The contemporary geopolitical map of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula underwent significant changes in 2025–2026. Notably, this is happening against the backdrop of a vague and uncertain future for NATO: France has expressed a desire to leave the bloc, as it once did during the Cold War; the United States is refusing to invest in its allies and is openly demonstrating intentions to annex the territory of another NATO member; and the situation regarding the admission of new members, such as Ukraine, also appears openly unclear. As a response to this political and military instability, new independent regional-level defense alliances are beginning to take shape.
ISRAEL’S PRECEDENT-SETTING MOVE
The most vivid example of this trend has been the Balkan alliance JDODC under Turkish patronage. However, today we are witnessing the emergence of its “mirror image” and a direct potential adversary — the strategic triangle of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. This grouping represents a logical response to Ankara’s expansion; moreover, it simultaneously demonstrates a deeper shift — the transformation of the very concept of military deterrence. In the new configuration, deterrence relies less on symmetry of forces and increasingly on risk management, information, and the speed of response to threats. The “Aegean Shield” serves as another striking indication that we are entering an era in which rigid, inefficient defense alliances (such as NATO or its Russian analogue, the CSTO) are being replaced by small alliances that emphasize modularity, technological efficiency, and advanced technical intelligence. These alliances are not only smaller (and therefore more flexible) and cheaper, but they also allow problems to be addressed precisely at the regional level, without involving unnecessary external actors in zones of core interest.
First of all, it is important to establish a key fact: the emergence of this alliance signals radical changes in Israel’s military philosophy. Historically, Tel Aviv adhered to a doctrine of reliance on its own forces (although this always appeared somewhat exaggerated given the Jewish state’s strategic dependence on the United States), and it was extremely reluctant to enter formal defense alliances. However, Turkey’s ambitions and its active operations in Syria, Iraq, and Africa have created a set of threats for Israel that cannot be neutralized alone. In this situation, the Israeli leadership took an unprecedented step, effectively offering Athens and Nicosia the role of its forward defensive perimeter. In addition, the lessons of the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 clearly demonstrated that in a high-intensity conflict Israel critically needs strategic depth. During those hostilities, Cyprus formally acted as a kind of remote rear for Tel Aviv, providing an evacuation point for Israeli civilian aviation and naval assets; today, this experience and the conclusions drawn from it are forming the basis of a permanent military alliance.
THE MEDITERRANEAN TRIANGLE CHANGES THE BALANCE OF POWER
It is also important to understand that the “Mediterranean triangle” fundamentally alters the balance of power that for decades was considered immutable. For a long time, the Turkish armed forces dominated the region not only due to their size but also because of the pace of technological modernization, while the Greek army, despite its scale, remained rooted in the 20th century. Cooperation with Israel gives Greece the opportunity to make a generational leap: Athens gains access to Israel’s military ecosystem with all its distinct advantages — powerful technical intelligence, expert analytical systems, high-quality military education, and access to advanced air operation planning methodologies. In short, this is not merely about acquiring new weapons, but about embedding modern methods of warfare into the structure of the Greek and Cypriot armed forces.
By forming JDODC in the Balkans, military advisers of the Turkish Republic advanced the concept of achieving regional military dominance through the creation of a local intelligence ecosystem that relies heavily on a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles, a network of cybersecurity centers, and Ankara’s own satellite constellation. In the triangle “Israel–Greece–Cyprus,” we see a symmetrical response — and one that constitutes a full-fledged military alliance, where Israel’s technological core and Greek-Cypriot geography merge into a system capable of countering Turkey even without direct combat engagement.
This assessment is confirmed by the reaction of the Turkish general staff and analytical centers such as the National Intelligence Academy (MİA): Ankara views what is happening as the creation of a deterrence system directed against it, in the form of a sensor, electronic warfare, and missile barrier that deprives the Republic of freedom of maneuver within its chosen “Blue Homeland” doctrine.
Note: The “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine is a Turkish maritime strategy proclaimed in 2019 by retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz and supported by Erdoğan. It equates maritime zones (continental shelf, EEZ) with land territory, asserting claims over 462,000 km² in the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean.
TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR GREECE AND THE DOCTRINE OF “ISLAND FORTRESSES”
For decades, Turkey’s military superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean was based on a rapidly developing defense industry and Ankara’s ability to saturate potential theaters of operations with inexpensive and effective military-technical solutions (notably various types of robotic weapons, which have become a hallmark of the Turkish Republic in recent years). Greece appeared to be lagging in this arms race, adhering to classic military approaches of the past century: its army was a cumbersome, inflexible structure focused on passive defense and burdened with an aging equipment fleet ill-suited to modern warfare realities. Cooperation with Israel radically changes this balance — the Jewish state possesses a broad range of technologies capable of transforming the scattered islands of the Aegean archipelago into a unified, integrated combat system.
