Anti-Russian sentiment is growing in Azerbaijan, and it’s not hard to assume that the Russian-Iranian strategic agreement has placed Aliyev before a choice: either move toward the Russia–Iran axis or go against it. But where can Aliyev actually turn—and why? Pashinyan’s fixed idea is the transition from a “historical” to a “realistic” Armenia.
ALIYEV’S ILLUSION
Let us recall that on April 21, Vladimir Putin signed the law ratifying the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran. The Iranian side has yet to ratify the agreement. The document, signed by the presidents of the two countries—Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian—on January 17, contains 47 articles. The agreement stipulates that if either side faces an external threat, the other is obligated not to assist the aggressor and to strive for peaceful conflict resolution based on the UN Charter.
In addition, Iran’s official government spokeswoman, Fatemeh Mohajerani, stated that Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iran is being coordinated through diplomatic channels. Previously, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi mentioned that Tehran expects the Russian leader to visit Iran in 2025. What this visit means for the Azerbaijan–Israel tandem needs little speculation.
Until the conclusion of the Russia–Iran agreement, Aliyev felt secure in his relations with Iran, counting on Russia’s protection or loyalty. However, after January 17, it became clear that Russia and Iran are embarking on a long-term partnership. Now, Azerbaijan perceives a threat even from Russia. Sensing the weakening of Russian influence in the South Caucasus, Aliyev seeks to assert himself as a regional factor through anti-Russian moves. Still, this is an illusion—and the geographic map itself confirms it. Azerbaijan does not share borders with Israel, Turkey, or even Nakhchivan. In this geographic configuration, Azerbaijan poses no strategic problem for Russia.
Precisely for this reason, Israel and the U.S. are now trying to encourage Armenia to open the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which would connect Azerbaijan with NATO ally Turkey, thereby pitting NATO’s interests against Russia’s with far-reaching anti-Russian objectives. This may also explain why Armenia’s Prime Minister recently made a brief visit to the U.S. and met with predominantly pro-Israeli American organizations (Atlantic Council, Heritage Foundation, etc.).
THROUGH THE TURANIAN CORRIDOR TOWARD THE PARTITION OF SOUTHERN ARMENIA
Thanks to Iran’s principled stance, there is a clear understanding within Russian political circles that corridors passing through countries neighboring Iran—as well as in regions of Western and Central Asia—fall into two categories: they are either competitors to Iran’s own corridors, or they are anti-Iranian projects. The anti-Iranian corridors are designed with the goal of border and geopolitical shifts, bringing negative consequences for Iran in the geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural spheres. In these corridors, trade and goods transit are only secondary objectives—the true aim lies in security and historically rooted territorial expansion.
At the heart of these corridors is the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” or more accurately, the NATO “Turanian Corridor.” Azerbaijan seeks to ensure that the main international East–West and North–South routes pass through its territory, aligning with what are considered natural economic and transit activities. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan began pushing for the creation of a corridor in southern Armenia.
By using the toponym “Zangezur” to refer to southern Armenia, Azerbaijani President Aliyev has repeatedly threatened Yerevan with the creation of a “Zangezur Corridor”—politically or militarily—which immediately provoked negative reactions from Armenia, Iran, and other countries. The goal of Baku and Ankara is to partition southern Armenia, aligning with pan-Turkist objectives. In essence, the use of the misleading term “Zangezur Corridor” instead of the more accurate “NATO Turanian Corridor” is flawed from historical, political, and legal perspectives. The term “Zangezur Corridor,” or Aliyev’s fabricated notion of “Western Zangezur,” refers to the Syunik Province with its capital in Kapan, located in southern Armenia and forming the border with Iran. In reality, this toponym expresses territorial claims toward Syunik.
If implemented, the NATO Turanian Corridor would transform the entire transit map of the region. This corridor is designed to eliminate the border between Iran and Armenia (by transferring the Syunik Province to Azerbaijan—under any name, even as a transportation route) and to establish a geographic link for Pan-Turkism along the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Central Asia axis, aligned with the goals of global actors and NATO (with a hub in London). In doing so, it would lay the groundwork for serious strikes against the key interests of China, Russia, and Iran in four strategic areas.
