Eastern fires: Turmoil in the Middle East

Alongside a potential war against Iran—an option flirted with by the Trump administration—the main prize for Israel would be the future annexation of the largest part of the West Bank, possibly leaving the Palestinian cities as enclaves that might be offered to the Jordanian king for administration. What is happening in the meantime on the Eastern Front?

In an article published in a scientific journal three years ago, the author of these lines predicted the return of what was then just the beginning of a world war to the very stage where it had first been announced—Syria, and more broadly, the Middle East. 1 For at least the past three years, it seems that the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern (especially Syrian) flashpoints have alternately flared up and subsided.

The powerful Pentagon is bombing the city of Sana’a in Yemen to stop the Houthis who are disrupting Israel’s allies. Yes, why are they disrupting Israel, a country for which America is always prepared to go to war—at least to provide supplies, fire support, and threats to those targeted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)?

The deployment of Iranian missile units to the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, at the exit from the Persian Gulf on March 22, along with simultaneous threats from the U.S., particularly President Trump, that Iran would face “severe consequences” if the Yemeni Houthis continued their operations against ships of countries supporting Israel, have become the focus of many media outlets. While Iran is threatened with sanctions and military force, Israel continues its aggression on the territory of fractured Syria and Lebanon with impunity. Now, only the Houthis are hindering the Jewish state from bombing hospitals, buildings, and vehicles in the Gaza Strip, destroying Palestinian settlements on just over 5,000 m² of the West Bank (in Judea and Samaria), and conducting operations in the aforementioned two countries. At the same time, no one is seriously stopping Turkey from becoming, de facto, a colonial metropolis for the Islamist necktie-wearing government in Damascus.

FROM DONETSK TO TRIPOLI

Toward the end of the Maidan, the color revolution and the coup d’état in Ukraine in 2014, a civil war broke out that was particularly intense in 2014 and 2015. At the same time, the Second Libyan War flared up (the first took place in 2011). As anarchy and the rampage of various armed formations spread across the country—groups that were kidnapping the prime minister’s deputies, foreigners, and occupying parts of the territory—the term of the General National Congress, elected in July 2012, expired at the end of 2013. This assembly in Tripoli unilaterally extended its own mandate, prompting General Khalifa Haftar to call for new elections. In mid-May 2014, he launched military operations in the name of halting the Islamists. By January 2020, the eastern Libyan National Army, led by the self-proclaimed Field Marshal Haftar, was on the outskirts of Tripoli with the support of Wagner forces. At that point, Turkey entered the war, deploying drones on a large scale, Syrian mercenaries, and its notorious “military advisors.” Finally, following negotiations between Russia and Turkey, a “permanent ceasefire” was established on October 23, 2020. Under this agreement, the country was effectively divided: a smaller part in the west, including Tripoli, remained under the control of the Islamist government loyal to Turkey, while the larger part fell under the control of the Assembly in Tobruk in the east. Meanwhile, the desert areas in the south are controlled by the nomadic Tuareg and Tubu tribes.

SHIFTING WARS

When the civil war in Donbas began, the so-called Islamic State was at its peak, capturing territories not only in Syria but also in Iraq. In September 2015, to prevent the fall of Damascus (whose eastern suburbs were already infiltrated by Islamist militias) and to preempt a Turkish incursion (Ankara had reached an agreement with Washington to militarily intervene and occupy a “humanitarian corridor” by the end of July 2015), Russia intervened. By the following year, the so-called Islamic State had been destroyed, and in 2016, due to the expanding areas liberated from Islamists by the Kurds in Syria, Turkey decided to launch a military incursion into the north of the country to stop the Kurds and preserve the Islamist presence in Idlib and its surroundings. Through three operations—Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Peace Spring (2019)—Turkey captured parts of its southern neighbor, mostly at the expense of the Syrian Democratic Forces led by the Kurds, and waited for a favorable moment.

When the Libyan war was halted—apart from sporadic gunfire and minor armed incidents in late 2021—and the war in Syria had reached a phase of stagnation, the Ukrainian army, following extensive armament and preparation provided by NATO, began artillery shelling in preparation for a ground offensive against Donetsk and Luhansk. These two republics had declared independence after referendums in May 2014, and following the Minsk II Agreement (which Ukraine never intended to implement), military operations subsided by February 2015, reducing to sporadic gunfire exchanges and mortar fire. When Zelensky refused to implement Minsk II on February 11, 2022, while simultaneously receiving guarantees from the United States, it became clear that the war would flare up again. The situation in the Middle East would largely remain calm until October 2023.

EXPANSION OF THE TURKISH ZONE TO DAMASCUS

Even before the negotiations announced by the winner of the U.S. presidential elections in November 2024, various armed groups in Syria—operating from the north, southwest, and south—seized, within a few days and with minimal resistance, the territory controlled by forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad (2000–2024), culminating on December 8, 2024. The largest coalition, alongside the militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, was led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, officially born as Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (1982–), who overnight transformed from a terrorist into an acceptable interlocutor for the European Union and the United States—and later, for others as well. Although, like the former Islamic State founder al-Baghdadi, he passed through a kind of training ground in U.S. military prisons in Iraq and had connections with various foreign intelligence services, his closest cooperation was—and continues to be—with Turkey. Turkey was also the first country he visited. In essence, his seizure of power in Damascus signifies that the Turkish sphere of influence has now extended all the way to the world’s oldest continuously inhabited capital—Damascus.

