The visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Yerevan sparked more serious discussions and analyses in Baku than in Yerevan itself. And that is highly symptomatic of the current reality south of the Greater Caucasus mountain ridge. Everyone is on edge, nerves are strained, tensions are snapping — there’s a pervasive sense that something, somewhere, is bound to explode.
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. – MORE WISHES, FEWER COMMITMENTS
Lavrov last visited Armenia three years ago. Since then, much has happened, and worrying trends have only intensified. Although Russia remains an indispensable partner for Armenia in many respects, and the West cannot provide the desired level of security and prosperity, the situation is far from straightforward.
The EU observer mission on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border does not guarantee border security. The strategic partnership charter that Armenia signed with the U.S. contains more noble aspirations than concrete commitments. At the end of March, the Armenian parliament passed, in second reading, a law on joining the European Union. In Russia, this plan raises — to put it mildly — serious doubts. The law is not an application for EU membership, nor does it contain any binding provisions.
So why does Yerevan, despite its sharp rhetoric toward Moscow, still not sever ties?
Why doesn’t Moscow respond with harsh measures (the harshest reproach so far concerned the import of agricultural products), even though the Russian press is filled with scathing criticism of Armenia’s leadership?
We offer the following assumption: Yerevan lacks a consistent foreign policy strategy. According to experts, its messaging to Moscow is intended to push Russia toward greater protection of Armenian interests. However, as those messages grew louder, they ended up drowning out all other foreign policy priorities.
DELAYED RESPONSE FROM THE CSTO
Undoubtedly, the greatest obstacle to Armenia’s full distancing from Russia lies with the West itself. Unfortunately, Russia has long consistently chosen security over prestige in its approach to the South Caucasus. From the perspective of those responsible for Armenia’s foreign policy, Russia appears to be an unreliable ally. Political relations have cooled, but it is worth remembering that this was not always the case.
The deterioration of relations began in the autumn of 2022. On September 13, 2022, Azerbaijan launched a massive attack on the Republic of Armenia and captured new territories, including 74 square kilometers around the tourist town of Jermuk. Armenian positions near Vardenis, Goris, and Sotk were attacked. Azerbaijani forces advanced 7.5 km in the direction of Jermuk.
As a consequence of the aggression, the Armenian side suffered heavy losses: 224 killed, over 20 captured, and another 293 wounded. Already on September 14, Armenia once again appealed to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — this time invoking Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty. However, the appeal remained unanswered: the CSTO did not make a decision to send a military contingent to Armenia.
Several weeks later, on October 23, the EU Council approved the establishment of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMA) in Armenia. The agreement was reached on October 6 at the Macron-Pashinyan-Aliyev-Michel meeting.
Only after all this, on October 12, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the CSTO was ready to send observers to Armenia, but that Armenia needed to initiate an extraordinary session of the CSTO Council.
This was not the first, but certainly the most massive Azerbaijani attack since the war in Karabakh.
At the extraordinary session of the CSTO Collective Security Council, convened at Yerevan’s initiative, it was agreed to send a mission to Armenia led by the Secretary General of the organization and the head of its Joint Staff to assess the situation. It was also proposed to send a permanent CSTO observer mission to Armenia. However, the Armenian side concluded that such support was insufficient and contrary to the letter and spirit of the CSTO Charter.
FROM SIGNAL TO FULL TURNAROUND
Armenia’s current foreign policy orientation stems from a combination of several factors: disappointment in Russia following military clashes near Jermuk, the desire to maintain ties with Western partners, and the liberal ideological orientation of the current generation of Armenian politicians.
It can be assumed that Yerevan’s refusal to accept the CSTO observer mission in the fall of 2022 was intended as a signal to Moscow and other partners within the organization: Armenia believed that the measures taken for its protection were insufficient. That signal bore no fruit, so Yerevan, metaphorically speaking, “raised its voice,” announced a possible withdrawal from the CSTO, recalled its representative, and then declared the “freezing” of its participation. This simultaneously sent a signal to the West: that the U.S. and the EU should understand Armenia’s readiness to leave its alliance with Russia.