DISRUPTING THE TRANSIT CORRIDORS OF RUSSIA, CHINA, AND IRAN
A few words about the transit sector. Russia, China, and Iran are currently focused on four major transit projects: the Silk Road Revival Project or Belt and Road Initiative, the North–South Corridor, the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor, and the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) Corridor. Within the framework of NATO’s Turanian Corridor, Ankara plans to carve a “corridor” from Turkey through the Caucasus and into Central Asia, and further into Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gwadar). In doing so, the four aforementioned corridors would be, to some extent, disrupted, obstructed, or weakened. The significance of this issue lies in the fact that American think tanks have openly stated that the consequences of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative are far more critical than any military threat China poses to the United States. The fact that Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan insisted on Afghanistan—where Dari and Pashto are spoken—gaining observer status in the so-called Council of Turkic-Speaking States is also a consequence of this matter, specifically Afghanistan’s geographical role in the Turkish Lapis Lazuli (Lazurite) Corridor.
REMOVING RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN GAS FROM THE GAME
In the energy sector, NATO’s Turanian Corridor is intended to ensure the flow of gas from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Baku. There is currently a gas pipeline consisting of three segments: the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), and the final segment from Baku to Italy. However, Baku alone does not have enough gas to supply this pipeline. If the Turanian Corridor is implemented and gas from the three mentioned countries is added to the flow, Europe will no longer need Russian gas from Nord Stream or Iranian gas from the Nabucco project. This would weaken the geopolitical energy leverage of both Russia and Iran. Simultaneously, China would face challenges in securing energy supplies from Central Asia, especially from Turkmenistan.
On the ethnic level, NATO’s Turanian Corridor aims to create a broad ethnic current based on Pan-Turkism in the Iranian regions populated by Azerbaijanis, building on the ethnic foundations that Baku and Ankara have developed for decades. Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Tatars, and Uyghurs together form the Turkic belt within Iran (Turkmen regions), in China (Uyghur regions), and in Russia (Tatar and Turkish regions).
NATO AT CHINA’S BORDERS
The “Turanian Corridor” is designed to bring NATO directly to the northern borders of Iran, the southern borders of Russia, and the western borders of China, specifically the Xinjiang Province—thus completing the encirclement strategy against these nations and laying the groundwork for their fragmentation. NATO’s ambition for eastward expansion did not vanish after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Adam Thomson, former UK Permanent Representative to NATO, the Alliance will not give up on such a strategically vital region as the Caucasus and Central Asia. He emphasizes that the Turanian Corridor will bring NATO to China’s borders. To believe that, since Turkey is already a NATO member, the Alliance has no need to be present in regions like the Caucasus and Central Asia is highly naive. If that were the case, NATO wouldn’t have expanded to Ukraine, Sweden, and Finland, and such moves wouldn’t have provoked conflict with Russia—especially considering that Estonia, Latvia (since 2004), and Poland (since 1999) are already NATO members.
Another key NATO strategy is to encircle Russia, China, and Iran, and establishing a presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is a critical step toward that goal. Furthermore, one of NATO’s strategic intentions with the Turanian Corridor is to strengthen the bloc of Turkic-speaking nations, effectively forming a “Turkish NATO,” much like the “Arab NATO” represented by the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). Therefore, despite Russia’s well-known sensitivity to NATO’s eastward expansion, the Alliance was not content with Turkey’s membership alone. It has steadily developed initiatives such as “Partnership for Peace,” the “Individual Partnership Action Plan,” and “Open Skies” programs with several post-Soviet states.