At the center of this process is the Achilles Shield project — an ambitious plan to create a multi-layered air and missile defense dome costing over three billion euros. The integration of Israeli Barak MX and David’s Sling systems with Greece’s existing American Patriot systems forms a full-fledged anti-access zone over key economic areas and gas fields (which constitute the area of interest for the potential adversary in the form of Turkey).
For decades, islands of the Aegean archipelago such as Rhodes and Karpathos were considered by Greek command to be extremely vulnerable to potential invasion due to their geographical features. Effective defense required a constant naval and air presence. However, by early 2026, Israeli military advisers and the weapons supplied by Tel Aviv radically changed the operational situation in this direction. The deployment of Spike NLOS missile systems with a range exceeding 32 kilometers on Rhodes, Karpathos, and along the Evros River fundamentally altered the concept of island defense. Spike NLOS allows targets to be destroyed without visual contact, operating on a “fire-and-forget” principle or via real-time first-person control. Whereas previously any Turkish military activity — provocation or attempted landing — required active intervention by Greek frigates, Israeli assistance has enabled Greece’s armed forces to destroy landing craft, helicopters, and unmanned boats before they approach, without risking naval assets.
MODERNIZATION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A NETWORK-CENTRIC STRUCTURE
At the operational level, this deterrence system is built around Israeli LORA ballistic missiles and high-precision PULS multiple-launch rocket systems. With strike ranges of up to 400 kilometers and exceptional accuracy (LORA missiles, for example, proved highly effective in Nagorno-Karabakh, including in precision strikes against transport infrastructure), these weapons provide Greece with the capability to strike critical infrastructure, airfields, and communication hubs deep inside Turkish territory. Drawing on the experience of U.S. HIMARS use in Ukraine, it is easy to understand how dangerous a military force the 36 PULS launchers approved for Greek procurement in early 2026 represent. And these are not standalone systems: they are integrated into a unified network with Israeli Heron and Hermes reconnaissance UAVs, reducing the cycle from target detection to destruction to mere minutes.
For example, LORA missiles launched from Karpathos can reach strategic air bases, naval centers, and communication nodes deep inside Turkish Anatolia. Greece has, for the first time in a long while, acquired a decapitation-strike capability, and Turkey’s military machine — traditionally relying on geographic depth as a natural advantage — now faces the reality that its rear facilities are within reach of systems integrated with Israel’s Ofeq satellite constellation and high-altitude reconnaissance drones. During the June 2025 campaign, Israel clearly demonstrated its ability to suppress air defenses followed by reconnaissance drone penetration: over 12 days of war, Iran managed to shoot down only one such aircraft. This is a dangerous tool that other potential adversaries of Tel Aviv cannot ignore.
GREEK ISLANDS AS UNSINKABLE “MISSILE CRUISERS”
As a result, the tactical template that Ankara so successfully employed in recent campaigns now threatens to turn against it: Greek islands are gradually being transformed into unsinkable “missile cruisers” with integrated intelligence and targeting systems.
It is important to emphasize that thanks to Israeli technologies, Greek defense is being modernized precisely along network-centric principles. The islands are no longer isolated assets; they are not a scattered collection of separate military elements. They will be linked by the Achilles Shield system, which will integrate in real time data from naval radars, Barak MX air defense systems, UAVs, and electronic intelligence stations into a unified network based on Israel’s C4ISR system (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Any maneuvers by the Turkish navy or air force will be detected by automated systems, and decision-making time for a counterstrike will be reduced to 3–4 minutes. In the near future, this will deprive Turkey of both the element of surprise and the ability to impose its own initiative in potential aggressive actions in the Aegean Sea.
In summary, the qualitative change in the Greek armed forces lies in the fact that, thanks to cooperation with Tel Aviv, they are no longer competing with Turkey solely in quantitative terms. Instead of attempting to surpass their neighbor in numbers of tanks or aircraft, Athens is now betting on asymmetry, precision weaponry, and intelligence superiority. For Ankara, this marks the end of an era in which it could dictate conditions in the region based solely on its technological advantage.
