Return of the (Written-off) Patriots

How the topic of the Special military operation (SMO) opened the doors of the Serbian media space to the long-marginalized national intellectual elite?

Author: Prof. dr Dragan Petrović

BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: A TURNING POINT FOR SERBIAN MEDIA

The beginning of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022 was a major and significant event that dominated media coverage worldwide. In Serbia, as well as in Serbian territories in general, the situation was the same, with the distinction that local media became much more open compared to the previous period. This was a significant change in the media sphere compared to the entire post-October period. Despite occasional changes in power and apparent modifications in political and social priorities, the entire post-October period was marked by the dominance of a pro-Western geopolitical agenda and the unquestioned “European path” as the “final determination.” This meant that Serbian society as a whole, and especially a large part of its elite (including the entry ticket into it), was unquestionably committed to a pro-Western agenda. Additionally, societal values such as the “European path” were adopted as priorities, along with respecting NATO and America as centers of power and even as bearers of values in the world.

UNTOUCHABLE QUESTIONS

By favoring these values in Serbian society, science, and media, modern history was re-evaluated. The resistance to NATO and the defense of Kosovo and Metohija in 1999 were relativized, and the Serbian struggle in the 1990s was underestimated and deemed wrong, with numerous crimes, notably the one in Srebrenica, being colossal and horrific.

These “untouchable questions” created the belief that the neoliberal-neomonetarist concept of running the economy and society was not only desirable and good but also the only possible one. In fact, in post-October Serbia, there was never a serious professional debate in this direction: these agendas came “from above,” from the centers of the EU and NATO, promoted by suitable (quasi)experts in Serbian territories with the support of NGOs, Western representatives, and, of course, supported by the authorities. Therefore, the neoliberal-neomonetarist economic-social model was not seriously debated in professional circles, nor were such dilemmas, if they existed, adequately conveyed to the broader public. On the contrary, attention was paid to individuals and NGOs that supported such a course, conducting sparse analyses and publishing reports on the results of this ruling model. At the same time, the ruling elites changed with elections, modified, formed new coalitions, or returned to power. Occasionally, the group of favored “analysts” for economic-social issues was refreshed with some new faces who received media space despite often highly questionable expertise in their fields.

THE RULING CONCEPT

The neoliberal-neomonetarist ruling concept, which enabled the sale of most of the industry, banking sector, and then agricultural goods, river and water sources, and other important economic objects, persisted as a constant. The funds from the sale of these goods, which were realistically far less than their value, were mostly invested in consumption and the budget, i.e., outside of capital investments and new investments, or even just for amortization. Thus, Serbia and its population relatively bearably endured the efforts of transition during those years and under such reforms, when it came to visible standards. At the same time, the external debt grew steadily and rapidly, basic assets (industry, banking sector, important areas of agriculture, and even some capital resources given for exploitation and concessions) were exhausted and sold to foreigners, while the country’s population decreased. This decrease was partly due to a negative natural increase and partly due to the emigration of the most vital layers, mostly young and educated individuals, abroad in search of livelihood.

MORE TELEVISION CHANNELS, LESS FREEDOM

Although the number of television channels in Serbia increased over this period of more than two decades, their concentration in the hands of a small number of owners (often fictitious) was noticeable. In 2016, a unique law in European terms on ownership, i.e., the accelerated privatization of nearly 70 regional and local television stations in Serbia, was applied. According to this unprecedented solution in Europe, it was decided that none of the outlets owned by cities in Serbia could retain their ownership status and had to be rapidly privatized. These media, managed by local self-governments, overnight became the property of questionable owners through accelerated privatizations. The process and criteria for obtaining various frequencies and media statuses in Serbia were particularly questionable. All this together further closed the media space in the country, creating the paradox that, formally, the number of television channels increased while media freedoms realistically decreased. The situation was similar with the print media in the country, which largely followed the fate of the privatization of the most vital areas of the economy. Often, they came into full or partial ownership of foreign and especially globalist media chains. On the other hand, the internet remains partly an unregulated space, suitable for broader political and social themes.

UNYIELDINGLY AGAINST NATO

Despite years of media spin, a real societal crisis, erosion of standards, and the constant struggle for mere survival for a significant portion of the population in Serbia, at the beginning of 2022, the majority of the population remained steadfast in their stance against joining NATO, in favor of defending Kosovo and Metohija, and affirmed their support for Russia. This refers to 80% of Serbian citizens who declared themselves against imposing any sanctions on Russia, against joining NATO, and against giving up Kosovo and Metohija (even if it meant gaining EU membership). To understand the changes that occurred in the media sphere in 2022, it is necessary to illustrate the political spectrum in Serbia, divided into three segments. One part certainly belongs to pro-Western parties and politicians, determined by about 20% of the population. The government itself (which expanded over time, as besides SNS and SPS, in 2024, the Patriots joined as well), largely thanks to the media it predominantly controls, managed to secure the majority of the dominant electorate. The third path, i.e., the patriotic opposition, which is the only one that realistically supports an alternative concept to the existing neocolonial neoliberal economic-social model and supports state-building policies, was squeezed and pressured in various ways. This political-media division was significantly altered with the onset of the Special Military Operation (SMO), at least in terms of the significant return of the national elite to a portion of the public space.