This policy, on one hand, aligned with the political convictions of Armenia’s leadership and the tradition of foreign policy “complementarity,” and on the other hand, was seen as a supplement to the security guarantees already provided by Russia and the CSTO. Armenia’s increased budget allowed it to conclude arms delivery contracts with France. These contracts were presented as evidence of readiness to draw closer to the West and of dissatisfaction with Russia’s course.
Was this merely a signal (or, in other words, an attempt to motivate Russia toward stronger support), or truly a foreign policy shift — abandoning alliance with Russia in favor of alliance with the West? It can be assumed that Yerevan’s steps, initially intended as signals to Moscow in late 2022 and early 2023, evolved into a course of disengagement over the following year. That course, however, has not produced tangible results — for reasons beyond the direct control of Armenian authorities.
FREED FROM ARTSAKH – ARMENIA TURNS TO NEW ALLIES
A diplomatic misstep should also be mentioned: the unconditional recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in October 2022. Still, official Yerevan quickly reinterpreted that decision to its advantage. Cynically speaking, Armenia was shedding its greatest foreign policy burden. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, imposed by Azerbaijan in December 2022, once again confirmed to the Armenian public the ineffectiveness of Russia as a security partner — Russian diplomats and peacekeepers could not (or did not want to) lift the blockade. Freed from the issue of Artsakh, Armenia could seek new allies.
The informational context in which Armenian leadership found itself must also be taken into account. Since the spring of 2022, the West believed in the imminent defeat of Russia in Ukraine and conveyed this hope to all its partners, including Armenia. Events from the fall of 2022 — the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kharkiv region and Kherson — reinforced this belief. The following year in Western capitals was marked by discussions of greater arms shipments to Kyiv and plans for a Ukrainian offensive. Only at the end of 2023 did cautious statements begin to emerge from Washington and Brussels that “things may not be going as planned.”
In such circumstances, Armenian authorities drew what they saw as a logical conclusion: they should distance themselves from Russia and seek alignment with the “stronger” West. Additional momentum came from other significant developments: even the brief euphoria from January 2022, when the CSTO intervened in Kazakhstan, began to fade.
At that time, Russia appeared to be a guarantor of stability, an arbiter, a center of power. Today, that image is gone. Kazakhstan is developing its own security strategy: it has signed a military cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom, is training officers at British academies, is building a factory with Singaporean partners to produce 155 mm NATO-standard ammunition, and is introducing a territorial reserve system based on Western models. All of this is unfolding within a paradigm in which Russia is no longer seen as an ally, but as a potential threat.
RUSSIA’S DOWNFALL – FROM REGIONAL LEADER TO GEOPOLITICAL LOSER
Azerbaijan has finally eliminated Armenian Artsakh, regardless of the CSTO or the killing of Russian peacekeepers. After shooting down a Russian aircraft in December 2024, official Baku demanded an apology and compensation from Moscow and closed the offices of Russian state institutions. Aliyev is acting openly: strengthening cooperation with Ukraine, sending humanitarian aid, and avoiding even formal neutrality.
Armenia — once a key Russian ally in the Caucasus — has effectively left the Russian sphere of influence. Prime Minister Pashinyan has repeatedly announced withdrawal from the CSTO; the country has recalled its permanent representative and shut down Russian propaganda media.
Uzbekistan has practically ignored the CSTO since 2012, but has been actively developing cooperation with Europe through summits and sectoral agreements. Last year saw a cooling of relations between Moscow and Tashkent due to an attempted assassination of an official and alleged “Chechen ties.” The whole of Northern Europe is adapting its armed forces for operations in the Arctic and the Baltics. Europe is increasingly uniting into an anti-Russian coalition. Germany is adapting its industry for military orders. EU defense spending is being directed toward 5% of GDP. For the first time, a joint European military budget is being formed.
