The bombing of the Yemeni city of Hodeidah on July 20, 2024, announced the beginning of Operation Long Arm. In response to the rocket attack on Tel Aviv a week earlier, Israel carried out its first direct strike on the Houthis, targeting oil and energy facilities and missile storage sites.
THE POWERLESSNESS OF A GLOBAL SUPERPOWER IN THE FIGHT AGAINST REBELS
After the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2023, the Houthis initiated a partial blockade of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, during which they attacked and hijacked several cargo ships in the Gulf of Aden. By December 21, 2023, at least twelve cargo ships had been attacked. In response to these attacks, the United States launched Operation Guardian of Progress on December 18, 2023, deploying Combined Task Force 153, led by the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and forces from an additional 12 allied fleets. As part of this operation, European allies initiated a separate operation named Aspides, aiming to secure safe passage for cargo ships through the Red Sea.
However, nine months later, the Houthis remained unyielding. In June, there was a significant increase in attacks on cargo ships. The sinking of the MV Tutor, the second major ship sunk by the Houthis since the crisis began, led to a sharp rise in insurance premiums for ships and goods.
It can be said that the U.S. Navy is engaged in its most intense naval deployment since World War II. Warfare is expensive, and operational costs have already reached nearly four billion dollars. Despite this, Washington has made virtually no progress in combating the Houthis. But why is this so? Why is the world’s greatest naval power unable to overcome a small group of rebels?
TURNING TO IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH
Although the Houthis today represent a significant geopolitical factor, the movement itself has humble beginnings. The Ansar Allah movement (God’s Supporters) was founded in 1992 in the Saada province as a religious and youth group by Hussein al-Houthi, focusing on the revival of Zaidism, a branch of Shia Islam. However, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the movement adopted a militant and revolutionary character. Alongside expressing openly anti-American and anti-Israeli views, the group also challenged the legitimacy of the Yemeni state. Over the next ten years, Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh attempted to suppress the movement, pushing it into the northern parts of the country. Cornered between Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni military, the Houthis turned to other Shia states and factions in the Middle East, primarily Iran and Hezbollah. With the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution in 2011, a local conflict quickly and unexpectedly evolved into a broader front in the Iran-Saudi proxy war. Abdullah Saleh would switch sides and support the Houthis during their capture of the capital city, Sana’a, in 2015. Despite this, Saleh turned against the Houthis once more.
However, after a brief conflict, the Houthis managed to consolidate their power in the northern regions and gain control of Yemen’s western coastline. In doing so, they established control over a key geopolitical point in the Red Sea region, along the coast opposite the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
With a width of about 30 kilometers at its narrowest point, the strait represents a “vulnerable gateway” for maritime trade. Access to the ocean has allowed the Houthis to establish new supply lines and actively engage in arms trafficking. Even after losing the strategically and economically important port of Aden, the Houthis managed to generate significant revenues—both from trade and piracy—exceeding $1.5 billion by 2020. The Houthis were able to withstand the war with Riyadh in 2015 primarily thanks to material support from Iran and Hezbollah. Years of war with Saudi Arabia and exposure to constant airstrikes taught the Houthis the importance of asymmetric warfare.
By capturing several ports, the Houthis gained possession of anti-ship missiles and Limpet-class naval mines, which they successfully modernized with Iranian assistance, turning them into effective and deadly weapons. By 2022, the Houthis had received new Iranian anti-ship missiles, including Noor missiles with a range of 120 km, Qader missiles with a range of 200 km, and Khalij Fars ballistic anti-ship missiles with a range of 300 km.
FROM SIMULATION TO REAL THREAT
Iranian drones such as the Samad-3 and Tolan-3 gradually became part of the Houthi arsenal. It is believed that the delivery of weapons is coordinated by an Iranian intelligence cell aboard the MV Behshad, a commercial cargo ship used for reconnaissance and intelligence missions in the broader Arabian and Red Sea region. Over time, the fight against the Houthis became prohibitively expensive. In 2021, the Saudis indicated their intention to withdraw from the war. While negotiating with Riyadh, the Houthis sought to strengthen their international position. After the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the Houthis saw an opportunity to legitimize their actions by aligning them with broader pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli narratives.
In July 2002, the U.S. Navy conducted a war simulation known as the Millennium Challenge, which dealt with a hypothetical war between the U.S. and Iran. The simulation was significant because it revealed the U.S. Navy’s lack of preparedness to defend against an asymmetric threat. During the exercise, the team representing Iran dispersed its forces on the ground and communicated exclusively via motorcycle messengers or light signals to avoid detection. In combat with the U.S. Navy, they used improvised explosive devices alongside cruise missiles. The Iranian team’s strategy resulted in the deaths of about 20,000 sailors and the destruction of 16 warships, including one aircraft carrier, ten cruisers, and five amphibious ships. Two decades later, the U.S. Navy faces a similar threat profile.