CONTAINMENT OF IRAN, RUSSIA, AND CHINA
Iran views the creation of the Zangezur Corridor (the NATO Turanian Corridor) as a weakening of its geopolitical position, as well as its geo-economic and geo-cultural capabilities in the region. First, this geopolitical instability is being planned with the aim of altering borders and geopolitical realities, severing the border between Iran and Armenia, and strengthening pan-Turkism. In the meantime, Iran is losing its role in the relationship between the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
Second, Turkey, as an agent of NATO, is attempting to implement a Western plan for containing Iran, Russia, and China, in order to prevent the formation of a new regional order. At the center of this plan is the Turanian NATO Corridor, whose goal is to align the transit and energy equations and plans of the three regional powers, to expand NATO’s reach toward the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and to promote Turanian-British ethnocentrism.
Third, Iran is losing its key role as an intermediary between Turkey and Central Asia. With the completion of this route, the East–West corridor between Turkey and Central Asia will be pushed into the background. A significant portion of Turkey’s trade with Central Asia depends on freight traffic through Russia and Iran. Each year, 43,000 Turkish trucks pass through Iran to reach Central Asia. With the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, Ankara will gain a new alternative and a shorter route for trade with Central Asia. Since Turkey’s trade route to that region currently passes through Iran, this direction will lose its importance with the opening of the new corridor.
Iran will also lose its point of integration with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which it currently maintains through Armenia. At present, there are three routes—through Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey—that provide Iran with access to Europe. The route through Armenia, which is Iran’s most reliable gateway to Europe, will be threatened with the opening of this corridor. Additionally, Iran views Armenia as the “gateway” for reaching the markets of Russia and other EAEU members. A free trade agreement between Iran and the EAEU was signed in 2018 and entered into force in 2019.
Finally, if the so-called Zangezur Corridor is realized, it will further diminish Iran’s crucial role in East–West transportation, and in energy debates, Iran’s access to its target markets will be undermined.
FEAR OF NEO-OTTOMANISM
Dr. Ahmad Kazemi, author of the book “Security in the South Caucasus,” stated for the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations of Iran: “Azerbaijan is attempting to create an imaginary pan-Turkic corridor in southern Armenia under the pretext of establishing a connection with Turkey and the rest of Europe. Instead, Iran has proposed the Aras Corridor, which for three decades has played a unique role for Iran in providing a land link between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.”
Naturally, apart from Britain, which was the creator of Pan-Turkism in the 19th century, other European countries do not support the “Zangezur Corridor” due to fears of neo-Ottomanism. They are paying greater attention to the Middle Corridor, which is fundamentally different in nature from the “Zangezur” route. China does not support the “Zangezur Corridor” due to security concerns related to the Uyghurs, but does not oppose the Middle Corridor as one of the region’s transit pathways.
The Middle Corridor, as a communication route, has attracted the interest of Central Asian countries over the past few decades. This corridor is associated with the “Zangezur Corridor” (NATO’s Turanian Corridor), which was proposed after the 2020 Karabakh war. The differences between them are vast, and understanding those differences helps clarify the nature of each corridor.
The Middle Corridor begins in China’s sea and land ports, passes through Kazakhstan to the port of Aktau, and then—crossing the Caspian Sea by ship—reaches the port of Baku in Azerbaijan. From there, transport continues by rail to the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi, and then across the Black Sea to the Romanian port of Constanța and the Bulgarian port of Varna. Another route follows the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, enters Turkey, and continues to the ports of Mersin and Istanbul, allowing further maritime links with various parts of Europe.
In contrast, the Turanian Corridor, which passes from Azerbaijani territory to Nakhchivan and from there into Turkey, blocks Iran’s geopolitical position and establishes a geographic link for Pan-Turkism.
APPROACHING ISRAEL
Since 2002, when the Israeli lobby (AIPAC) helped Azerbaijan overturn Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, which restricted state aid to Azerbaijan, Israel has become Baku’s closest ally. Both Israel and Azerbaijan perceive Iran as a threat, making their cooperation appear natural. Since then, Baku and Jerusalem have grown into close partners, especially in key areas of military and energy cooperation.