Syria, once an example of Russian geopolitical influence, is now the site of mass liquidation of pro-Russian elements. Russian bases in Syria have become the weakest point of Moscow’s initiatives in the Middle East.
In just three years, the security architecture of Eurasia has been radically transformed. Russia is no longer a regional leader, political center, or guarantor of stability. Its geopolitical influence is not just declining — it is being effectively erased.
NOT A WORD ABOUT THE DISPUTED STATUS OF KARABAKH
Once, Russia was surrounded by a zone of formal neutrality. Now, it is encircled by a system of defense alliances where Moscow often has neither allies nor mediators. Such tectonic shifts are irreversible. Historically, Russia avoided bloc politics. The famous quote “Russia has only two allies — the army and the navy,” attributed to Tsar Alexander III, is a political metaphor, not a universal truth, and it contains many pitfalls.
The same applies to the Declaration on Allied Cooperation with Azerbaijan signed in February 2022. It served as a protective measure at a time when Russia’s main forces were engaged on the Ukrainian front. The presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh required close relations with both Armenia (without which the mission could not succeed) and Azerbaijan. There were essentially no other guarantees for the peacekeepers, especially after the start of the special military operation and the Prague Declaration.
In October 2022, a meeting was held in Sochi between Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the joint statement, both sides committed not to use force or threats of force. This did not satisfy Armenia. At the November CSTO summit, Yerevan rejected the already prepared proposal to deploy an observer mission in its territory. In May 2023, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced the possibility of leaving the CSTO. In September, Armenia withdrew its representative, and since November 2023, it has no longer participated in high-level meetings. From January 2024, it ceased participation in military exercises and later stopped paying membership dues.
At the same time, Armenia abandoned its previous position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. At the meeting on October 6, 2022, in the presence of Azerbaijani President Aliyev, French President Macron, and European Council President Michel, the Armenian leader reaffirmed commitment to the Alma-Ata Declaration, which implies mutual recognition of the territorial integrity of former Soviet republics. There was no mention of the disputed status of Karabakh, nor of the rights and security of Armenians in the region.
A BREAK HASN’T HAPPENED – WHY?
Azerbaijan took advantage of the situation: first, “activists” blocked the Lachin Corridor, followed by the official border service. In September of the following year, a military operation was carried out on the territory of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, after which the Armenian population was forced into exodus. Russian peacekeepers, while trying to assist civilians, suffered casualties. Putin later stated that he had not been informed of Armenia’s intent to recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan: “I personally learned about it from the media.” He also made it clear that recognizing Karabakh as “Azerbaijani” nullified the reasons for Russian peacekeeping in the region.
But why hasn’t a full severance of relations happened (yet)? Perhaps the issue doesn’t lie with Armenia, but with the U.S. and the EU. They cannot offer Armenia the same economic benefits as membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, nor concrete security guarantees like those (at least symbolically) offered by the CSTO. Armenia will not receive EU subsidies or NATO guarantees immediately upon leaving international associations involving Russia. Withdrawing from these structures at this moment would isolate Armenia in the region, placing it in direct confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
This wouldn’t only be risky for Yerevan — for Washington and Brussels, a complete Armenian break from Moscow without a clear alternative would be a political failure.
As for Azerbaijan, the question is why Ilham Aliyev does not stop. Even though he won the war, his ambitions are leading toward a breakdown of relations with Russia, including the crossing of all “red lines.”
DISTANCING FROM MOSCOW IN FAVOR OF ANKARA
Azerbaijan gained importance in Russian foreign policy after joining Western sanctions. While Armenia also serves as a “window” for trade, Azerbaijan’s shared land border and participation in the “North-South” corridor give it strategic weight. However, construction of the railway through Iran is delayed. In the summer of 2024, there was even talk of transiting Azerbaijani gas through Ukraine. Although this was never realized, the mere discussion highlights Baku’s significance to Moscow.
