The South Caucasus is a crossroads of competing powers: Russia to the north, Turkey and Azerbaijan to the east and west, and Iran to the south. For Armenia, a small landlocked country with a long history of conflict, survival has often depended more on the skill of maneuvering between powerful states than on “choosing sides.” Hypothetically, by joining NATO and the EU, Armenia risks alienating not only Russia, a major economic and military player in the region and a historical partner, but also Iran, a neighbor with whom it maintains complex relations. Tehran has historically viewed Yerevan as a buffer zone against Turkish and Azerbaijani influence: Armenia’s accession to NATO could increase regional tensions, leaving Yerevan even more isolated.
ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR – SEVERAL AMBIGUITIES
Turbulence in the South Caucasus is taking on a permanent character. In the second decade of March 2025, accusations from the Azerbaijani side about alleged shelling of Azerbaijani positions by Armenia became more frequent. Armenia’s Ministry of Defense regularly denies these accusations. In Armenia, it is generally believed that such false statements are how Azerbaijan prepares the ground for renewed military action. But there’s something that needs clarification here. It is clear that Azerbaijan is consistently ready for aggression. However, a new aggression doesn’t require continuous concoction of pretexts, which are easily refuted by, for example, European observers. For a new, unexpected aggression from Baku, a single, more or less fabricated reason is sufficient. As is known, Baku and Ankara plan to open the extraterritorial so-called “Zangezur Corridor.” At the same time, according to Turkish ministers, in addition to the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem, Europe and the Armenian government under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan are also interested in the “Zangezur Corridor.”
If by Europe we primarily mean the United Kingdom and continental Europe, then the interests of some players invested in the “Zangezur Corridor” align with those who oppose Russian-American dialogue and a cessation of hostilities in former Ukrainian territories. By insisting on the so-called “Western Zangezur” issue, Aliyev is actually preparing public opinion for the elimination of the Armenian-Iranian border, which in practice would mean the blockade of Iran from the north. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s desire to seize numerous territories in Iran populated by Turkic peoples cannot be ignored. Recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened official Tehran with certain groups that might act on Iranian territory. Against this ambiguous backdrop, Azerbaijani propaganda and pro-government Telegram channels spread false information claiming that Armenia is intensively preparing for a new war with Azerbaijan, which could erupt in a few weeks after reservist training begins in the neighboring country this April. The systematic rearmament of the Armenian army is making the Azerbaijanis nervous.
REARMAMENT OF THE ARMENIAN ARMY
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Armenia began purchasing new weapons as early as 2020, signing a contract with India for the acquisition of four “Swathi” artillery locating radars. These systems are designed to detect enemy artillery positions and adjust return fire, enabling efficient destruction of firing points. The first deliveries under this contract were completed in 2021. Also in 2020, Armenia signed a contract with Russia for the purchase of multi-purpose Mi-17 transport helicopters, but the exact number of rotary aircraft remains uncertain. According to SIPRI, it involved four units. The contract was finalized in 2022. This type of helicopter is actively used for troop transport, medical evacuation, and airborne operations. A sharp increase in arms procurement occurred in 2023. During this period, Armenia signed several major contracts simultaneously. Most notably, Armenia received Indian multi-purpose rocket systems (MLRS) “Pinaka” 214mm. These systems, similar to Russian “Smerch” and “Grad,” are intended for the destruction of personnel, lightly and heavily armored vehicles, rocket launchers, command posts, communication centers, military-industrial infrastructure, and remote deployment of anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. The system is designed to perform combat tasks, including in mountainous terrain, using tactics of rapid strikes and changing firing positions.
