praised two controversial Romanian historical figures – Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, founder of the militant ultranationalist Iron Guard movement, and Ion Antonescu, who was the fascist dictator of Romania during the Second World War, and who aligned Romania with the Axis powers. According to Georgescu, because of the inspiration he felt from these two figures, he himself “lived the national history, [and] through them speaks and spoke the national history, and not through the lackeys of the globalist powers that lead Romania today temporarily…” Georgescu had also previously stated that the Romanian Revolution of 1989 was exploited by the West in order to “steal Romania’s resources”.
Even despite Georgescu’s openly pro-Legionary views, the fact that he can still gain so much support from the Romanian electorate in a country where pro-Legionary sentiment and symbolism is effectively illegal just goes to show just how popular Romanian nationalism continues to be, despite the relatively liberal and so-called “progressive” nature of the pro-Western Romanian media and current government.
As of the writing of this article, Georgescu is ahead of Elena Lasconi in the Romanian opinion polls for the second round by quite a big margin – 60% for Georgescu, 40% for Lasconi. Such a significant lead for a strongly nationalistic politician in an EU and NATO country shows that for most Romanian voters, traditional values and a strong sense of patriotic fervour seem to be far more important causes than the pursuit of so-called “modernism” and “progressivism” as part of the globalist West and the equally globalist blocs which are the EU and NATO. Instead of a Romania under the influence of the West or the East, according to Călin Georgescu, the only influence that should be taking a foothold in Romania is native Romanian influence.
ELENA LASCONI: THE LIBERAL
In stark contrast to the strongly nationalistic and pro-Legionary Călin Georgescu, Elena Lasconi represents the complete opposite in Romanian politics – liberalism and pro-Western sentiment. Lasconi’s ideology appears to resonate most strongly with the youth of Romania, which also appear to make up her largest voter base. This is not surprising, considering how much of the European youth in general tend to vote in favour of more liberal and/or left-wing candidates, instead of the traditionalism and nationalism of right-wing candidates. However, such a trend is more evident in Western and Northern European countries – which Lasconi aspires to see Romania emulate socially, culturally and politically – as opposed to Eastern European and Balkan countries, where even much of the youth remain sympathetic and supportive of traditionalist and nationalistic values. Romania, as a Balkan/Eastern European country (depending on who you ask in the country), appears to be following the trend of the latter, with much of the youth supporting the nationalistic Călin Georgescu.
In order to strengthen her own chances in the presidential race against Georgescu before the second round of the elections this Sunday, Lasconi has ensured to focus on issues which younger voters are more likely to be passionately interested in. One such issue is something which has been previously explored in this article – LGBT rights. Especially in the bigger towns and cities, which tend to be more liberal than the more conservative smaller towns and rural areas, pro-LGBT sentiment among the youth is still relatively high, with many older voters in the cities also being somewhat sympathetic to the LGBT community, albeit to a lesser extent. However, it is important to note that Lasconi and her political party, the Save Romania Union (USR), do not have a definitive policy regarding LGBT rights in Romania. While Lasconi herself and the USR are pro-LGBT, there is currently little to no indication that either will do very much in order to change and/or strengthen LGBT rights in Romania. One factor for the relative lack of proper attention to the issue of LGBT rights is that Lasconi herself is very well aware that while pro-LGBT sentiment among the Romanian youth is relatively high, across the entire population of Romania, the country’s continuing strong sense of traditionalism and conservatism will inevitably prove to be an obstacle in any and all situations where Lasconi and the USR may seek to pass new laws in support of Romania’s LGBT community. Thus, Lasconi’s pro-LGBT sentiment during her presidential campaign is more likely to be simply a way to garner more votes and support from the more liberal voters in Romania than anything truly meaningful in terms of any future policies she may enact, if she were to become President of Romania.
Lasconi is also supportive of even deeper integration of Romania’s membership of the European Union, being in favour of further political, economic and even military co-operation within the bloc, as well as being in favour of Romania’s entry into the Schengen Area. Even among the relatively pro-EU population of Romania, the concept of even deeper integration into the bloc has been met with some scepticism, considering the negative implications of a country integrating even more of its society and infrastructure with that of the EU, to the point where the potential to leave the bloc – should the people desire to do so – becomes increasingly difficult.
