Over the last ten years, the European Union has been rapidly transforming from one of the most important defenders of users’ digital rights into the architect of an increasingly totalitarian system of technological control. Although Europe’s attention was previously focused on regulating transnational corporations – fighting monopolies, protecting personal data (GDPR), limiting targeted advertising – now the vector is changing: the focus is on the internet users themselves, their devices, and communication systems.
CONTROL OF THE ANDROID ECOSYSTEM
At the turn of 2024 into 2025, two directions of European policy suddenly begin to converge: first, a system of strict regulation of the hardware and software levels of smartphones is being introduced – specifically, new requirements for the Android ecosystem, which in fact make it just as closed as iOS. Second, EU officials are promoting the Chat Control 2.0 initiative – a draft regulation that introduces mandatory scanning of users’ personal messenger messages directly on their devices.
Separately, these processes are already provoking fierce debates. The first direction concerns the fundamental principle of the “right to modify” devices, the second – the key right to confidential correspondence. Together, they can create an infrastructure in which user control will be embedded at every level – from hardware to cloud services.
At the core of these changes lies a combination of three factors:
• Political – strengthening the role of the European Commission as a legislator that actively promotes initiatives in the field of cybersecurity and online protection under the slogan of protecting children and society from threats.
• Technological – the tendency towards tightening the chain of trust in digital devices, where every element – from the bootloader to the application – must be certified and controlled.
• Social – the growing pressure of law enforcement agencies and special services, which demand greater access to digital data.
The result of this will be (and already is!) a sharp disruption of the balance between security and freedom in favor of centralized control. If earlier privacy was understood as a fundamental right and interference as an exception, now interference may become the norm, and privacy – a condition that must still be earned.
It is precisely at this point – at the crossroads of Android hardware restrictions and Chat Control 2.0 – that we see the birth of a new model of Europe’s digital space: a model in which the state acquires the ability not only to regulate platforms but also to effectively control the architecture of user devices and communication channels.
NEW RULES FOR ANDROID IN THE EU: HOW THE “OPEN” SYSTEM BECOMES CLOSED
The European cybersecurity rules that come into force in 2025 in fact change the very nature of Android smartphones on the EU market. What has distinguished Android from iOS for years – the ability to modify the system, install third-party software, and alternative firmware – will now either be prohibited or made so technically complicated (and legally illegal) that it loses all meaning.
These restrictions are based on requirements to ensure the integrity of system software and prevent the launch of unsigned code. What does this look like? You can become familiar with the list of EU requirements for smartphone manufacturers:
• Strict Secure Boot – loading only signed official firmware.
• Verification of system code signatures at every boot stage.
• Rollback Protection – prohibition of returning to an older OS version, even an official one.
• Blocking bootloader unlock for devices sold in the EU.
• Restrictions on root access – direct prohibition or impossibility of obtaining it.
• Possibility of blocking the installation of third-party APK files under the pretext of protection against malware.
It is reasonable to ask another question – why is this being introduced? Why are such harsh sanctions against internet users necessary?
Formally, the initiative is presented as a measure to combat malicious firmware, spyware, and supply chain attacks. Regulators claim that in conditions of growing cyber threats and geopolitical tensions it is necessary to exclude the possibility of compromising devices through uncontrolled software.
FOR COMPANIES – PROFIT, FOR USERS – LOSS OF PRIVACY
The European Commission and individual EU countries cite an increasing number of targeted attacks on mobile devices, the use of vulnerable, uncertified Android versions in cyber-espionage, and… the need to introduce unified security standards for all smartphones sold in the EU. What are the real consequences for ordinary users?
First of all, the end of firmware that can be customized to personal needs. Projects such as LineageOS, CalyxOS, and GrapheneOS will either become unavailable or will work only on devices imported into the EU through informal channels. This process also entails monopolization of repairs and upgrades – servicing and component replacement will be completely dependent on official centers, making maintenance more expensive. Almost certainly (similar to Apple’s policy) we will face accelerated obsolescence, where the manufacturer will be able to stop supporting a device more quickly, forcing you to buy new models – and, of course, with price increases due to the lack of alternative channels for installing software and app stores.
Tech giants welcome this: Samsung, Xiaomi, and Motorola are already restricting bootloader unlock functions on European models. Some are doing this preventively, even before the standards officially come into force, citing “regulatory requirements.” Google is tightening Android certification and integrity control. For companies – profit, for users – loss of control and privacy.
CHAT CONTROL 2.0: A NEW ARCHITECTURE OF SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE GUISE OF SECURITY
If the restrictions on Android change the hardware–software foundation of user devices, then Chat Control 2.0 is designed to directly affect the architecture of communications. Officially, this project is presented as a measure in the fight against child sexual abuse (CSAM), but its technical implementation actually creates a universal mechanism for the complete inspection of personal correspondence.
What exactly does this project envisage?
Chat Control 2.0 obliges all messengers and email services operating in the territory of the EU to introduce client-side scanning – scanning messages, photos, and videos before their encryption and sending.
For the user, this means the following:
• Every image or file attached to a message is checked locally on the device.
• Algorithms compare the content with databases of “prohibited content” (for example, CSAM hashes in the PhotoDNA database).