During the Russian president’s state visit to Baku last August, Vladimir Putin was accompanied by a very high-profile delegation, including the foreign minister, two deputy prime ministers, two presidential aides, the heads of Rosneft and Gazprom, as well as leaders of the state development bank and a development institute. However, events in the last decade of June 2025 indicate that the relationship has entered a phase of systemic cooling.
More and more frequent diplomatic signals point to a deepening strategic rift. Although the level of communication is formally maintained, in practice Baku is demonstratively shutting down cooperation channels. The cancellation of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk’s visit, suspension of cultural programs, and a demonstrative pause in official negotiations are not spontaneous reactions, but elements of a well-constructed policy of distancing from Moscow.
The formal trigger was the actions of Russian security services against ethnically tied criminal groups, including those connected with the Azerbaijani diaspora. Searches and arrests in Yekaterinburg became the spark for a diplomatic protest. In Baku, these were portrayed as a xenophobic campaign against Azerbaijanis.
Azerbaijan does not view these actions as an internal Russian crackdown on crime, but as interference with its clans and interests in Russia. Baku’s reaction is strategic: it is accelerating the transition to a foreign policy model that distances itself from Moscow in favor of Ankara, as its main ally in security, economy, and regional politics.
TURKIC UNITY INSTEAD OF EURASIAN INTEGRATION
The formulas of Eurasian integration are being replaced by the concept of “Turkic unity,” in which Baku sees itself as part of a supranational project — an alternative to the Russian one.
The contours of the future are clear: Baku will continue its strategic distancing, although until recently it formally avoided abrupt moves. Moscow, amid its weakening influence in the Caucasus, is effectively losing mechanisms of political control. Dialogue with Aliyev is at a dead end — there is not even symbolic cooperation, and former diplomatic channels have been frozen. Attempts to compensate for this with rhetoric no longer work — what is needed is a systemic response. Without a strategic reset in its foreign policy approach to the Caucasus, Russia risks definitively yielding the region to Turkey and other players.
The start of the open phase of conflict is linked to the end of December last year. According to experts, the trigger was the collapse of a global deal on the delivery of Azerbaijani gas to Germany via a Russian pipeline through Ukraine, as well as allegedly obtained evidence of financing the Karabakh clan in Armenia through Moscow (the arrest of Vardanyan was a major success for Azerbaijani services, with help from Armenian counterparts).
The cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia has objective causes. Russia is losing influence in the South Caucasus — primarily in Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also in its weakening ties with Iran. It is trying to strengthen its position in Abkhazia, where Turkey is also working to establish itself, while in Georgia it is trying to balance against growing Chinese influence.
Azerbaijan is now freeing itself from the obligation to coordinate positions with Moscow on issues concerning Iran. Baku is very interested in weakening Iran, while simultaneously increasing Turkish influence. In the long term, the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance could lead to the formation of a large energy hub that would include Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan — as a replacement for Russian gas on the European market.
ALIYEV IN CONTACT WITH SHOIGU
There is another dimension: the personal and political connection between the Aliyev and Yeltsin families. Thanks to Boris Yeltsin, Heydar Aliyev returned to power and secured the dynasty. The Aliyevs have maintained close relations with Naina Yeltsin, Tatyana Yumasheva, and Sergey Shoigu. Shoigu visited Baku multiple times, most recently in August of last year. Now, Shoigu is no longer a channel of communication — he has clearly been removed from the Caucasus file.
As Baku’s position strengthens, Aliyev has no reason to make concessions to the Kremlin. The friendship between Putin and Aliyev is a thing of the past. For Azerbaijan, the role of Russia’s opponent is useful — especially due to its access to the European market. It will adhere to Turkey’s strategy and support Ukraine. Together with Turkey, it will try to draw Armenia into its sphere of influence — and Yerevan understands this, which is why it prefers to build relations with the EU rather than Moscow.
