The storm of military and political processes engulfing Eastern Europe has forced many countries, once part of the pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact bloc, to awaken from a prolonged slumber. The new challenges that have become an undeniable reality of this era leave no room for ambiguity in interpreting events—in the current circumstances, preparation for an impending war has become a necessity.
Hopes in the once unified and powerful force of the North Atlantic Alliance have turned into echoes of past decades; the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the disjointed, ineffective military aid provided to Ukraine have underscored the need to rely solely on one’s own strength. This principle applies especially to smaller countries, which are the most vulnerable to aggression and the least valued by their allies.
A notable example of transformation in military-political thinking during this new, harsh era is Bulgaria. A small country, formerly part of the socialist bloc, Bulgaria demonstrates remarkable pragmatism, flexible thinking, and rational aggression in its approach to modernizing its armed forces. Clearly, Bulgaria is concerned not only with enhancing its military capabilities but also with preparing for war.
A NEW STRATEGY
In October 2023, an expert group led by Bulgaria’s Minister of Defense, Todor Tagarev, unveiled the new National Defense Strategy of the Republic to the public. The document is significant for its central thesis: Russia is identified as the primary adversary and the main security threat, an unshakable fact regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine.
Since 1991, when the Cold War officially ended, national military strategies have often been vague collections of debatable considerations. Explicitly identifying potential enemies was considered inappropriate, as the prevailing belief was that the era of wars and conflicts had ended.
However, a lack of specificity in military strategy translates into an inability to optimize efforts to strengthen defense capabilities.
“As a Black Sea nation, Bulgaria is deeply concerned about Russia’s military capabilities and aggressive policies in the region, the militarization of Crimea, and the war developments in Ukraine. Bulgaria believes that Black Sea security can only be achieved through NATO’s collective efforts with active EU participation, and we must contribute actively… You must understand that, with the radical change in the strategic environment, Bulgaria becomes an easy target for systematic Russian hybrid aggression. The Kremlin will exploit every opportunity to provoke our country and undermine our civilizational order,” said Bulgaria’s Minister of Defense, Todor Tagarev, in “Perspectives on Adapting Defense Policy to the Challenges of the New Geostrategic Environment.”
It is evident that the military institutions in Sofia aim to formulate a direct and highly pragmatic military strategy that allows for the most rational allocation of resources and capabilities for a small and relatively poor country. This approach is supported by a clearly defined zone of Bulgaria’s military interest—the Black Sea basin.
These considerations shape Bulgaria’s current military development process. Without a land border with Russia, potential conflicts would likely unfold in two domains—maritime and aerial—precisely where the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is focusing its efforts.
MODERNIZATION OF THE AIR COMPONENT
The expansion of Russian air bases and the construction of missile arsenals in the Black Sea began almost immediately after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. This obvious threat prompted the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense to actively seek ways to strengthen its air operation capabilities.
As a comprehensive solution to the challenges it faces, Sofia decided to renew and re-equip its aviation arsenal with modern multirole fighter-bombers. Given that Bulgaria’s potential theater of war has already been defined as the Black Sea, the country’s primary military assets consisted of land-based anti-aircraft missile systems and coastal anti-ship missile systems. This Soviet-era weaponry represented significantly outdated equipment with extremely limited capabilities, and their replacement would entail substantial costs that Bulgaria’s defense budget could not bear.
An alternative (as previously mentioned, comprehensive) was found in tactical aviation. Modern aircraft are more than capable of defending airspace and attacking enemy ships with air-launched guided weapons.
As a result, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense acquired F-16 Block 70 fighters—initially limited to just eight units. However, after the onset of the large-scale conflict in Ukraine in 2022, the contract with Lockheed Martin was expanded to 16 combat aircraft, plus two F-16D models for training and combat.
The most interesting (and perhaps most important) part of the modernization of the Bulgarian Air Force was the extensive reconstruction of the country’s central airbase—Graf Ignatievo. This project is not just technical; it is closely linked to the deepening cooperation between Bulgaria and NATO structures, carrying a clear political and military subtext. Bulgaria is actively cooperating with the United States, and the reconstruction of the Graf Ignatievo base is overseen, coordinated, and executed by U.S. military contractors and the U.S. Air Force. This is no coincidence—Washington aims to expand its operational capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank, building a network of airbases in the region for rapid deployment and support of several hundred fighter-bomber aircraft, if necessary.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Another significant aspect of Bulgaria’s increased military potential stems from lessons learned in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The high efficiency and low cost of various types of drones have made them highly desirable weapons, capable of bolstering the arsenals of small and relatively poor nations.
The aerial strikes conducted by Ukrainians on infrastructure in Russia demonstrated how challenging it is for Russian forces to intercept kamikaze drones (essentially inexpensive cruise missiles). Unsurprisingly, this type of weapon caught Bulgaria’s interest—its official adversary is Moscow, and Russia’s Black Sea region is filled with strategically important ports and industrial infrastructure.
The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense has funded several domestic defense companies that have introduced intriguing projects, including kamikaze drones and aerial reconnaissance devices. For instance, the company Samel-90 developed the SAMJET unmanned aerial vehicle, similar to the well-known Iranian Shahed-136 drone, with comparable characteristics and capabilities. Drones of this type can easily target Crimea and beyond, such as Novorossiysk or Taman, and could theoretically paralyze Russian maritime trade (e.g., by destroying oil terminals).
Bulgaria is also making significant efforts to produce its own reconnaissance drones. According to reports, these drones are designed to enhance the reconnaissance capabilities of the country’s ground forces and to monitor coastal waters more effectively. A limited number of domestically produced Bulgarian drones have already been used to search for naval mines and guide naval divers to them for demining operations.
EXPANSION OF NAVAL CAPABILITIES
As a coastal state, Bulgaria is also striving to build its military capacity in this domain. Within the framework of developing its navy, two new MMPV patrol ships have been ordered, produced in cooperation between the Bulgarian shipbuilder MTG-Dolphin PLC and the German company NVL Group. These ships are not designed solely for patrolling but are also equipped for naval combat, featuring Swedish Saab RBS15 Mk 3 anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare systems. They are expected to enter service in 2025 and 2026.
The most significant development, however, is the conversion of a Project 770 medium landing ship into a minelayer at the Terem-KRZ naval arsenal in Varna. It is likely that another ship of the same type will undergo a similar transformation. Mine-laying represents a practical choice for a country with limited resources that is actively rearming—it is clear that Sofia is adopting NATO practices seen in the Baltic region, planning to use naval mines in the event of conflict with Russia. Given the significant reduction in the capabilities of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet over the past 2.5 years, it is evident that mine-laying operations would primarily target Russian commercial ports. Since 1991, Moscow has lost significant anti-mine capabilities and may lack an adequate response to such measures.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Bulgaria serves as an example of a country preparing for potential military conflict in a rational and focused manner. Bulgarian military authorities have carefully assessed their capabilities and resources, correctly prioritizing the development of their armed forces. Sofia aims to be a NATO member that is not militarily dependent, relying not only on the Alliance’s support but also strengthening its own forces. This approach provides Bulgaria with both defensive capacity and the ability to conduct offensive actions using cost-effective, asymmetric methods such as naval mines and kamikaze drones.
Moreover, learning from Ukraine’s harsh lesson of lacking domestic military-industrial resources, the Bulgarian government is working to localize weapons production within its own territory.
The decisions and logic of Bulgaria’s military-political circles certainly deserve closer examination. This material serves merely as an introduction, intended to highlight Sofia’s systematic approach to building its armed forces.