QUESTION OF DEFENSIVE CHARACTER
Armenia ordered 24 such systems. Although SIPRI notes that deliveries have not yet begun, some Armenian and Indian sources reported last fall that the first batches of Pinaka systems had already arrived in Armenia. At the same time, a contract was signed for the purchase of three long-range radar stations Ground Master-200, manufactured in France. These radars are designed to monitor airspace and manage air defense systems, enabling timely responses to potential enemy airstrikes. An interesting contract was also concluded in 2024: for 36 French self-propelled artillery units, CAESAR 155mm. These howitzers, with their high mobility, can hit targets up to 40 kilometers away, making them an effective tool for counter-battery combat and offensive operations. Deliveries under this contract have not yet begun, but the very fact that the deal was made reflects Armenia’s serious intentions regarding strengthening its artillery capabilities. Military cooperation between Yerevan and Athens is also deepening. During a visit to the Armenian capital on March 4, the Greek Minister of Defense mentioned a multilateral cooperation format involving Armenia, Greece, France, and India. The Armenian side, for its part, states that its current focus is on solving issues of a defensive nature, including engineering works on the border with Azerbaijan and strengthening the country’s air defense capabilities.
A SMALL HELPING HAND TO ZELENSKY
In December 2024, Baku claimed that Moscow was responsible for the downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines flight that resulted in the deaths of 38 people after the plane veered off course and was shot down near Aktau, Kazakhstan. Some individuals, including Azerbaijani officials, suggested that the crash was caused by Russian air defense systems, citing the proximity to a war zone and reports of Ukrainian drone activity that may have triggered such a response. Azerbaijan’s desire to assign blame is understandable, but the incident also reflects the chaos in a region affected by the Ukrainian conflict, where identifying the true culprit carries the risk of escalation. It’s as if Aliyev is saying, “Look what you’ve done — now we’re funding Zelensky’s regime.” As if no one knew about the close relationship between Baku and Kyiv. One might recall the scandal when Ukrainian blogger Roman Bochkala posted on social media a photo showing the production of 122 mm shells for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The blogger emphasized that the ammunition was being produced “in one of Ukraine’s partner countries.” At the same time, the photo accidentally included a plate bearing the name and logo of the Azerbaijani defense industry group, Palladium. The company dismissed the story as fake, but that doesn’t mean much. Moreover, Azerbaijan had previously been caught aiding the Ukrainian armed forces. The country sent aerial bombs to Ukraine. The ammunition was delivered via Sudan and Poland by the CIHAZ Industrial Association, an entity under Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense Industry. The deal was carried out in cooperation with Ukrspetsexport.
ALIYEV COUNTS ON TURKEY
Azerbaijani MiG-29s were transferred to Ukraine and actively participated in the Ukrainian forces’ counteroffensive on the southern front against Russia. Ukrainian media confirmed that Azerbaijan delivered QFAB-250 LG guided aerial bombs for Su-25 aircraft to Kyiv. Such openly hostile moves are linked to two key factors: first, Aliyev is counting on Turkey, and second, he is trying to exploit Russia’s perceived weakness due to its prolonged “special operation.” Thus, he believes now is the time to pressure Moscow over gas issues. The suspension of gas transit through Ukraine has dealt a painful blow to Azerbaijan’s interests, costing the country around $6 billion annually. Nevertheless, despite Baku’s dissatisfaction and accusations, it maintains a balanced relationship with Russia, Turkey, and the West.
DISILLUSIONED WITH RUSSIA, ARMENIA MAKES A (DISASTROUS) TURN
All these events are unfolding during deeply unsettled times for the South Caucasus. Armenia’s shift toward the West may not bring the security and prosperity its leaders hope for; on the contrary, it may undermine its strategic interests. Armenia is disillusioned with Russia for several reasons—some justified, others less so—which the pro-Western elites skillfully exploit. For example, much of Armenia’s disappointment with Russia stems from the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023—a defeat many in Yerevan blame on Moscow’s alleged inaction, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers. However, the reality is not so clear-cut. At the same time, Russia has proven to be a valuable ally for Armenia at crucial moments. During the 1990s, Moscow provided decisive military support during the First Karabakh War, helping Armenia achieve its initial victories. More recently, in 2020, a ceasefire brokered by Russia halted Azerbaijan’s advance, saving Armenian lives and territory when they most needed it. Economically, Moscow remains a “lifeline” for Yerevan. Armenia has access to the Eurasian Economic Union and maintains a steady flow of remittances from Armenian workers in Russia.
