The 11th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States, held in the capital of Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of November, brought together leaders from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Organization of Turkic States, previously known as the Turkic Council, is an international organization composed of independent Turkic countries working together to strengthen mutual relations. The members include Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, while Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status. In such meetings, the West, not without reason, perceives the threat posed by Islamism and neo-Ottomanism.
INSTRUMENT AND GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS
When the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) held its Congress on May 20, 2018, at the Olympic Hall Zetra in Sarajevo, attended by and with the participation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the “neighborhood” of this unstable colony known as Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the West, was overwhelmed with political and cultural discomfort. The eight-hour “Congress of Neo-Ottomanism” held in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina came as no surprise to those well-versed in the policies of the Turkish president and his Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Since coming to power in 2002, Erdoğan and his party have pursued a policy closest to the meaning of the word “neo-Ottomanism,” which emerged several decades before the AKP took control of Turkey. Until then, this doctrine had been unable to become a dominant political and foreign policy direction.
FROM KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM
Since the end of World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the rise to power of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey was governed by Kemalism, which involved building a modern, secular society and renouncing former traditions and Ottoman policies. Turkey’s primary goal after World War II was aligning with various European integrations, particularly the European Union. Any attempt to strengthen Islamism within society was effectively suppressed through military interventions and coups.
However, over time, disappointed by the slow progress in European integrations, Turkey began exploring other options, including new economic-political alignments like BRICS. While foreign policy aspirations underwent some adjustments, Bosnia and Herzegovina never lost its significance in terms of Turkey’s geopolitical—Islamic and neo-Ottoman—ambitions.
RADICAL MOVES
Although Turkey’s foreign policy began to shift in the early 1990s, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the collapse of the Soviet Union spurred Ankara to act more aggressively, accelerate processes, and strengthen its influence in both the Balkans and predominantly Muslim Caucasian and Central Asian states.
It is essential to recall Turkey’s foreign policy at that time, embodied by President Süleyman Demirel, the only foreign head of state to attend the funeral of Franjo Tuđman, with whom he had worked during his lifetime to foster reconciliation between Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demirel believed in protecting Bosnian Muslims but not at the expense of the interests of other peoples living in the region.
After the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, Turkey’s policy gradually radicalized. Initially, Erdoğan’s focus was solely on economic and social reforms. Once he stabilized Turkey’s economy, he consolidated his power by taking more radical steps, including changes in foreign policy and the gradual introduction of Islamism into Turkish society.
THE OTTOMAN AND ISLAMIC BALKANS
Over time, the Ottoman Empire began to enter public discourse, with Erdoğan identifying it as a positive model for Turkey to aspire to. Similar sentiments were echoed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the intellectual architect of neo-Ottomanism and former foreign minister. In his book Strategic Depth: The International Position of Turkey, Davutoğlu elaborates on how Bosniaks and Albanians should become the foundation of Turkey’s policy in the region, while also mentioning Croatia, which he assigned to an external circle of interest.
A statement made by Davutoğlu in 2009 was met with sharp criticism from parts of the Croatian public as well as from many Serbs. The controversial remark was:
“We want a new Balkan region based on political values, economic interdependence, cooperation, and cultural harmony. This was the Ottoman Balkans. We will revive this Balkans… The Ottoman centuries in the Balkans are a success story, and now it’s time to bring that story back.”
LEADER OF ALL MUSLIMS?
Erdoğan’s messages following the 2014 elections are still remembered, particularly when he declared that his victory was celebrated in Sarajevo, Beirut, Gaza, Skopje, Beirut, and Kabul. Mentioning Kabul in this context revealed that, beyond neo-Ottomanism, Erdoğan and Turkey were assuming the role of the leader of all Muslims globally.
Turkey’s strong influence in the Balkans is also evident through the establishment of a branch of the Anadolu Agency, various financial sponsorships by TIKA agencies, the activities of the IHH (Insani Yardım Vakfı) foundation, and promises to build factories and highways between Sarajevo and Belgrade. Erdoğan has not stopped at expanding influence in areas that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire but has also extended his reach to Turks in the diaspora, such as those in Germany and Austria.
The growing influence, combined with the policies Erdoğan pursued domestically after the failed military coup, led to increasingly tense relations with Germany and the rest of Europe. Not even the migrant agreement eased these relations.
ROLE IN THE ARAB SPRING
Turkey’s rise was also visible in the Middle East, particularly in regions formerly under Ottoman rule. Among Muslim states, Turkey once had the closest relations with Israel. However, the relationship was permanently damaged after the Gaza flotilla incident, Erdoğan’s clash with Shimon Peres at Davos, and especially after Israel’s brutal destruction of Gaza, killing civilians, women, and children.
