When, in May 2016, during the ceremonial reopening of the renovated Ferhat Pasha Sokolović Mosque in Banja Luka, Turkish Prime Minister in resignation Ahmet Davutoğlu delivered his final political speech, the public in Republika Srpska and across the Balkans believed that the concept of Neo-Ottomanism was departing along with its creator. They were mistaken. At the time, Davutoğlu described the reconstruction of the Banja Luka mosque as a message of peace to all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and almost threateningly declared that “Banja Luka cannot be separated from Sarajevo, nor Sarajevo from Mostar.”
EVERYTHING HELEZ DIDN’T SAY
Ferhadija, the Old Bridge in Mostar, and the Aladza Mosque in Foča, he emphasized, are a shared cultural heritage that we will “protect, restore, and build together.” “Together,” without a doubt, also referred to the 78 million Turks who, Davutoğlu added, “were here, are here now, and will be here forever.”
As the founder of the Neo-Ottoman doctrine, Davutoğlu laid out his political concept in the book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position, and at every opportunity promoted Turkey’s imperial past, glorifying the idea of restoring Turkish power in the Balkans.
After his departure from the political scene, the President of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, continued to advocate for the same ideas, balancing between loyalty to the religious brotherhood of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the reality that the Serbian people are the most numerous in this part of the Balkans and that Serbia is the most important state. In that spirit, Erdoğan continued to arm Muslims with weapons and religious radicalism while offering economic cooperation to Serbs. Turkish drones and armored vehicles in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—or more precisely, their Muslim components—are merely the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy in action.
The arming of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the radical Bosniak politician Zukan Helez, Minister of Defense in Sarajevo (i.e., within the joint institutions), readily discusses, has also had its conspiratorial dimension. The two Turkish Bayraktar drones officially obtained by the Armed Forces of BiH are only a symbolic message, behind which lies a much more dynamic cooperation with certain Muslim firms in Sarajevo, the transfer of military technologies, and a significantly larger quantity of weapons and equipment intended for use in the event of potential conflicts—conflicts that Bosniak representatives in Sarajevo openly insist upon.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION FOR A “JUST IN CASE”
Superficial analysts have made their assessments—“this is not the 1990s,” and “there’s no more JNA and no weapons,” or “no potential for a new war.” Such predictions have been refuted by facts. Where there is a psychological readiness of a nation to resolve its status at any cost, weapons will be found. What matters is the will—and Bosniaks have no shortage of it.
It is a fact that Bosniaks have never hidden their attitude toward the “Dayton Agreement,” calling it a “straitjacket” and thereby expressing anger and frustration over their defeat in the 1990s war. The humiliating peace whose painful terms were dictated by the Dayton Agreement was a heavy burden left to the younger generations of Bosnian Muslims. This dissatisfaction then became the foundation upon which all forms of religious and political radicalism were built. Such a community was waiting for a chance for war, and for that purpose, “just in case,” as Bakir Izetbegović put it, industrial capacities for weapons production were developed in several factories.
“Unis-Pretis” Vogošća, “Bratstvo” Travnik, “Igman” Konjic, “Repair Institute” Hadžići, “Binas” Bugojno, “Unis-Ginex” Goražde, and some other, less significant factories have stockpiled weapons and military equipment—small arms, sniper rifles and ammunition; mortars and mine-explosive devices, rocket systems and projectiles, howitzers, and detonators (fuzes, initiation caps)—all stored in Muslim warehouses guarded by security, without any joint institution in the country having influence, or even access.
TRAINING ON TURKISH MILITARY RANGES
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is officially not a member of the recently formed anti-Serbian military pact “Croatia–Albania–Kosovo”—likely only because representatives of Republika Srpska would not permit such a development—political Sarajevo continues to expand its military capabilities with the help of ideological allies and religious brethren in Turkey. In line with these strategic directions, Defense Minister Zukan Helez announced Turkey’s decision to donate two Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Armed Forces of BiH, as well as one additional drone of an unknown model developed under NATO’s Defense Capacity Building project. Turkey will also deliver to Sarajevo a radio-electronic warfare system specialized for countering drones, as well as a general-purpose helicopter.
Special training necessary for the use of this equipment—naturally intended for Muslim members of the Armed Forces of BiH—will take place at Turkish military ranges. Regarding regular military procurement, Helez also announced the purchase of four Kirpi 2 infantry fighting vehicles and plans to acquire a total of 32 units after resolving all aspects of the project’s financing.
RETAIN THE MUSLIMS, BUT DON’T LOSE THE SERBS
The Turkish donation followed two weeks after media close to Sarajevo published plans to expand the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s defense industry, including the opening of new production facilities in Bihać, Zenica, and Tuzla—where, according to the plans, the labor shortage would be addressed by employing inmates from the Zenica Correctional Facility. In this context, it’s unsurprising that military cooperation with Turkey is deepening—at the beginning of the year, soldiers from the Armed Forces of BiH participated in a military exercise held about 50 kilometers from the Turkish-Armenian border. All of this indicates that Sarajevo is carrying out an accelerated militarization of the Federation, which remains largely aligned with similar activities by secessionist structures in Priština and also official Zagreb. This is a fact that must not be underestimated—especially as it represents a convergence of geopolitical interests aimed against Serbia and the Serbian people in a broader sense on one side, and, on the other, Turkey’s expansion into the Balkans, which relies on transforming Muslim military-political forces in the region into proxy forces for Ankara.
The result is the formation of a broad anti-Serbian coalition preparing for the possible resolution of the so-called “Serbian question” by military means. This makes further strengthening of military ties with friendly Hungary—and the possible establishment of a partnership with Greece, which likewise sees Ankara’s expansionist policy as a significant threat—a matter of key national importance.