Russia is no longer of interest to Azerbaijan. But Baku can cause problems for Moscow (it effectively controls access to the Caucasus for various Wahhabi and separatist groups). Russia has few levers left. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha visited Azerbaijan on May 25–26 of this year. The Azerbaijani side tried to present it as a “routine visit by the head of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Azerbaijan,” but no expert will believe that. This was not just a courtesy call — especially in the context of cold relations between Baku and Moscow, and Aliyev’s refusal to attend the May 9 celebration in Russia for the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II.
UNITED BY FEAR OF RUSSIA
Let us agree that no Declaration on Allied Cooperation can replace the realities that the Kremlin, until recently, tried to ignore. Between Russia and Azerbaijan, there are systemic contradictions. Between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, there is systemic alignment of views regarding the geopolitical configuration that has existed since 1991.
What unites them is the fear of a strong Russia — under any flag and in any form. Kyiv has consistently supported Baku’s aspirations to “reclaim its Karabakh,” while Azerbaijan has never hidden its dissatisfaction over the “loss” of Crimea and Donbas. Here we must look for the roots in GUAM and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.
However, if the Azerbaijani government, until recently, had the intelligence and tact to stop in time, Ukraine succumbed to the temptation to become “anti-Russian,” along with all the burdens that come with such a “package.” Throughout the post-Soviet period, Baku and Kyiv have developed numerous ties in areas such as transport, logistics, and military-technical cooperation. Ukrainian arms supplies have always been important for the Azerbaijani armed forces.
Azerbaijan has always supported Ukraine’s “territorial integrity,” but at the same time has feared the political culture of perpetual “Maidans” characteristic of Ukraine or Georgia. In that sense, Russia’s vertical system is much more understandable and ideologically closer to Baku. Azerbaijan has also never wanted to get involved in other people’s games with unpredictable outcomes. Azerbaijani authorities have never wanted their country to become a Turkish vilayet. For that reason, every cooling of relations with Russia must have limits — just as the “brotherly friendship” with Ukraine has its limits. Another key issue is the growth of international capitalization while balancing among various centers of power. There is much to learn from Baku.
Who benefits from the rising tension between Russia and Azerbaijan and Baku’s demonstrative tilt? Naturally, we are first of all speaking about Turkey, which aspires to a leading role in the entire “Turkic world” — but how beneficial is that for Baku?
As R. Guzayev writes on the IMEMO RAS website, “The current level of military-technical cooperation between the countries does not fully reflect the extent of integration processes between Turkey and Azerbaijan, but one can assume that the states are moving toward forming a military-political union.”
LONDON’S INTRIGUES IN TURKISH HANDS
Turkey’s allies are systematically increasing their influence over Azerbaijan’s military. In the long term, this could have a negative impact on Azerbaijan’s national identity. The logic of Turkish projects ultimately does not assume the sovereignty of a “brotherly” state — something local elites cannot ignore.
Secondly, the cooling of relations between Moscow and Baku benefits Britain, Russia’s age-old rival in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. There is reason to believe that London is weaving intrigues through the hands of Turkey, which has long served as a conduit for British intelligence services. It is well known that MI6 is currently headed by a former ambassador to Ankara, Richard Moore — a close confidant of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a committed pan-Turkist.
The involvement of Israeli intelligence cannot be ruled out either, as they are also interested in weakening Russia and Iran in the region and have long used Azerbaijan as a channel for advancing their interests.
But why does Baku need this? Do they understand that they are deepening the rift between the countries, which will ultimately result in problems for Azerbaijan itself?
Baku should ask itself: who benefits from the deterioration of relations with Moscow, and does it understand the consequences?
MORE LIBERAL THAN BRUSSELS?
Another development deserves attention: why has Azerbaijan, despite growing anti-Armenian rhetoric, not yet launched a new military offensive like the one near Jermuk? At that time, Baku used force to push Armenia into relinquishing Karabakh. Peace negotiations, demarcation, and delimitation talks are at a standstill. Yet, there are no new rounds of heavy military pressure on Armenia to force it to accept Azerbaijan’s terms. It is reasonable to assume that some hidden deterrent exists, but what exactly it is remains unclear. It’s even possible that Yerevan is underestimating the influence of its still-official Russian ally.