It is also not insignificant that the first forces to enter Damascus last December came from the south, including Druze units as well as others that had been supplied for years from the American base in southern Syria—Al-Tanf.

OPERATION GREATER ISRAEL

As part of the Middle Eastern war (2023–), Israel launched a military incursion into Lebanon for the first time since 2006—and the sixth time since 1978—in order to once again confront Hezbollah. Over the course of just over fifty days of fighting, utilizing all three branches of its armed forces, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) managed to capture individual settlements and areas extending 3 to 5 kilometers into Lebanese territory. A ceasefire was agreed on November 26, yet since then Israel has occasionally violated it by targeting sites in Lebanon, primarily south of the Litani River, which flows roughly parallel to the Israeli border, about 30 kilometers to its north.

Today, as partial ceasefire negotiations are underway in the Saudi capital, mediated by the U.S. and Russia, Israel has continued operations aimed at creating a Greater Israel. The territorial expansion into Syria is intended to include the country’s south—specifically the region around the city of Suwayda, home to a significant Druze population, which also resides in Israel and Lebanon. Leaders of the armed formations—among them Druze—who were among the first to reach Damascus on December 7, announced on February 24 the formation of a Military Council, naturally with Israeli backing.

In fact, just one day earlier, Benjamin Netanyahu declared at a formal ceremony—addressing both the military and the public urbi et orbi:

“Pay attention: We will not allow HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) forces or the new Syrian army to enter the area south of Damascus… From the forces of the new regime, we demand full demilitarization of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda. We will also not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria.”2

HUMANITARIAN STARVATION AND INHUMAN RESPONSE

In response to the bloody and desperate incursion by Hamas fighters across the security barrier on October 7, 2023, Israel launched the longest military operations in its history. These included military actions in Lebanon, where Hezbollah, starting October 8, according to its officials, provided limited fire support to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. As part of these wartime efforts, there was also an exchange of fire with Iran. Alongside Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis also began limited fire exchanges with Israel on October 19, 2023. Just twelve days later, on October 31, they struck Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat, about 1,800 km from Yemen. Official statements said the Houthis began attacking Israeli and Western ships from mid-October 2023, targeting countries supporting the Jewish state in order to stop the bombing of the Gaza Strip. These attacks continued until a two-month ceasefire between Israel and Gaza was reached on January 19, 2025—on the feast of Theophany.

However, although the ceasefire was supposed to include the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from a significant part of the Gaza Strip (and in a second phase, from the rest), the exchange of most prisoners, and a halt to military operations, Israel reportedly violated the truce around 40 times during the ceasefire, according to data from Gaza. These violations resulted in the deaths of around 155 people, including journalists and humanitarian aid workers. After Hamas refused to release the remaining 59 hostages, which it had intended to exchange in the second phase, Israel on March 2 banned the delivery of humanitarian aid. Starting March 9, it also cut off electricity, which led to the shutdown of the desalination plant. In other words, even before the ceasefire officially expired on March 18, Netanyahu’s government began implementing a policy of starvation and dehydration, coupled with intermittent attacks—which escalated into mass strikes on March 18. The desperate return fire that followed, in response to the resumed bombing and enforced starvation (along with the ban on all forms of aid, including medicine), was portrayed in local media as aggressive action by Hamas.

THE HOLY LAND, YEMEN, SYRIA, IRAN, AND THE BALKANS?

Following the intense bombardment of the remaining armed arsenal of the Syrian army and the fall of Assad, Israel seized the remaining part of the Golan Heights, the central and northern sections of Mount Hermon along the Lebanese border, and began occupying parts of the Quneitra and Daraa provinces—an operation that continues to this day.

While the Druze population enjoys the protection of Israel, Christians and Alawites in Syria have been left at the mercy—and largely the cruelty—of the new Islamist regime. After an attempted uprising and resistance in early March in western Syria, at least a thousand Alawites and Christians (the full extent is still unknown) were massacred in a retaliatory strike by Islamist forces now in control of Damascus. Numerous civilians fled to Russian military bases along the coast, and numerous videos have surfaced showing mistreatment and executions of prisoners.

As the Israeli military continues expanding its operations in the Gaza Strip—killing over 400 people on just the first day of renewed attacks (March 18)—a hospital built by Turkey was also destroyed. Speaking of hospitals, the U.S. military struck an oncology hospital in the Yemeni capital Sana’a, controlled by the Houthis since 2014, on March 26.

Alongside a potential war with Iran—an option being openly entertained by the Trump administration—the principal reward for Israel remains the future annexation of the majority of the West Bank, possibly leaving the Palestinian cities as enclaves to be offered for administration to the King of Jordan.

The Balkans—once an echo of the East and at times a harbinger of what is to come—are torn by internal political divisions of varying origins across several countries (Serbia, Romania, Republika Srpska/Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to some extent Greece), yet in all of them, these divisions run contrary to freedom and justice. Hence, the pressure on Republika Srpska comes as no surprise, nor do the announcements of lithium mining, or the gathering of the heirs of former Axis partners into a Tirana–Pristina–Zagreb alliance, which is now also calling upon Sofia to join.

  1. Slobodan Janković, “World Trends from 2022”, Српска политичка мисао [Serbian Political Thought], Vol. 77, No. 3/2022, page 179-200 ↩︎
  2. Take note: We will not allow HTS forces or the new Syrian army to enter the area south of Damascus,”…
    “We demand the complete demilitarization of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa and Suwayda from the forces of the new regime. Likewise, we will not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria.” ↩︎