Martin Sellner is a prominent Austrian activist, author, and thought leader widely recognized for his energetic defense of European cultural identity and sovereignty. As the co-founder and key figure in the Identitarian Movement of Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich), which he helped establish in 2012, he has inspired a new generation of activists through modern, media-savvy campaigns that emphasize preserving ethnic and cultural diversity across Europe against the challenges of mass immigration and globalization. With his clear communication style, philosophical background, and prolific work as an author—including influential books outlining strategic visions for political and cultural renewal—Sellner has emerged as one of the most articulate and visible voices in the contemporary European right, passionately advocating for the protection of homeland traditions and demographic stability in an increasingly interconnected world.
In this interview, Austrian activist and political figure Martin Sellner outlines his case for “remigration” as both a legal and political project, arguing that much of what he proposes could be achieved through stricter enforcement of existing laws combined with targeted legal reforms. He discusses the growing influence of the Freedom Party of Austria, the launch of his Institute for Remigration as a pan-European advocacy and research hub, and the broader rise of national-conservative movements across the continent. Sellner also addresses the personal impact of deplatforming and travel bans, while arguing that public opinion is shifting in favor of tighter immigration policies—and that Europe faces a narrowing demographic window to act.
First, I wanted to ask about your book Remigration. In it, you outline structured return policies, including databases and long-term demographic goals. How would these policies comply with current Austrian and EU law? Would the legal framework need to change?
I would say about 60–70% of what I propose is simply enforcing existing law—law that currently isn’t being applied consistently and is often abused. The remaining part would involve expanding the legal framework, not breaking it.
This isn’t unprecedented. If you look at Germany after the first major asylum wave, there was what was called the “asylum compromise,” which introduced significant restrictions. So I support a comprehensive overhaul of asylum and naturalization laws. Naturalization should become much stricter, mass naturalization should stop, and the legal obstacles that currently prevent deportations need to be removed. I want to stress that everything in my proposal is constitutional. It would require an evolution of the legal system, not a violation of it.
And if the Freedom Party of Austria were to enter government with, say, 40% of the vote, do you think they would support those legal changes?
Absolutely. The Freedom Party already has a program focused on reforming asylum and naturalization laws. They are also willing to confront international legal frameworks that obstruct national policy—whether that’s EU law or rulings from international courts. We believe these institutions should not dictate our national future. So yes, I’m confident the Freedom Party would be prepared for that legal battle.
Do you think they could govern alone after the next election?
No, they would need over 50% for that, which is extremely rare in Austria. But if they reach 30–35%, it would be very difficult for other parties to form a coalition without them. In that case, they would almost certainly be part of the next government—likely as the leading force.
You recently launched the Institute for Remigration. Can you explain its mission? Is it focused on research, lobbying, grassroots organizing—or all of the above?
All of the above. I would say we’re not radical—we’re just early. What is considered controversial today will be mainstream tomorrow. What’s truly extreme is the replacement of indigenous populations within a few decades, or the emergence of parallel societies. Remigration is a response to that.
We’ve seen that public opinion is shaped less by parliaments and more by networks—think tanks, NGOs, and activist groups. The left has dominated this space for years. Our institute is meant to counter that.
We aim to function as a European-wide think tank and coordination hub. That includes policy research, political consulting, data analysis, and narrative-building. But we also want to move into grassroots activism—campaigns, organizing, and mobilizing people who want to act but lack structure. Ultimately, the goal is to accelerate what I see as an inevitable political shift in Europe.
You’ve faced entry bans in Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. How has that affected your strategy?
It’s been a long process. First, they tried legal action against the movement I co-founded. When that failed, they moved to deplatforming—removing me from social media, shutting down bank accounts, restricting financial access. When that didn’t work, they began issuing travel bans. In Germany, I was repeatedly prevented from holding events—sometimes with police intervention. But recently, I won a legal case declaring those actions unconstitutional. I’m still banned from the UK and the U.S., though I’m currently applying for a visa. These restrictions are ultimately ineffective—you can’t stop ideas by stopping someone at the border.
Some would argue these measures amount to political suppression.
Of course. We’re often told the West is free, but for many people with dissenting views, that’s simply not the reality. There’s censorship, financial exclusion, and even legal pressure. At the same time, I see it as a sign of weakness. It shows how nervous the establishment has become.
You’ve argued that remigration is becoming mainstream in parts of Europe. What evidence supports that?
Polling data consistently shows that majorities—often between 50% and 70%—support reducing immigration and increasing deportations. Even when the term “remigration” is tested, it often receives majority support. Then you have electoral trends. Right-wing and national-conservative parties are rising across Europe—Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, the UK. The political shift is clear. The problem is that the current elites don’t have an answer to this shift, except censorship and resistance.
You’ve said Europe has a limited window to execute large scale remigration—around 10 to 15 years. Why?
Because of demographics. The current majority in Europe is largely older—what you might call the “boomer generation.” Among younger generations, in many cities, the demographic balance has already shifted. If we don’t act within this window, democratic change may no longer be possible. Once a demographic shift becomes irreversible, political outcomes follow. That’s why I’m focused on this issue now. I believe the time for action is very limited.