Azerbaijan is a major energy exporter to Israel, supplying 55% of Israel’s oil imports. In return, Israel sells weapons and military technology to Azerbaijan worth billions of dollars. Between 2016 and 2021, Israeli weapons accounted for 69% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports. These shipments included missile interception systems and drones, which played a significant role in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
From 2016 to 2023, a total of 92 arms export flights were conducted from an Israeli military base to Azerbaijan. These flights intensified just before Azerbaijan’s military offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The ongoing war in Gaza has not disrupted this cooperation. Azerbaijan even allowed Mossad to use an advanced observation base for monitoring Iran and prepared an airfield that Israel could potentially use in the event of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Some analysts in Baku are so confident in the prospects of further rapprochement with Israel that they claim: “If the United States decides to support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Azerbaijan could play a supporting role”.
However, such a conclusion is highly controversial. Any armed conflict in the region is especially undesirable for energy-exporting countries, as their production facilities become potential targets for attacks by opposing sides. This risk becomes even more significant if Azerbaijan were to be directly drawn into a military confrontation with neighboring Iran in the role of a “partner” of one side, as some experts in Baku suggest.
Two important aspects are worth considering here. Relations between Russia and both Armenia and Azerbaijan are going through a complex period. Armenian society and political elites remain traumatized by the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh after two devastating military defeats. They are attempting to place part of the blame on Moscow, while also seeking to diversify their foreign policy by strengthening ties with the United States and the European Union.
INAPPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION IN THE PARADE
The cooling of Russian-Azerbaijani relations occurred in the context of the crash of an AZAL passenger plane, which was flying from Baku to Grozny on December 25, 2024, and went down near the Kazakh city of Aktau. President Ilham Aliyev’s refusal to participate in the Victory Parade in Moscow was welcomed with pride in Baku and assessed as a justified and dignified move—especially in light of recent incidents: the downing of the AZAL civilian aircraft, cyberattacks on official Azerbaijani resources, and the denial of entry to an Azerbaijani MP into Russia. According to statements from Azerbaijan, these events made participation in the parade inappropriate.
The following are comments by several Baku politicians and experts. Political scientist and MP Rasim Musabekov believes that attending events in Moscow under current conditions is dangerous and inappropriate. He cites as reasons the lack of a Russian response to the downed AZAL civilian aircraft and other contentious developments, including the entry ban on an Azerbaijani MP. He emphasizes that all commercial flights to Russia have been canceled and that participating in the parade in Moscow could be interpreted as “support for Russia’s unacceptable policy toward Ukraine.” Azerbaijan, he says, clearly supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and rejects rhetoric about a “fascist regime” in Kyiv, as well as the participation of representatives from the LNR, DNR, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. He believes it is obvious that “this company is not for us,” and that Moscow already understands well the strength and regional importance of Azerbaijan. Attempts to act against it by force, propaganda, or economic pressure will provoke a proportional response.
He adds that Russia must understand that 90% of the world’s countries do not have a favorable view of it. “The president of Turkey—Azerbaijan’s strategic partner—is not coming to Moscow. Nor are the Prime Minister of Israel or the leader of Hungary, with whom we have good relations. Why, then, should Azerbaijan be an exception?”
Natig Jafarli, leader of the REAL party, believes that the decision not to go to Moscow was the right one and shows that Azerbaijan is the least dependent country in the region when it comes to Russia, and that in the last five to six years, official Baku has played a key role in weakening Russian influence in the South Caucasus.
GEORGE RIBBON — A SYMBOL OF OCCUPATION?
Elchin Alioghlu, director of the Baku Network, states that President Aliyev’s absence from the Victory Parade in Moscow is not a gesture or diplomatic protest, but rather a demonstration of Azerbaijan’s refusal to be seen as a tagalong in someone else’s geopolitical plans. A country that has restored its territorial integrity and gone through complex diplomatic phases no longer wants to take part in symbolic events for the sake of false respect.
In recent months, serious disagreements have accumulated between Baku and Moscow. If Moscow still considers Baku its “younger brother,” then it is time to take another look at the modern map of Eurasia. The Kremlin must understand that the era of hierarchies is over. President Ilham Aliyev conducts a foreign policy in which partners are judged not by past merits, but by the attitude they show today. That is the rule of the new world: respect is not proclaimed — it is earned. Not with words, but with actions.