Turkey also intervened in the wars in Iraq and Syria and supported uprisings against secular, pan-Arab socialists in the infamous hybrid operation known as the Arab Spring. However, after the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, Turkey was left “empty-handed,” as its favorites no longer managed to gain or retain power in the Arab world. Consequently, Erdoğan’s policy partially pivoted toward the Russian sphere, risking strained relations with Moscow.
This approach to foreign policy faced significant criticism from the Turkish opposition and parts of the public. Kemalist policy traditionally avoided conflicts in the Middle East to prevent such disputes from spilling into Turkey. After all, Turkey had its own battles in Cyprus and against the Kurds within its borders and certainly didn’t need new conflicts.
EXPANSIONIST IDENTITY
Erdoğan’s blend of Islamism and neo-Ottomanism represents not merely a shift in foreign policy but also an attempt to construct a new cultural identity based on former religious and political traditions. Western media have reported on how Turkey uses soap operas (!) to build influence, constructs grand presidential palaces, and revives Ottoman-era memories through staff uniforms on Turkish Airlines.
One method of influence among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina was producing a TV series about Alija Izetbegović, commissioned by the state broadcaster TRT.
FROM SOAP OPERAS TO POLITICS
During Erdoğan’s tenure, historical epics were produced, including films and series about Mehmed the Conqueror and his conquest of Constantinople, as well as Suleiman the Magnificent. Erdoğan even criticized the producers of the popular series Suleiman the Magnificent for not portraying him in the “right light.” Erdoğan often refers to his supporters as descendants of the Ottomans but never renounces Atatürk, whom many Turks still regard as the “Father of the Turks.”
However, Erdoğan did not stop at cultural projects. This is evidenced by the symbolic map of the “Turkish world,” presented to him by his coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
The map shows that territories of countries where Turkish is spoken, where there is a Turkish population, as well as parts of eastern Russia with a majority Muslim population, are placed “under Turkey.” Although the photo was published on social media after the meeting, Erdoğan and Bahçeli did not give statements to the media nor comment on the case of the map.
A NOTABLE GIFT
The gift didn´t go unnoticed in Russia, with which Turkey has long had a balancing act in relations. According to Bahçeli’s map, the “Turkish world” includes parts of southern Russia, eastern Siberia, the Balkans, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and parts of Mongolia and Iran.
The Nationalist Movement Party, from which the gift giver originates, is an extreme right-wing, ultra-nationalist, and euroskeptic political party in Turkey. This party holds 48 seats in the Turkish parliament out of a total of 600 and is a partner in the ruling coalition led by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party. The party, whose program is based on nationalism with Islam at its core, was once considered a neo-fascist political option.
In 2020, Bahçeli actively advocated for the reintroduction of the death penalty, which was abolished in 2004, and the party leadership at the time stated that they believed the death penalty should be imposed in cases of child sexual abuse, crimes against sexual integrity, and violent attempts to overthrow the constitutional order.
What connected Erdoğan and Bahçeli was their shared policy of expanding Turkey’s influence, as illustrated by the message behind the gift and the revival of the neo-Ottomanism concept, which had been proposed as significant years earlier by former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.
HOW DID KOSOVO BECOME PART OF TURKEY?
The idea primarily referred to Turkey’s influence and expansion into Islamic countries, modeled after the Ottoman Empire and Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent’s conquests during the 16th century. The ideology of neo-Ottomanism is followed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose neo-Ottoman rhetoric is reflected in a statement he made in October 2013, in Prizren:
“Do not forget that Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo,” which caused disruptions in communication with Belgrade.
Erdoğan’s adherence to this policy was also noted by former diplomat and prominent Belgrade intellectual Darko Tanasković, who quoted Israeli political scientist Ephraim Inbar, stating:
“Turkey actively operates in all Muslim countries, striving for a leadership role. It seeks to solidify its influence in Balkan countries that were once under Ottoman rule.”
It is also no secret that Erdoğan supports a pro-Islamic concept, which he demonstrated by converting Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque.
MORE THAN JUST AN IDEA
Recently, a summit of the Council for Cooperation of Turkic-Speaking States was held in Istanbul, where the name was changed to the Organization of Turkic States, and the Turkish World 2040 Vision was adopted.
Erdoğan’s ambitions, however, go beyond these concepts. The truth is that he has never been interested in a purely cultural Turkophone alliance (stretching from Thrace to East Turkestan) because it is not about culture but the Ottoman Empire. The German press simply calls it “neo-Ottomanism,” stating that “it is no longer merely a conceptual construct by which Turkey, as the remnant of the Ottoman Empire, seeks to alleviate the trauma of losing significance.”