Hence the somewhat hasty attempts to reach agreements with Azerbaijan (border demarcation in the Tavush region) and Turkey (negotiations on normalization of relations). On one hand, this is about shedding burdens — a kind of pre-sale preparation. For the U.S. and EU, an Armenia that has reached agreements with Azerbaijan on peace and borders, and with Turkey on mutual recognition and the restoration of transportation links, is clearly more attractive than an Armenia that has no diplomatic relations with two of its four immediate neighbors.
On the other hand, the rhetoric of the Armenian leadership accompanying efforts at reconciliation with Azerbaijan and Turkey is meant to confirm the country’s loyalty to the liberal path. Leave behind the myths of historical Armenia, lost territories, thousand-year-old heritage — this is the essence of Nikol Pashinyan’s message to his fellow citizens. All of that is outdated, it’s no longer in fashion; within the borders of the Armenian SSR, only a state exists, and that is what we should be focusing on — so the prime minister urges.
Overall, this sounds like the tone of European intellectual fashion at the turn of the century, when Armenia’s leader began his journalism career and European liberalism strongly opposed nationalism. Since then, the European Union has softened some of its stances on nationalism, but in Yerevan, it seems, it is sometimes politically useful to be more liberal than Brussels.
In short, a potential Armenian withdrawal from the CSTO will now be interpreted by the Russian elite as an acceptable cost to be paid for a greater objective — victory over the Kyiv regime. There is an understanding that the alliance itself will not fall apart if Armenia leaves it. And whoever holds power in Yerevan will face the same problems as Pashinyan and have the same tools for solving them as the current prime minister. No one is truly interested in Armenia’s exit from the CSTO.
In this sense, even if contacts within the CSTO are frozen, Moscow can maintain bilateral channels. Armenia is understandably dissatisfied that Russia still cannot deliver certain types of weapons. But Russia has advanced combat experience that could be useful to Armenia.
TURKISH ADVANCE TOWARD ASIA
As for Azerbaijan: prior to the Russia–Ukraine war, any changes in the South Caucasus were practically impossible without Moscow’s approval. But since 2022, the situation has changed. Azerbaijan realized that, to carry out operations in the region, it only needs the approval of its long-time ally — Turkey.
All of this points to the fact that Russia, having lost its political resources in the region, is no longer capable of resisting Azerbaijan’s expansionist policy. It should be emphasized that the Russian opposition never aimed to defend Armenia’s interests. The main objective has always been Moscow’s own interest. For decades, Russian policy in the South Caucasus operated on a kind of double ultimatum principle: when Russia needed something from Azerbaijan, it relied on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and used Armenia; and vice versa — when it wanted concessions from Armenia, it supported Azerbaijan. This policy, though not ideal, functioned until the 44-day war in 2020.
After the war, at first glance, the results may have seemed favorable for Russia: Moscow was able to deploy its armed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, a retrospective view shows that this outcome, along with Azerbaijan’s growing role, was not fully aligned with Russia’s regional interests. Prior to the war, Russia could maintain balance in the region without direct military presence. After the war, it lost that instrument of influence.
The disruption of the military and political balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan has effectively deprived Russia of an important lever of influence in the region. Azerbaijan’s success in Artsakh — with direct Turkish involvement — opens new opportunities for Ankara to gradually implement its long-standing pan-Turkic strategy. At the same time, Turkey’s preliminary policy in this direction has turned it into the most important hub on the transit route of energy resources from fraternal Azerbaijan to Europe.
Amid the crisis in Russia–EU relations, Turkey is also eyeing a breakthrough toward Asia for exporting strategic resources from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan via Azerbaijan and its territory into Europe, bypassing Russia.
Russia and Iran should have clung with all their might to Armenian Artsakh and Syunik. In Iran, they’ve already realized this.