Elkhan Shahinoglu, director of the “Atlas” Center for Political Studies, believes that Aliyev’s boycott of the parade in Moscow is a correct strategic decision. First, most of the parade guests wore the George Ribbon — a symbol of Russian aggression. When chauvinists in Russia occupied Georgian territories, they wore those ribbons. The same ribbons are worn during the aggressive war against Ukraine. The president of Azerbaijan, who supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, will not wear the symbol of an occupier. In many countries, that ribbon is officially or unofficially banned as a symbol that promotes war aggression, as is the case in Georgia.
Second, during the parade on Red Square, the host repeatedly used the phrase: “This equipment is used in the special operation,” without mentioning Ukraine. This further illustrates the political use of the parade by the Kremlin, which has turned the event into an ideological platform.
Former Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov notes that, aside from the obvious reason—the plane crash—there are other factors not yet disclosed, primarily related to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
TIME FOR RUSSIA TO ASK QUESTIONS
Security expert and political scientist Arastun Orujlou believes that the participation of the heroic Azerbaijani army—which liberated its territories from occupation—alongside the criminal and occupying Russian army in a parade is an insult to Azerbaijan, its military, and its people. He adds that Aliyev should have at least responded to the deportation of an Azerbaijani MP who was on his way to celebrate his father’s birthday that day, but was incapable of doing so. The chairman of the Azerbaijani parliamentary commission for combating foreign interference and hybrid threats, Ramid Namazov, stated on May 2 that the cyberattack on several Azerbaijani media outlets, which occurred on February 20, 2025, was organized from Russia.
According to his claims, “the attack was conducted at a high technical level by the cyber-espionage group APT29 (‘Cozy Bear,’ also known as ‘Midnight Blizzard’ and ‘The Dukes’), connected to Russian structures.” “The cyberattacks on the Azerbaijani media group Global Media were systematic and targeted, with the main goal of manipulating public opinion and undermining national informational sovereignty,” said Azerbaijani MP Nagif Gamzayev. According to him, the duration and intensity of the attacks indicate that they were not spontaneous but premeditated.
The topic of cyberattacks originating from Russian territory is particularly sensitive in the context of bilateral relations and requires a thoughtful approach. This list of openly anti-Russian statements could go on. Russian media also commented on Aliyev’s refusal to travel to Moscow. For example, in the article “He Took Revenge for Everything: What Did Aliyev Trade Victory Day For?” the author wrote: “Meanwhile, brazen disregard for Victory Day may be the last straw for the Kremlin, which may finally start responding harshly. This suspicious ‘friendship’ with a republic that supplies our enemies with weapons no longer seems necessary to anyone, except perhaps business partners of the Azerbaijani oligarchy. It is time we start asking questions—not only about the legality of trade and the presence of migrants in our country. It’s time to find out what happened to the Russian officers in Karabakh.”
THREATS FROM BAKU
Let us recall that in September 2023, Azerbaijani forces fired on a “UAZ-Patriot” vehicle carrying Russian peacekeepers near the village of Janyatag. All soldiers in the vehicle were killed, including two deputy commanders of the peacekeeping contingent. If we continue to act so passively and mildly, without responding to Baku’s provocations, such incidents will continue to occur.
According to threats reported by IA Turan, “Azerbaijani officials are currently preparing documentation for an international legal case, aiming to hold Moscow responsible for the downing of the aircraft and the death of 38 passengers near Aktau airport in Kazakhstan. The official stance is firm: Russia must acknowledge its role, compensate the victims, and punish those responsible. If this does not happen, Azerbaijani officials warn that further diplomatic escalation will follow.”
“Dialogue remains a possibility, but Moscow must take responsibility,” said a statement from the state news agency APA. “If Russia refuses, Baku is prepared to take further steps.”