REALLOCATION OF FORCES
Although the Houthis do not possess the same resources and capabilities as Iran, the U.S. Navy’s actions are nevertheless constrained, primarily due to broader geopolitical factors. Resource scarcity and tensions in the South China Sea prevent Washington from fully focusing on the Arabian and Red Sea regions. Additionally, the U.S. is involved in a wide range of engagements, from the ongoing war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern conflicts to the potential emergence of new hotspots in South America. As a typical thalassocratic state and the world’s largest naval power, the U.S. is obligated—by its prestige—to maintain military, diplomatic, and intelligence presence worldwide. However, current disruptions on the international stage are forcing Washington to narrow its ambitions and reallocate its military forces from one region to another.
The consequence of this is the creation of a kind of “power vacuum,” enabling challenger powers to further establish themselves in neglected regions.
WITHDRAWAL OF THE EISENHOWER FROM THE RED SEA
In July, the U.S. Central Command announced the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier Eisenhower from the Red Sea. Although the reason was not specified, it is presumed that this was due to frequent attacks and potential damage sustained during its deployment. Consequently, Washington was forced to withdraw the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt from the South China Sea at a time when open escalation between China and the Philippines was looming. This further weakened the U.S. strategic position in the East. Another issue lies in the tactical deployment of modern warships. These vessels are exceedingly expensive and designed exclusively for combat with other conventional warships. Modern warships are not intended for asymmetric warfare, and Washington is reluctant to risk having one of its costly, highly sophisticated ships destroyed by cheap and unsophisticated weaponry. For example, building an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer costs $2 billion, with monthly operational expenses of $7 million. On top of this, repair costs, even for minor damage, can reach hundreds of millions of dollars.
To illustrate asymmetric warfare, we can refer to the 2000 incident when Al-Qaeda attacked the destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) with an explosive-laden boat. The result was that a boat worth about $1 million inflicted $240 million in damage and killed 17 sailors. Additionally, every launched ship missile costs between $1 million and $4.3 million. It is no surprise that the total costs of Operation Guardian of Progress range between $2.8 billion and $4 billion. These are certainly not final figures, and U.S. taxpayers had these numbers in mind when voting in the November elections.
ENCOURAGED BY ALLIED INCOMPETENCE
Due to the war in Gaza, Washington is unable to rely on its traditional strategy of building broad coalitions. Except for Bahrain, none of the Middle Eastern states have any intention of directly engaging in the conflict with the Houthis. Only European states have been compelled to participate, but they have proven to be of little help. The European Task Force Aspides has a different mission. It is limited to operations in the Red Sea aimed at protecting merchant ships and, unlike the U.S. and Britain, does not participate in direct strikes against the Houthis. Moreover, the European task force faces additional challenges. Due to the nature of its mission, the European fleet lacks adequate defenses against anti-ship missiles or explosive boats. A significant issue is the absence of a unified EU command structure, compounded by poor communication and uncoordinated actions with the U.S.-British fleet in the Arabian Sea.
As a result of these factors, neither operation has yielded the expected results. The allies’ inability has encouraged the Houthis to intensify their attacks in recent months. For comparison, between January 2017 and June 2021, the Houthis carried out 24 drone attacks, averaging one drone every 70 days. However, from November 2023 to July 2024, they conducted 77 attacks, or one drone every three days. This has led insurance companies to significantly increase premiums, while transportation costs have risen due to rerouted trade from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10 days to delivery times.
A SYMBOLIC MESSAGE TO TEHRAN
It is worth noting that on October 17, the U.S. bombed Houthi positions using B-2 bombers. This was a demonstrative exercise, as the bombers took off from Andersen Air Base on the island of Guam, flying nearly 10,800 kilometers in one direction to Yemen. Three strategic bombers participated, each carrying two DBU-57 bombs, weighing 16.5 tons each. The attack targeted underground complexes used as storage and production centers for ballistic missiles. The B-2 bomber had not been used in combat since 2017 during an attack on an ISIS training center near Sirte, Libya. Until October 17, the B-2 had only been used for demonstration purposes, such as flights along the Russian border. Interestingly, the U.S. did not utilize its base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, which could have shortened the flight path. By doing so, the U.S. sent a symbolic message to Iran that Washington is prepared to act anywhere in the world. This attack serves as a symbolic warning of what Tehran could face in a potential conflict, where the U.S. would side with Israel, as evidenced by the recent delivery of the THAAD anti-missile system. This indicates that, despite all setbacks, the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing from the Middle East. At the same time, unable to defeat the Houthis in direct conflict, the U.S. is attempting, through such demonstrative military actions, to compel Iran to rein in its proxies in the region.