BAKU-MOSCOW: END OF CONFLICT OR GROWING TENSION?
As for Azerbaijan and Russia-Azerbaijan relations: many experts believe that the planned visit of Azerbaijan’s president to Moscow on May 9, for the Victory Day celebrations, marks the end of the conflict that erupted over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash, which was damaged while evading an attack by Ukrainian drones and crashed an hour and a half later near Aktau. This series of events followed an apology by President Vladimir Putin, compensation paid to the victims’ families by a Russian insurance company, and the decision to erect a monument in Moscow to the true founder of modern Azerbaijan, the country’s third president, Heydar Aliyev. Recently, Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of the Federation Council and the third most powerful figure in Russia, paid an official visit to Baku. Despite a rather cold reception from President Ilham Aliyev, the event can be viewed as a symbolic step in easing tensions between the two countries related to the plane crash. At the same time, according to information from the anonymous but well-informed Telegram channel “Nezygar,” the Security Council of the Russian Federation (headed by Medvedev), in collaboration with relevant departments, is considering possible responses to “aggressive escalation from Baku,” which runs counter to the spirit and letter of the bilateral agreements, including the 2022 Agreement on Allied Relations.
HOW TO BRING BAKU BACK TO REALITY
Aliyev has become intoxicated by the annexation of Karabakh, says a source from Staraya Ploshchad, and has forgotten about Azerbaijan’s economic ties with Russia. This could cost him far more than the desire to showcase his “coolness” to the broader public in Azerbaijan and Turkey, where he casts himself as the regional Caspian leader. Russia has a wide range of tools to bring Baku back to reality. Transfers from Azerbaijani migrant workers in Russia to their homeland—averaging over a billion dollars annually—make up about 7% of Azerbaijan’s annual budget revenue. Halting these transfers would have an immediate impact on the country’s deficit and state spending. Azerbaijan’s exports to Russia consist mostly of vegetables and fruits, often re-exported from Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia supplies Azerbaijan with grain, dairy products, vehicles, equipment, and is part of many joint ventures (1,400 companies with Russian capital, totaling about $8 billion in investments) based on localized Russian technologies. The trade surplus in 2024 favored Russia by around $2 billion. About 30% of Azerbaijan’s total food exports are tied to Russia.
In other words, Russia could, in a few months, nearly painlessly push Azerbaijan to the brink of economic collapse. Another possible lever to curb anti-Russian rhetoric from Azerbaijani authorities is revisiting transportation cooperation. For example, excluding the Baku sea port from the North-South transport corridor and directly linking the Russian section of the route with Iranian ports. Additionally, Russia could block the export of Azerbaijani oil to Europe via the transit port of Novorossiysk, which would cause a sharp drop in Baku’s foreign currency income—the primary source of its budget. There are no alternatives to this route.
THE ISSUE OF THE KUBAN LEZGINS
Finally, Russia could reconsider its policy on the so-called “Lezgin issue.” This concerns nearly 100,000 “Kuban” Lezgins living in northern Azerbaijan, near the Dagestani border where their kin reside. Since the Soviet era (1965), Azerbaijani Lezgins have sought reunification with the Lezgins in Russia into a unified Lezgin Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the USSR, the Sadval movement was established, opposing the forced assimilation of Lezgins and advocating for the inclusion of their territory into Dagestan. However, their demands were rejected with the support of the Russian Federation, and the movement—lacking Moscow’s backing—lost its radical momentum. Nevertheless, among Russian businessmen of Lezgin origin, the idea of reunification with Azerbaijani Lezgins remains current. The Kremlin could support their initiatives in this direction, as well as other measures aimed at revising relations with Azerbaijan.