Such measures have already been initiated in Baku, as confirmed by a demonstrative act of support for Kyiv—granting one million dollars in humanitarian aid—at a time when domestic media are running an intense anti-Russian campaign with unfounded accusations regarding Russia’s “imperial ambitions,” claiming that it leads an “aggressive propaganda campaign against Azerbaijan,” and even alleging that Russia has taken Armenia’s side in the conflict with Baku by supplying it with weapons and attempting to subject the Caucasus region to its influence.
An interesting situation has arisen: due to Western influence, relations with Russia have been damaged in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, this did not prevent Nikol Pashinyan from traveling to the Victory Parade in Moscow, despite strong pressure from the European Union, which called on all partners and member states to boycott the event.
On that occasion, the President of the National Assembly of Armenia, Alen Simonyan, stated: “This is our victory too. Three hundred thousand Armenians gave their lives for it; many fought in the armies of the Allied countries. That is why Pashinyan’s participation in the May 9 celebrations is primarily a matter of historical memory and respect, not political signaling.”
TRANSITION FROM HISTORICAL TO REAL RELATIONS
Ahead of his visit, Pashinyan made some notable statements while presenting the government’s performance report to the parliament. He described the current relations between Yerevan and Moscow as a shift “from historical Armenian-Russian relations to real ones.” This, he said, is part of a broader process—“a demarcation between real and historical Armenia,” which, “not only are incompatible, but pose a serious threat to one another.”
The topic of Armenian-Russian relations, which have been rapidly changing since 2020, is usually viewed through the lens of confrontation between Russia and the West. The reasons are clear, and Armenia’s leadership actively contributes to this view, readily showcasing its new priorities. However, Pashinyan assigns even greater meaning to these changes, framing the choice not as one between geopolitical orientations, but as a choice between past and future.
By the past, judging not only from his recent statements but also from actions over the past few years, he means not so much reliance on Russia as the entire set of cultural-historical notions embedded in national consciousness.
The most intriguing aspect of Pashinyan’s remarks is that he boldly defies the global trend dominating world politics today. He proposes casting off historical shadows that “hang like lead weights” from the legs of modern statehood and allowing the state to develop as it actually exists in reality. However, such tendencies do not align with the minimalist pragmatism currently prevailing in global affairs.
Over the past decades, moderation and caution—prioritizing the prosperity and security of citizens—were considered virtues of small and medium-sized states. Great powers, either explicitly or tacitly, committed to supporting such an approach and maintaining the status quo through various institutions. This was the consensus during the period from decolonization up to the crisis of global liberalism. Leaders who attempted to alter the territorial status quo according to their own visions encountered resistance.
However, after the Cold War, a growing number of incidents began to emerge, mostly due to the disintegration of large states (the USSR, Yugoslavia, and some African countries), where maintaining the administrative boundaries that emerged from these breakups was accepted as the norm, no matter how artificial those lines might have been.
SAKASHVILI’S ANTIPATHY TOWARD GEORGIAN IDENTITY
Today we have entered a new phase. With the weakening of global universalism, national-historical sentiments are reawakening. What was recently taboo is now considered acceptable. The violent resolution of territorial and border disputes, where possible, faces fewer institutional barriers. National identity and the sense of belonging are increasingly becoming integral to state reorganization—whether for better or for worse.
Political science classics Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba emphasized: “Statesmen striving to establish political democracy often concentrate their efforts on building a formal set of democratic institutions. They may focus on creating political parties to foster mass participation. But stable and effective democratic governance requires more than mere institutional and administrative structures. Its development depends on political culture. If that culture cannot support a democratic system, the chances of its success are slim.”
It must be acknowledged that Pashinyan is not the first statesman in the South Caucasus willing to radically sever ties with the past for the sake of the future. Mikheil Saakashvili openly displayed his aversion to everything that made up the unique Georgian socio-cultural core, as that identity poorly aligned with neoliberal reforms. The result of his nearly decade-long experiment was twofold: on one hand, the reformist momentum produced tangible results—even his opponents admit progress in transforming public administration. On the other hand, turning Georgians into a “service people,” stripped of national pride and placed at the service of a “service economy,” did not take root. Society rejected the reformer with gendarme methods, and his political downfall was met with relief.