A HOSTAGE TO ITS OWN GEOPOLITICAL CALCULATIONS
Despite everything, Washington is forced to seek a diplomatic solution. Several approaches should be considered. On one hand, Washington could strengthen its support for the Yemeni government in Aden. The problem with the Aden government is that it lacks the support of the Yemeni population, sufficient economic resources, and legitimacy—similar to the Houthi rule in Sana’a. For the U.S. to win over Yemeni public opinion, it must offer a clear alternative. This requires unavoidable financial support for the government in Aden and active involvement in internal political processes. On the other hand, achieving this goal necessitates UN support as well as the involvement of Russia and China, which could influence Iran and thereby the Houthis. To attract Russia and China, the U.S. would be forced to make certain geopolitical concessions. However, the U.S. is not prepared to sacrifice Ukraine and Taiwan to save the Red Sea trade route, which both nations would demand. It appears that secret diplomacy will not succeed. The only remaining option for the U.S. is to work on ending the war in Gaza to deprive the Houthis of justification for their military actions. However, any agreement contrary to Israeli interests will have negative repercussions on the current administration in Washington. Evidently, Washington has unintentionally become a hostage to modern international relations and its own geopolitical calculations, lacking a plan or solution that is both practical and politically viable.
A SIMMERING CONFLICT BETWEEN TRUMP AND NETANYAHU
Donald Trump’s victory in the recent presidential election has raised new questions about the future of the security architecture and geopolitical actions, not only in Europe and the Far East but also in the Middle East.
There is a theory that a simmering conflict between Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu has been ongoing since 2020. Netanyahu supported Biden in the presidential election despite Trump’s active efforts to affirm Israel’s statehood through the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE, and recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the U.S. and other countries. During the final phase of the campaign, the Washington Agreement was signed, obliging Serbia and so-called Kosovo* to move their embassies to Jerusalem. On his Twitter account, Trump noted that Kosovo* was the first Muslim—or, as he termed it, “Middle Eastern”—state to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. However, during the recent election campaign, Netanyahu supported Trump while showing restraint toward the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, due to the Biden administration’s alleged involvement in anti-government protests in Israel in 2023 and rhetorical support for Palestine aimed at winning Muslim voters.
A PEACE FORMULA FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
It should not be forgotten that during his first term, Trump pursued an explicitly anti-Iranian policy, ranging from withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal to the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani. In September 2019, when the Houthis struck Saudi Arabian oil fields, Trump declared strong support for the Saudis and readiness to go to war with Iran. However, Trump did not start any wars and applied a Cold War model toward Iran, avoiding direct conflict.
Conversely, in January this year, Trump accused Biden, particularly Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, of the U.S. “bombing across the Middle East” while Austin “wages war from his laptop in a hospital room.” In July, during a conversation with Netanyahu, Trump stated that if elected, he would work toward establishing peace in the Middle East and combating anti-Semitism on university campuses. It is difficult to predict what Trump’s “peace formula” for the Middle East would look like. It might involve withdrawing the fleet from the Arabian and Red Sea regions. Although Trump criticized the Biden administration for abandoning Afghanistan, a potential fleet withdrawal would likely be executed differently, without dramatic scenes of civilians clinging to aircraft wheels or leaving valuable military equipment in enemy hands.
PREPARING FOR A SECOND COLD WAR WITH CHINA
It is of vital interest to the U.S. to reduce the number of open fronts initiated by the Democratic administration in order to consolidate internally and prepare for what British historian Niall Ferguson called the Second Cold War with China. In line with this, the expectations of the new administration and campaign promises logically lead to such a scenario, involving de-escalation and restraint of allies and satellites. For Israel, a dignified exit from the “stalemate” might be found by declaring some miraculous victory over Hamas and Hezbollah. Unlike Democrats and some Republicans, Trump is not ideologically burdened with neoconservatism and the idea of American exceptionalism. During his first term, he demonstrated himself as a realist politician who could escalate tensions with North Korea to the brink of nuclear war and then meet with Kim Jong-un to negotiate denuclearization—a previously unimaginable scenario since North Korea’s founding in 1948. Trump could take a similar approach to resolving Middle Eastern issues. It should be noted that in his campaign, Trump focused more on resolving the conflict in Ukraine than on the Middle East. If the U.S. and Russia find a sustainable solution for Ukraine, it is likely that Russia would influence Iran to rein in its proxies in the region. Any agreement with Iran would inevitably affect the Houthis, leading them to abandon missile attacks on Israel and the blockade of the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