• In the case of a “match,” the data is automatically sent to security agencies or the operator for additional verification.
The project also represents an open threat to data encryption during communication. End-to-End encryption (E2E), on which services such as Signal, WhatsApp, and Threema are based, implies that the content of messages is known only to the sender and the recipient. Chat Control 2.0 undermines this principle: in order for scanning to work, encryption must be weakened. This, in turn, opens up a multitude of vulnerabilities – the mechanism for scanning data becomes a kind of potential “back door” for hackers, intelligence services, or corporate espionage, and the use of E2E ceases to be any guarantee of privacy.
Although the draft law is officially aimed at combating CSAM, with the same technical means it is possible to scan other categories of content – and, having such a broad spectrum of possibilities, the authorities will, of course, use them. In essence, this is an instrument not only of censorship but also of potential intimidation against any category of dissenters or the “undesirable.”
AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CREATING TOTAL CONTROL
In particular, the restrictions on Android and Chat Control 2.0 are already seriously reducing digital freedoms. But their simultaneous introduction in the EU creates an effect that can be called an integrated infrastructure of surveillance and censorship at the user level.
How will this work in practice? First of all, a closed hardware–software environment is created. For example, a smartphone sold in the EU will by default be equipped with Secure Boot and a signature verification system – which excludes the installation of unsigned or modified operating systems. Unlocking the bootloader or obtaining root (administrator rights) will be impossible — because the user has no direct access to the system processes of his own device, purchased with his own money. Any attempt to install a third-party messenger client or an alternative app store will be blocked by integrity checks.
Logically, this contributes to the introduction of mandatory content scanning on the software level. All applications can only operate in official versions, verified and approved by Europol – and by law they are required to implement client-side scanning. The user is powerless – he physically cannot replace the application with a version without scanning.
This is the ideal environment for creating total control without the possibility of bypassing or preserving privacy. Even if the user is technically skilled, hardware protection makes it impossible to bypass Chat Control mechanisms without replacing the device with a non-certified one – and such smartphones or computers can easily be blocked at the network services level.
LEAKAGE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
The combination of hardware monopoly over software and mandatory algorithmic scanning creates not only individual restrictions, but also a new type of digital ecosystem, in which privacy ceases to be an available option. For Europe, which has historically positioned itself as a defender of digital rights, this will be a fundamental shift toward a model of a “controlled internet,” which resembles the approaches of authoritarian countries such as China more than the former liberal standards of the EU.
For the ordinary user, such measures will mean a noticeable deterioration in the quality of digital life – and that is a fact.
The user will become completely dependent on the manufacturer, who will be able to impose updates, delete applications, and cut off support for the device at any time, effectively forcing him to buy a new model.
At the same time, the risk of losing privacy will increase: the awareness that personal messages, photos, and videos are automatically scanned before sending encourages self-censorship even when it comes to harmless topics, and false algorithm activations can lead to account blocks or even unnecessary contact with law enforcement.
There will also be a danger of confidential data leaking, since centralized verification systems are an attractive target for hackers and are not immune from errors, as a result of which private materials may fall into the wrong hands. Usual access to alternative applications and services will be restricted, depriving the user of the opportunity to choose more secure, convenient, or independent tools.
All this together will lead to a situation in which the smartphone will cease to be a personal device and will become a controlled platform, where every function and every communication channel is under external supervision, and any deviation from the set rules becomes impossible or punishable.
FREEDOM IN THE ERA OF INTEGRATED STATE CONTROL
The new EU rules for the Android ecosystem and the Chat Control 2.0 initiative are not just another in a series of regulatory acts. Together, they form an architecture in which state and corporate interests merge at the point of hardware–software management of devices and communications.
Under the banners of “cybersecurity” and “child protection,” technical and legal mechanisms are being created that allow centralized control over what users can run on their devices, the scanning of private correspondence before encryption, and the prevention of any bypass of state control at the hardware level.
The problem is not that these measures have a false purpose (although combating cybercrime and child abuse is indeed important). The problem is that their implementation creates an infrastructure that can be used far beyond the declared purpose.
The history of digital regulation shows: if surveillance technology exists, it will expand its scope of application – from security to political and commercial control.
Can this be opposed? Probably, yes. The technical community must develop and improve encryption methods and data exchange protocols that are resistant to centralized restrictions, as well as support and spread channels for installing software outside of official ecosystems, in order to preserve space for free and secure communication. At the same time, the community of citizens – ordinary users – must engage in political struggle against the introduction of all-encompassing censorship and methods of total control.
EUROPE RISKS BECOMING A COPY OF CHINA
It is necessary to highlight in every possible way the risks of the upcoming (and already approved) measures connected with regulating the digital environment – otherwise, Europe will become a copy of China in its worst manifestations, and that moment may come much faster than we would all like to assume.
For now, we still have a choice — either we will build a digital space in which security and privacy are in balance, and control is subject to social accountability, or we will create a closed system managed from outside, in which security will be subordinated to control, and freedom will become a privilege.
On which path the EU will take in the next two–three years depends whether “digital Europe” will remain a territory of rights and freedoms or will turn into a dark parody of the Soviet “Iron Curtain” with carefully filtered access to information.