To Georgia’s credit and that of its active class, the attempt to sever ties with “historical Georgia” led to the right lesson: breaking with the past by force leads nowhere—be it in socio-economic or (geo)political matters.
Transferring the experience of Georgia then to Armenia today is hardly appropriate—the global, regional, and domestic situations are fundamentally different. And it seems there is no figure in Armenia today comparable in destructive force to Mikheil Saakashvili. Pashinyan is too weak, less charismatic, and less determined. But one conclusion can still be drawn: renouncing social and political tradition is a painful and risky process. Even when rejected, tradition tends to return—like a boomerang. And mishandling that weapon is most dangerous for the one who wields it.
FATAL MISTAKE OF TBILISI
Another important distinction: Saakashvili’s social experiments were accompanied by the offensive policies of the U.S. and EU in the post-Soviet space, along with their active support. It is true that Tbilisi made a fatal mistake in assuming that such support included military guarantees in the event of a conflict with Russia. Still, at the time, Western capitals genuinely anticipated a rapid geopolitical reorganization of the region in favor of Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The era of “color revolutions” and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East marked the peak of direct Western involvement in reshaping territories south and east of the Atlantic. In that context, Saakashvili—who covered the country in EU and NATO flags—had some grounds to expect accelerated integration into a different geopolitical alliance.
However, his gamble failed for two main reasons: the excessive ambitions of the Georgian elites, who saw themselves as “the heart of Europe” while ignoring their own tradition (for instance, Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani, who after long wanderings across Europe emigrated to Russia with Vakhtang VI and settled in Moscow); and the mounting challenges faced by Western policies as a whole.
Today’s situation in Armenia somewhat resembles that time—the confrontation between Russia and the West has reached a new level. But unlike Georgia, which could then rely on systemic (though limited) support, no one is promising Armenia anything concrete today. All Western focus is directed elsewhere. Armenia is being offered a path toward the “collective West” at its own risk—with one problem it is allowed to bring along: Russia.
APPROACHING TURKEY – DESPITE THE PAIN, TEAR HISTORY OUT OF YOURSELF
When it comes to the central issue—the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the normalization of relations with Turkey—Yerevan will have to rely solely on itself. Russia’s services have been rejected, and the support of the EU, particularly from France and the United States, boils down to encouraging words. Yerevan has no one to lean on, and its own capacity to defend its positions is limited.
Questions remain—who is responsible for the collapse of Armenia’s defense capabilities, and to what extent could allies have compensated for that deficiency? Armenian authorities primarily blame Moscow for failing to provide support at critical moments, to which responses have been both argumentative and rhetorical.
Be that as it may, one must start from reality. And it is precisely Pashinyan’s logic that is used to justify the irreversibility of that reality: giving up ambitions and historical interpretations for the sake of reconciliation with neighbors. But it is clear that this won’t help. Time has shown that Armenia’s pursuit of rational moderation clashes with the intentions of others—primarily a belligerent Azerbaijan.
The policy of the Armenian leadership has brought the country to a point where it has no one to rely on, and its closest representative of the “collective West” is Turkey. It is not out of the question that the demarcation proposed by Pashinyan—between real and historical Armenia—will force Yerevan to “demarcate” even from its own most sacred legacy: the memory of the Genocide. Thus, relations with a key neighbor—who in truth does not care—might “improve.”
The childish and incoherent attempts of Pashinyan and his team of unskilled “kinder-surprises” to construct a model of behavior in an era of global transformation are doomed to failure. Pashinyan himself admits: “The process of demarcation between real and historical Armenia is far more painful because it is happening inside each of us.”
If we pause for a moment, the image appears grim: every Armenian is being asked to, despite the pain, rip their history out of themselves and remain rootless in their native land, exposed on a windswept geopolitical parapet, where fierce winds blow and the horizon is shrouded in thick fog. What will remain after such an operation—it is hard to imagine.