Lasconi’s pro-EU stance goes hand-in-hand with her desire to see Romania become even more aligned with the West in general, including Romania’s continued membership of NATO. Even more so, Lasconi has expressed her desire to even see Romania geopolitically closer to the United States, which has generally been met with much scepticism in Romania, as much of the population do not see the United States in a favourable light, regardless of whether the President of the US is a Democrat or Republican. Again, while many Romanians may indeed wish to see their country align with the EU on certain matters, as far as co-operation goes, Lasconi’s strongly pro-Western, pro-Atlanticist and globalist stance may prove to be alienating for many Romanians who wish to see as little foreign interference in their national affairs as possible.
Lasconi has also been very much open about her wish to see Romania become an even more secular country, with the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church being minimised to only delivering on spiritual and religious matters, not social, cultural nor political. Again, among the more liberal youth in Romania, this may prove to be one of Lasconi’s more popular policies, however, with the overwhelming majority of Romanians being Orthodox Christian, the concept of a more secular Romania may prove to weaken Lasconi’s position in the race for the presidency. Attempting to push secularism on an otherwise strongly religious nation almost never goes well for any so-called progressive political candidate.
Returning to the sphere of geopolitics and foreign relations, Lasconi has been vocal about increasing Romania’s level of support for Ukraine in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. This has proven to be somewhat controversial in Romania. In general, Romanian public opinion regarding the level of support for Ukraine has become increasingly mixed. Although Romanians generally do support Ukraine’s war effort against Russia, many Romanians – especially the older generations – have not forgotten about the fact that some former Romanian territories are still a part of Ukraine and are considered by some to be occupied territories, since the days of the Soviet Union. These territories include Northern Bucovina, the southern part of the Odessa region and even the infamous Snake Island. Culturally, among many Romanians, Ukrainians are also generally viewed as similar to the Russians, as both are former Soviet nations which have had much negative history against the Romanians, both during peace and war. The general attitude towards Ukrainian refugees has also been dipping into sceptical territory, as some Romanians feel that the Ukrainian refugees seem to be enjoying even greater social rights than even many Romanian citizens. This sentiment can also be seen with the relative lack of pro-Ukraine symbolism across Romania, with Ukrainian flags and pro-Ukraine slogans being generally absent from Romanian public life, in contrast to the situation immediately following the initial Russian invasion in February 2022. Then there is the issue of just how much aid Romania should be sending to Ukraine. At a time when Romania is still seeking to improve its economic struggles and defensive capabilities, in the event that a hot war between NATO and Russia does break out, many in Romania feel as if their more immediate concerns should be domestic issues, not prioritising Ukraine, especially when the current situation in the latter appears to be increasingly in Russia’s operational favour, not Ukraine’s. If Ukraine is indeed on course to lose their war against Russia, then perhaps it may not be in Romania’s long-term interests to continue giving Ukraine aid that Romania itself may need in the future. For Elena Lasconi, the issue of Ukraine may prove to be one of her most disadvantageous in her race for the presidency.
On the topic of Călin Georgescu’s pro-neutrality stance, Lasconi stated that Romania is currently facing “a historical confrontation between preserving Romania’s young democracy…and those who want to return Romania to the Russian sphere of influence.” This statement comes across as puzzling and somewhat ironic, considering the fact that Georgescu is openly supportive of the aforementioned Romanian historical figures Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Ion Antonescu, both of whom were militantly nationalistic and very strongly against both communism and the idea of Romania falling under any Russian sphere of influence. Furthermore, the Legionary movement founded by Codreanu fought an extended armed resistance against the Romanian communist regime up until the 1950s. With the proper historical context provided, Lasconi’s claims that Georgescu is somehow pro-Russian, when he is in fact pro-neutrality – i.e. pro-Romanian – could very well fall flat and could in turn very well negatively impact her presidential campaign overall.
As far as the presidential race overall goes, as of the writing of this article, Georgescu is far ahead in the polls when compared to Lasconi. However, whoever wins in this Sunday’s second round of elections, it is very likely that Romania will no longer be a politically forgotten part of Europe, but rather a country that will seek for itself an opportunity to put itself back on the map of Europe as a nation of powerful significance, for both the West and the East – not least for Romania itself and its people.