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN AZERBAIJANI POLITICAL SCIENTIST
Renowned pro-Azerbaijani political analyst Maksim Shevchenko believes there are individuals in Russia who are intentionally aggravating the situation with Azerbaijan. He argues that there is traditionally a type of diaspora lobby whose influence is greatly exaggerated. At the very least, they couldn’t achieve anything with Armenia. Pashinyan continued his line of rapprochement with Turkey and Azerbaijan—a policy that, incidentally, is supported by President Putin. In any case, according to the Azerbaijani lobbyist, he has not heard a single word of criticism against Pashinyan from Putin himself—unlike the powerful propaganda outlets in Russia, which are controlled by Armenians not originally from Armenia, but who believe that the country is virtually their property. Generally, this issue (of strained relations with Azerbaijan) is not being hyped in Russia. From the overall tone of the Russian authorities, Shevchenko concludes there is a desire to resolve this conflict (over the airplane, author’s note) as quickly as possible. Based on this, Shevchenko believes that a series of issues have accumulated that undoubtedly require resolution. Specifically, he calls for dialogue at the presidential level between the two countries, whose leaders have always maintained very good personal relations and very good dialogue. Perhaps Shevchenko and others like him simply want to see the situation this way?
THE GAS FACTOR THAT MUST NOT BE IGNORED
Any impartial expert or political analyst understands that the tragic airplane incident was not the cause but merely the trigger for the eruption of long-standing problems in the strategic relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan. Issues have accumulated between Moscow and Baku that previously did not require urgent attention. Speaking of strategic, global aspects, against the backdrop of which certain tensions in Russia-Azerbaijan relations arise, one cannot ignore the changes occurring both globally (e.g., Trump’s re-election) and regionally (in the Middle East, South Caucasus, and the Caspian region). These developments complicate the “clash of interests” in bilateral relations. First and foremost, the crisis surrounding gas communications—namely East to Europe—must be highlighted. In effect, all the gas wealth of the Caspian Sea today is concentrated in Azerbaijan. This is a very important factor in Russia-Azerbaijan relations because Azerbaijan cannot fully supply all communication routes with its gas, while Russia needs to find new markets for its gas. And the Southern Stream is unimaginable without addressing this issue with Baku. Gas communications are a strategic issue. Ukraine, as we know, blocks the transport of Russian gas through its territory. Moreover, it claims it will not allow Russian gas to pass through Azerbaijani pipelines. It’s safe to say this is a very difficult moment in the current Moscow-Baku dialogue. Among such changes, the Russian-Iranian “Strategic Partnership Agreement” should not be overlooked. As noted by Azerbaijani media, this agreement could even have military aspects. Naturally, Baku interpreted this with a big question mark, as the Russian-Iranian alliance is also a message to Trump.
REASSESSING RUSSIAN PRESENCE
A genuine thaw in Russia-Azerbaijan relations seems to be postponed. Official Baku has notified Moscow of the termination of the Russian cultural mission “Rossotrudnichestvo” in Azerbaijan. At the same time, an actual information war has erupted. The state TV channel AzTV aired a highly resonant report listing all of Azerbaijan’s grievances against Russia dating back to the 1990s. Azerbaijani media began investigating the activities of the Russian House, accusing it of espionage and anti-government propaganda. Special attention was paid to the work of Russian media in Azerbaijan. Local media raised the issue of the need to “balance parity” in the media presence of the two countries, pointing to the disproportionate Russian media influence in Azerbaijan. The new information campaign reflects deeply rooted contradictions that have been waiting for their moment to come to light. Azerbaijani media are now openly calling for a reassessment of the Russian presence in the country’s information space. The story of Sputnik Azerbaijan is no longer just a dispute over media presence—it’s part of a broader debate on the acceptable limits of Russian influence. The news agency Report.az quoted excessively self-assured Azerbaijani “sources”: “Our country has become a donor itself and no longer needs foreign aid, especially when such assistance comes through opaque schemes.” Some Azerbaijani authors, not without visible satisfaction, highlighted the synchronized nature of their government’s decisions regarding both Russian and American “soft power” tools.
However, this assessment is somewhat disingenuous. USAID is a clear irritant for the new occupant of the White House and his team—a visible symbol of the “globalists in power,” a legitimate target for those building the “American golden age.” Meanwhile, President Ilham Aliyev expresses readiness to cooperate with the Trump administration and even aims to “raise U.S.-Azerbaijani relations to a strategic level.” This means that USAID’s withdrawal from Baku will likely be welcomed (at the very least, with neutral indifference).