TURKISH REFLECTION AND THE “STRETCHED FRONT” STRATEGY
Ankara’s reaction to the formalization of the Israel–Greece–Cyprus triangle in 2025–2026 is devoid of illusions: Turkey’s military-political leadership perceives what is happening as the formation of a deterrence system in a region it considers an area of exclusive interest. Assessments are voiced at the level of the president, the foreign minister, and the top military leadership, indicating a consolidated internal consensus: the “Aegean Shield” is openly recognized as a direct military threat. Within Turkish expert circles and intelligence structures such as the National Intelligence Academy (MİA), it is openly stated that the combination of Israeli intelligence, Greek geography, and precision strike systems is capable of depriving Turkey of military initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In this situation, Turkey is forced to adopt a similarly asymmetrical response, attempting to stretch the resources and attention of its opponents. Rather than engaging in a frontal confrontation in the Aegean Sea, Ankara is intensifying its presence in other theaters — Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. The reinforcement of the military contingent in Tripoli and the construction of a Turkish spaceport in Somalia planned for 2025–2026 represent attempts to create counter-threats for Israel and Greece in distant theaters. The logic of the Turkish General Staff is transparent: if the “Aegean Shield” blocks Turkey in its near maritime zone, then Turkey must create conditions under which Israel’s resources are diverted to protecting shipping lanes in the Red Sea or seeking and supporting potential allies in North Africa.
However, the very existence of such an “African front” only underscores the strength of the new alliance formed by Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. The fact that a regional great power is forced to formulate a military response thousands of kilometers from its borders, openly acknowledging its inability to dominate the adjacent Aegean Sea, is the best proof of the effectiveness of the network-centric deterrence concept.
ROBOTIZATION AND AUTOMATION — THE FUTURE OF NEW MILITARY ALLIANCES
What is the most important conclusion to be drawn from this? It is by no means the trivial lesson “fortify an island and you will control the sea,” as this has been done in all eras since antiquity. The most important conclusion, as always, is one we have already reached when analyzing various conflicts of recent years: digital technologies in modern warfare are not primarily about efficiency.
Rather, they are a means of compensating for the structural limitations of post-industrial societies: low birth rates, limited mobilization bases, weak industrial capacities, and an inability to rapidly scale production. It is digital technologies — technical intelligence, robotic weapons, data-processing systems — that make it possible to generate the necessary mass of military capabilities in the absence of large populations.
It is noteworthy that advanced technologies enable the transition to an equally advanced system of “small military blocs,” which appear to be the future of alliances in the 21st century — a kind of “miniature Ententes.” Their main strength lies in their ability to solve problems here and now — the problems of specific countries and specific regions. The modern era was characterized by such tactical alliances: the Entente, the Axis, the Triple Alliance, and others. Postmodernity led us from an era of hot conflicts between individual alliances to the slow, titanic, tectonic-plate-like confrontation between two gigantic military blocs — the Warsaw Pact and NATO. They were undoubtedly effective during the Cold War, but as we can see, the world has fundamentally changed. The Warsaw Pact was fractured and defeated, while NATO has turned into a fiction more concerned with budget coordination and resolving dozens of internal national conflicts and contradictions than with its direct defensive functions. It is a huge and unwieldy structure with no clear purpose of existence — inadequate to the current geopolitical situation — and, realizing this, NATO member states are actively preparing for conflicts… with each other.
A NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE SYSTEMS
Both JDODC and the “Aegean Shield” of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are critically important to view not as situational coalitions, but as manifestations of the same trend. What we are witnessing is the emergence of small, technologically saturated military blocs of a new type. Their task is not to wage a “big war,” but to manage the security environment: narrowing the window for an adversary’s use of force, increasing transparency of its actions, and automatically turning any aggressive step into a military crisis with broad international consequences. Above all, they function as structures of strategic deterrence.
This is precisely why processes of this kind are so painfully perceived in the capitals of revisionist powers such as Turkey. Such military alliances do not pose a direct military threat, but they make escalation costly, risky, and uncontrollable — seriously undermining the plans of any potential aggressors seeking to realize imperial ambitions “with little blood on foreign land.”
We are not witnessing the militarization of individual regions, but a new stage in the development of strategic deterrence systems in a post-industrial world. And the sooner this is understood by modern military expertise not as a set of unrelated regional “anomalies,” but as a general shift in military thinking, the sooner we will realize that in modern conflicts the decisive factors are not depth of defense or the size of formations, but the speed of threat detection, the ability to link intelligence and strike assets within a unified system, and the capacity to manage escalation in real time.