MEETING IN LONDON – PART OF A BROADER STRATEGY
Of course, Ankara has not taken only these steps. First, in mid-March 2025, the long-time head of Turkey’s military intelligence agency MIT, Hakan Fidan—now Minister of Foreign Affairs—stated: “The United Kingdom, Europe, and Turkey can form their own sphere of influence in the region,” emphasizing that “European leaders are uncertain how to proceed if the world becomes divided into multiple zones of influence.”
As the first global step in forming a military-political alliance and a new “Tripartite Pact,” on April 30, 2025, Turkey and the United Kingdom signed the Specification of the Turkish-UK Defence Industry Council (TUDIC), institutionalizing cooperation between the two countries in the field of the military-defense industry.
Haluk Görgün, head of Turkey’s Defence Industry Secretariat, Turkish Deputy Minister of Defense Musa Heybet, and Maria Eagle, the UK’s Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry, met in London, as announced by Turkey’s Defence Industry Secretariat on platform X: “At the meeting, which aimed to deepen cooperation in addressing the changing global security environment and shared threats, a strong will was expressed to further enhance military and defense industry relations between the two countries.”
As part of the meeting, a specification was signed institutionalizing cooperation in the defense industry between the UK’s Ministry for Defence Procurement and Industry and Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense.
Satellites of this new “military and political alliance” in the Balkans—such as Croatia, Albania, and the para-state of Kosovo—have already taken several steps in this direction. Although Croatia’s military power today is more the subject of jokes than serious consideration, things are nonetheless moving toward deep divisions and conflicts at the regional level.
THE SIGNIFICANT VISIT OF A TURKISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
The arming of Muslim Sarajevo is not an incident but a consistent pattern in Turkey’s military and political machinery. After all, Turkey has never hidden its ambitions.
Much earlier, beneath the radar of all media outlets, came the news that at the end of 2024, a delegation from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Turkey paid a three-day visit to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The delegation was headed by the Chief of the Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaşar Kadıoğlu. The importance of this visit is indicated by the guest’s position—he is the second-highest-ranking official in the Turkish General Staff, directly responsible to the Minister of Defense and President Erdoğan. At the same time as Kadıoğlu’s visit to BiH, the red-green Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency, Denis Bećirović, was on an official visit to Turkey.
After the high-ranking Turkish military delegation departed from Sarajevo, Zukan Helez, according to the German specialized portal hartapunkt.de, announced the procurement of six Bayraktar TB2 tactical combat drones with three ground control stations. In addition, two Muslim teams from the Armed Forces of BiH are currently in Turkey undergoing training. Although delivery was originally planned for January 2025, it has only recently been partially carried out. This was the first announcement of the procurement of highly sophisticated combat equipment for the needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Air Force and Air Defense, aimed at establishing a fixed-wing military aviation capability as a powerful deterrent against any potential lightning attack on BiH and as a means of transitioning to a political phase of freezing the newly established realities on the ground.
DRONES IN CASE OF WAR
With the procurement of drones—specifically, tactical combat unmanned aerial vehicles (TCUAVs)—Sarajevo and the Bosnian Muslims would complete the arsenal necessary for a projected war. This is a new military technology that has radically reduced, and in some cases—as demonstrated in the Karabakh war—completely eliminated the risk factor of human losses, while increasing the first-strike hit rate and target elimination to nearly 100%. Countries that employ drones at the tactical, operational, or strategic level are capable of tracking, identifying, and striking targets anywhere in the world, or even reaching from Bosnia and Herzegovina across the Adriatic Sea to Rome and the Vatican. If such weapons were to fall into the hands of radical Islamists, regional fear and the potential for various types of blackmail from Sarajevo or Ankara—from Tehran or Riyadh—would be inevitable. Localized actions would ensure strikes without triggering so-called military involvement by third parties or full-scale military intervention, with or without a UN mandate. This would also preclude the mass deployment of air power or the mobilization of large ground forces, which require time and high-level governmental approval.
ELIMINATION OF ASSAD’S SOLDIERS
Turkey, for instance, during its operations in occupied Syria, used its ANKA-S and Bayraktar TB2 drones to track and locate targets, which were then eliminated by Turkish F-16 fighter jets using precision-guided munitions from a distance—without entering Syrian airspace, in accordance with agreements signed between Turkey and Russia. On the other hand, Turkish drones managed within a few hours to completely halt Assad’s forces during their occupation of Syria, enabling the “terrorist infantry” of Al-Nusra and HTS to enter Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus largely unopposed and without major combat.
Following that initial shock strike, the drones, through coordinated operations in the following days, eliminated more than 3,000 of Assad’s soldiers, 151 combat vehicles, 8 helicopters, 5 aircraft—including two large Ilyushin Il-78 transport planes—along with 8 complete air defense systems with radar and command stations. These included the latest Russian short-range Pantsir-S1 missile systems, as well as a multitude of other equipment.
Moreover, not a single Turkish soldier or pilot was lost in these attacks, while the enemy was forced to alter its intentions on the front, completely change its strategy, and ultimately surrender unconditionally.
THE PIECES ARE IN PLACE
Alongside the Wahhabi element and the strong organizational presence of the Muslim Brotherhood—with the legacy of Alija Izetbegović and his religious and political doctrine outlined in the Islamic Declaration; supported by the Party of Democratic Action and the so-called Social Democratic Party; and with the help of Turkey—all the pieces on the “great chessboard” of the Balkans have been arranged. The infantry is ready and motivated, there are weapons, external support is present, and the major crisis artificially triggered by Christian Schmidt is creating the conditions for a new war.
The talk of “arresting Milorad Dodik” as the main objective is merely an intelligence smokescreen for much more important goals and a far broader military operation.