THE IDEA THAT TOOK HOLD OF MOSCOW’S TOWERS
The same cannot be said for Moscow’s reaction to the closure of the Russian House, no matter how cautiously politically correct the comments from Russian officials may be. Naturally, it’s inappropriate and simplistic to compare various tragic incidents (such as the deaths of Russian military personnel due to Azerbaijani Armed Forces actions in 2020 and 2023), but they cannot be erased from the minds of ordinary Russians or the authorities. It’s important to recognize the systemic problems. That’s much harder, but without such understanding and assessment of the current crisis, attempts to find a way out will be ineffective. After Russian-Armenian relations entered a phase of deep “freeze” (which happened in September 2022 after major military clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border), the idea of replacing the alliance with Yerevan by forging one with Baku took hold in many minds within Moscow’s “towers.”
“Aliyev and Putin speak the same language, they are for sovereignty and a strong state, they ‘integrate nations,’ the West is not their order, they won’t side with Washington and Brussels, unlike Pashinyan. Our countries share serious economic interests…” These are simply narratives—a collection of popular talking points. All are strained and inadequate. Many factors are interconnected here. Truthfully, there is a nuance! Concern for national sovereignty and state interests does not always, and is not always meant to, translate into a pro-Russian stance. Just as adherence to “traditional values” and a rigid vertical power structure are not synonymous with Russophilia. Moscow and Baku have had, and perhaps still have, common interests. But there have also been, and will be, significant differences (energy policy, Ukraine, regional security in the Caucasus, the Turkish factor and Turkish solidarity, “historical politics”). The origins of many problems go back to the collapse of the USSR.
A TURKISH SATELLITE IN THE CSTO — SOUNDS WISE?
It is dangerous to overlook this, to fall into illusions, to build unfounded expectations, or even to engage in direct projection, replacing realistic assessments with baseless fantasies. To understand the depth of oversimplification in such matters, let’s turn to the leader of the “International Eurasian Movement,” one of the ideologists of the so-called Eurasian idea and the Russia-West confrontation, a self-proclaimed prophet and “Vanga,” and a consistent lobbyist for Azerbaijan—Alexander Dugin.
After the 44-day war in 2021, he declared that it was time for Baku to join the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union:
“There are no longer any logical contradictions for why that shouldn’t happen. The Karabakh conflict is resolved. Everything has more or less calmed down. And the delay in Azerbaijan joining the Eurasian economic system, the lack of movement in that direction, in my opinion, reflects a certain misunderstanding in Moscow.” The question of Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with the EAEU and CSTO was raised even during the discussions around the five regions connected to Karabakh and the surrounding areas.
Now is a very delicate moment. Putin and Aliyev, with great difficulty, have built a model that led to such a positive result for Baku in Karabakh. The efforts were truly titanic. Russia is willing to help friends. Putin sees Aliyev as a strategic partner. That is certain. Shifting the topic of Azerbaijan’s accession to the EAEU or CSTO into some indefinite long-term future could become a stumbling block that must be avoided at all costs. Because the regional situation depends on the Azerbaijan-Russia alliance.
So, what more can be said? A prophet!
A Turkish satellite, Azerbaijan, in the CSTO! But some people in Moscow actually listen to his opinion. The leadership and elites of modern Azerbaijan believe that theirs is no longer a country to which conditions can be dictated. The victory in Karabakh, stable economic growth thanks to energy exports, and strengthened geopolitical standing have turned Baku into an independent regional player. President Ilham Aliyev, who considers himself equal to Putin, is not willing to tolerate Moscow’s patronizing tone. That’s why Moscow’s reaction to the airplane incident caused such outrage in Baku. And this is the main, and most unfortunate, result of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War for Russia. Likely, Aliyev’s example will become a turning point not only for Russia-Azerbaijan relations but for the entire post-Soviet space.
