Hungarian society is so polarized that there is practically no longer a shared understanding of reality, which was clearly visible during the spy affair when leaked recordings of conversations involving the foreign minister were meant to serve as evidence of information leaking from the EU toward Moscow. The two political camps, Fidesz and Tisza, in the words of Hungarian journalist Mátyás Kohán, do not share a common view even of the events themselves, let alone their consequences.
“For opposition voters, Szijjártó is a Russian agent and a ‘Trojan horse’ within the EU. Supporters of the government, however, emphasize that he is one of the most open and accessible ministers, and that nothing that has leaked so far—whether it concerns helping the Slovak prime minister establish contact with Moscow or discussions with Sergey Lavrov about easing sanctions—is contrary to his public positions. His opposition to sanctions and his willingness to assist allies in contacts with third countries are not hidden stances, but part of his open political communication, which a segment of voters clearly supports.”
When asked whether this affair led to significant changes in voter preferences, our interlocutor says that the core electorate on both sides is stable and numbers in the millions. Such complex campaigns, he believes, are aimed at an ever smaller group of undecided voters.
“It is impossible to precisely assess their effect, but it is clear that they will not be the decisive factor—elections will be decided on the basis of structural issues, not scandals.”
Public opinion polls show diametrically opposed results—while some pollsters give a clear advantage to Viktor Orbán’s party, others predict its inevitable defeat. Where is the truth?
Due to the generally low accuracy of public opinion research in Hungary—which was true even for more predictable elections like those in 2022, and even more so for the 2026 elections, which are structurally different in many aspects from the previous three electoral cycles—I cannot say with certainty where the truth lies. What I can do is indicate where I believe the truth is, and where it certainly is not, based on what we know—not only from public opinion research.
The Hungarian polling industry is characterized прежде свега by political parallelism: political parties usually rely on a predefined circle of research agencies and, with rare exceptions, do not engage those considered close to the opposing political camp. This has led to the development of trust-based relationships between pollsters and the politicians they work with, making them to some extent more willing to participate in shaping public perception through polling if their political clients wish so. In this campaign, Fidesz primarily relies on surveys by the Nézőpont and Századvég agencies, while Tisza works with Medián and 21 Kutatóközpont. Závecz Research, IDEA, Republikon, and Publicus—smaller institutes previously associated with the now-weakened left opposition—also publish polls favoring Tisza, attempting to survive the political collapse of their former client base and adapt to new circumstances.
Another issue is that Hungarians today are less willing than ever to respond to pollsters, while key voter groups are practically inaccessible to the most commonly used methods. Telephone surveys—which dominate—are based on outdated databases from the last public phone directories and are often conducted by the same subcontractors for multiple agencies. Online and hybrid surveys show disproportionately high participation from younger respondents, while field research is expensive and rare. This gives enormous importance to how researchers process raw data in order to make it representative. In addition, they can rely only on census data and polling station results, since Hungarian electoral authorities do not publish the sociological structure of voting, unlike, for example, Germany.
Errors by pollsters in the previous election cycle were significant: the trend was to overestimate the opposition and underestimate the government, even among pro-government agencies. In other words, even with the best intentions, accurate polling in Hungary is difficult to conduct—and intentions are not always the best. There were periods when pro-government agencies did not publish results for months, while some pro-opposition surveys were burdened with obvious inconsistencies. For example, Medián’s latest survey estimated turnout at 89%, with over 90% among young people—figures that are difficult to sustain given that the historical maximum was 70.5%, and young voters are traditionally among the least active. The same survey also shows that the far-right party Mi Hazánk is strongest in liberal Budapest, even though its voter base is concentrated in poorer rural areas—further calling into question the assumptions underlying the results.
Despite all this, I believe that internal party polling is more reliable than public surveys, and that pro-government agencies conduct more frequent and extensive research. Therefore, I believe that leaked internal polling from the ruling party is closest to reality. Since the end of last summer, these have consistently shown a narrow but steady lead for Fidesz—on the order of 1 to 5 percent—along with a positive trend in most single-member districts since November. The latest estimate by the Nézőpont agency, giving Fidesz the lead in 66 districts, Tisza in 39, and leaving one to an independent candidate, is consistent with these findings. According to leaked information, Medián has similar internal results but presents them differently in public. In conclusion, I expect a close result in the party lists, with a slight advantage for Fidesz, while in single-member districts Fidesz may lose some urban strongholds but retain a clear overall advantage due to the concentration of opposition voters in large cities.
How much space, given the Hungarian electoral system, is left for smaller parties, and can they influence the final outcome of the elections?
Without a clear majority, the Hungarian electoral system makes such a scenario unlikely, because the outcome is largely decided in single-member constituencies, where only the two largest political forces or blocs have a realistic chance of victory. I would even dare to say that the chance of any party other than Tisza and Fidesz–KDNP winning a mandate in such a constituency is practically zero in this election cycle. The only scenario in which a third party—realistically Mi Hazánk—could become decisive would look like this: Tisza would win the party-list vote by a margin small enough for Fidesz–KDNP to still secure more mandates in single-member districts, due to the concentration of Tisza’s voters in urban areas, but large enough to prevent Fidesz–KDNP from forming an absolute majority. The probability of such a scenario, however, is lower than the likelihood that one of the two major parties will win an outright majority.
The Democratic Coalition and the MKKP have already announced that, in such a case, they would form a coalition exclusively with Tisza, but it is unlikely that they will even enter parliament. It is unclear how Mi Hazánk would react. Its electorate includes both those who want a change of government and would support an alliance with Tisza, and those who generally agree with Fidesz–KDNP policies and vote for Mi Hazánk as a warning to the ruling party, aiming to force it into a coalition. For this reason, the movement’s leader, László Toroczkai, has refused to commit in advance to a coalition with either side and has announced that in such a situation he would negotiate with both to see who is willing to make greater concessions. It is still assumed, however, that in such a case he would be more likely to choose Fidesz–KDNP, although this is not certain.
As election day approaches, increasingly loud warnings are coming from the European Union about the consequences Hungary would face in the event of a Fidesz victory. How are Hungarian citizens reacting to such pressure?
External pressure directed at Hungary because of policies that are highly popular domestically has proven politically beneficial for Fidesz–KDNP, while at the same time harming the opposition, which advocates closer cooperation with the EU and is perceived by part of the electorate as subordinate or even traitorous. The freezing of EU funds has somewhat altered this dynamic, as economic voting is traditionally an important factor in Hungary. Although the decision to freeze funds is extremely unpopular and it is difficult to ignore the fact that funds were quickly unblocked for Poland after the 2023 elections—suggesting political pressure—this period has coincided with weak economic growth in Europe, posing an additional risk for Hungary’s export-oriented economy. The freezing of funds hit Hungary at a moment when it was already vulnerable and further worsened negative economic trends. This has partly distanced some pragmatic, economically motivated voters from Fidesz and mobilized a portion of previously undecided voters in favor of the opposition. Thus, it has indirectly weakened Fidesz–KDNP, even though political conflicts with the EU on issues such as migration, LGBTQ+ policies, or Ukraine remain highly beneficial for the ruling party.