MEDIA PUZZLE

These changes did not apply to the media that promoted the pro-Western model while simultaneously supporting the Western opposition, such as TV channels N1, Adria, the newspaper Danas, the magazine NIN, Novi Magazin, and others. For the two years of the conflict in Ukraine, it was practically impossible to see any expert on these media outlets who was not for Ukraine and NATO. At best, and very rarely, such individuals could be decorative in the pro-NATO agenda. Contrary to the Western media, in media supporting the government, which is the majority of the scene in Serbia, regarding the Ukrainian conflict, the situation was far more sophisticated. For instance, RTS, a TV channel with a national frequency, tries to give minimal space to the pro-Western opposition and very little and statically to the patriotic side, despite the dominant influence of the government. In terms of foreign policy, RTS leans towards NATO and Ukraine when it comes to the Ukrainian conflict. In shows related to the Ukrainian conflict, the same team of guests, who are covertly sympathetic to the Ukrainian and pro-Western side, predominantly appear. Regular guests are generally not very qualified as experts on the Ukrainian conflict or the post-Soviet space. For instance, in all shows, a staple guest is Professor Aleksandar Životić from the Department of Yugoslav History at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, along with frequent appearances by economist Goran Nikolić and journalist and diplomat Dragan Bisenić. Životić is a young established history professor who also deals with relations with the USSR but not the contemporary period. Interestingly, he completed a specialist course in Russia as a historian but has been a collaborator with a pro-NATO center led by Šutanovac since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. Nikolić and Bisenić do not hide their pro-Western orientation either. Nikolić co-authored two books with the author of these lines, one of which was about Ukraine (Geopolitics of Contemporary Ukraine, published in 2009). However, Nikolić authored only the economic chapter, with about 90% of the book being the work of the author of these lines. Nikolić is a solid economist, despite defending his doctorate at Megatrend. Bisenić is a journalist who later served as a diplomat and ambassador to Egypt. It may not be unusual that these experts are regular guests on RTS, but it is quite unusual that they are constant and practically irreplaceable, while other far more competent authors on these topics are not invited at all.

“PROVEN” COMMENTATORS

The author of these lines had the honor in the fall of 2022 of having a half-hour show “Professionals” on the first program of RTS dedicated to him, on the occasion of defending his third doctorate at a state university. On that occasion, scientific books published both domestically and internationally (40 of them), including five on contemporary Ukraine, were presented. However, this was not a sufficient reason to invite me even once to the shows dedicated to the Ukrainian conflict, which are organized approximately monthly on RTS (mostly in the OKO magazine). Other experts on the post-Soviet space and international relations are also not invited to these shows on RTS, and since the guests are predominantly pro-Western, the analyses of this conflict are presented in that direction. Therefore, pro-Western media in Serbia, which directly support the pro-Western opposition such as N1, Adria, Danas, numerous magazines, and weeklies, exclusively organize shows on the Ukrainian conflict with pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian guests, and this is only slightly less the case with RTS.

EXPLOSION OF “ACTUALITIES”

However, the first twists and some liberation of post-October media in Serbia, precisely through the topic of the Ukrainian conflict, can be seen in most other media in the country. The most spectacular show is “Actualities” on Happy TV, which is broadcast daily, with the primary topic being the Ukrainian conflict. The show quickly became the most-watched not only in Serbia but also in the region. Besides the program of the newly formed TV channel Informer, it is probably the only openly pro-Russian show about the Ukrainian conflict in the broader region (and possibly in Europe outside the post-Soviet space). The quality of this show lies in its concept, which involves two-hour durations and up to three hours on weekends, the fact that it regularly features three guests and competent hosts, displays maps, coverages, and occasional inclusions of other experts. The guest structure is the greatest quality of this show, as it predominantly consists of university professors, scientific and professional creators, high-ranking retired officers (generals and colonels), former politicians, and specialists on the topic. Although the show is more or less inclined towards Russia, its high quality is undeniable, which has quickly created a million-strong audience and broader interest in the region. Other shows on Happy TV that occasionally deal with or touch upon the Ukrainian crisis are not as specialized, and the guests are mostly representatives of various geopolitical options, from Cyrillic in the evening (on Mondays, though often with topics related to Serbia), through the Morning program, the show After Lunch, Telemaster, and other shows.

PINK’S BALANCING ACT

Regarding the production of Pink TV, which also has a national frequency, there is a noticeable leaning towards NATO and the Ukrainian side, but representatives of other options, including the pro-Russian one, are also present. This is more evident on the former Pink 3, now TV Vesti, which, unlike Pink 1, mainly has predominantly political and serious programming. The most prominent shows dealing with the Ukrainian crisis are “News with Srđan Predojević” (approximately 90 minutes with three guests, a concept similar to Actualities), followed by a one-hour show with Jovan Palavestra, and half-hour analyses usually with one guest. On the other hand, TV Vesti does not have a national frequency unlike Pink 1, its shows are generally not uploaded to YouTube (all other TV channels, including those mentioned, do this, increasing the effect of viewership), and it has not realistically gained a larger audience despite all the evident editorial effort. One of the problems is probably the quality of the guests, which lags by at least one level behind those in Actualities, even in the best show on this channel, hosted by the excellent Srđan Predojević, and which practically represents their copy in its concept. The difference is also that Actualities are openly pro-Russian, while Predojević’s show tries to be neutral and, besides the Ukrainian conflict, also addresses some other crisis issues in the world.
(To be continued)